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ABSTRACT
POST-ELECTORAL CONSULTING
POLITICAL CONSULTING AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
MAY, 2001
DOUGLAS A. LATHROP, B.A., THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
M.A., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jerome Mileur
As political consultants become more prominent figures in congressional campaigns, they
are simultaneously expanding their sphere of influence into the policy-making realm. No
longer relegated to the limited confines of candidate-campaigns, many consultants remain
principal advisors to politicians once in office. In addition, consultants are insinuating
themselves into the legislative process by managing single-issue, grassroots movements
on behalf of trade associations, corporations and advocacy groups in an effort to affect
legislation as it moves through Congress. The flowering of a post-electoral consulting is
due, in part, to the advent of the “permanent campaign.” Major policy initiatives have
taken on the trappings of campaigns as politicians and interest groups court the public for
support. Blurring the distinction between campaigning and governing places a premium
on the specialized knowledge consultants possess in fields such as polling, mass
marketing, and media relations. Post-electoral consulting raises important questions
about the efficacy of applying campaign tactics in a governing context, the nature of
political discourse in a mass media polity, and about the role of unelected figures in a
representative democracy.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL CONSULTANTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Introduction
Part of the genius of the American electoral system is its elasticity. The manner
by which we select our public officials has managed to persist, despite vast shifts in
social attitudes, enormous population growth, and monumental technological
innovations. A citizen from the 1 8th century may be surprised to see women, blacks and
young people at the polls, but he would recognize the electoral process. Yet the way we
conduct elections m the twentieth century bears scant resemblance to the rustic, early
days of the republic or, for that matter, even to the Jeffersonian party democracy of the
nineteenth century. It can be safely said, without digressing into the history of American
elections, that campaign methods have transcended the stump speech and the ward heeler.
The modern era, owing partly to the rise of candidate self-selection and a
communications revolution spurred by television, demands a dizzying array of technical
wizards and political svengalis to manage an exceedingly complex and costly campaign.
Although campaign advisors have existed in American politics since the 1700s,
the twentieth century has witnessed the professionalization of campaign advising under
the rubric of political consulting.* Political consultants, loosely defined, are men and
women with whom candidates contract for a fee to provide expertise on topics ranging
from the aesthetic to the substantive; from physical appearance and demeanor to policy
issues. They are readily distinguishable from other paid campaign workers since they
usually work for more than one client during an election and lack an intimate, personal
connection to the candidate (a more rigorous definition will be provided later in the
discussion). Independent consultants cooperate occasionally with political party leaders,
but operate for the most part independently of the national party apparatus, though their
party affiliation and especially their ideology often influences who their clients are.
Consultants have no common pedigree, fixed training or standard accreditation, and
though many claim governmental and political experience, a significant number do not.
Business marketing, academia, and journalism are among the diverse fields that have
produced successful political consultants. This eclectic background may be attributed to
the relative immaturity of the profession. As recently as the 1970s there were fewer than
40 people who considered themselves full-time political consultants nationwide.^ Despite
their currency and a dearth of empirical evidence, politicians and party leaders place
stock m consultants' abilities and believe that they have had a profound impact on
campaigning and the electoral process in general.
As political consultants become more prominent in the American electoral
process, they are simultaneously expanding their sphere of influence into the policy-
making realm. No longer relegated to the limited scope of the campaign, many
consultants remain principal advisors to the politician once in office. The flowering of a
post-electoral relationship between public officials and consultants is due in large part to
the advent of the “permanent campaign.”' Major policy initiatives take on the trappings
of a campaign as politicians court the public for support. Blurring the distinction between
campaigning and governing places a premium on the specialized knowledge consultants
possess in fields such as polling, mass marketing, and media relations. Beginning with
the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 and his elevation of campaign pollster Pat Caddell
to full-time political advisor, consultants have held prominent, if often unofficial,
positions in the executive branch. Successive occupants of the White House have
embraced and expanded upon this practice. In the early 1990s this trend migrated to the
legislative branch where consultants employed their technical and communication skills
to help clients wage policy battles in Congress.
Before speculating on the effects consultants may have on the policy making
process, a clear definition of what constitutes post-electoral consulting is needed. There
are two essential components to post-electoral consulting, one dealing with the actors
involved and the other with the techniques they use. A consultant involved with policy
2
making is somewhere between the official staff and an ad hoc counselor solicited by
political leaders. They are paid for their services like official staff, but perform outside
the conventional organizational loop.^ To clarify my research mission and avoid
confusion about who is considered a consultant, I have limited my analysis to those
individuals who maintain an independent client base made up of several paying
customers. A personal confidant or trusted civic figure who bends the ear of a politician,
even if the advice is sought on a regular basis, is not a consultant for two reasons: they
do not earn a living as political advisors, and they are not in the regular employ of other
political actors (this includes other politicians and interest groups).’ The other aspect of
post-electoral consulting is the incorporation of campaign methods into governing as, for
example, the public relations blitz that paralleled the health care reform effort in 1993-
1994 and the hard sell of the Contract with America by Republican consultants illustrate.
Polling expertise, marketing skills, and the ability to sell a public policy to the general
populace are as valuable after the election as they are during the campaign. In sum, post-
electoral consulting is defined by the professionalization of the agents and the application
of their trade to governing.
The growing presence of political consultants in the legislative process begs the
question, what does it mean for American politics? Several important concerns are raised
by post-electoral consulting. First, pursuing public, campaign-oriented strategies makes
it more difficult for elected officials to negotiate in good faith. Given the institutional
rivalry between the White House and Congress, exacerbated for years by persistent
partisan division, creating legislation acceptable to both branches is a trying endeavor.
The addition of consultants to the legislative process has altered the relationship between
the executive and legislative branches by sharpening those divisions. Consultants are
often accused of debasing the electoral process by encouraging candidates to recite
market-tested phrases and creating a false sense of melodrama through overwrought
appeals. They bring the same theatrics to governing, inflating rhetoric and making it
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harder for politicians to compromise. Second, political consultants, as private citizens
crafting public policy appear to escape accountability. The crux of a democratic society
is the degree to which citizens control their elected representatives through frequent,
regularly scheduled elections. Although a consultant's client is ultimately liable for
policy decisions, consultants themselves are beyond the reach of electoral retribution.
Third, despite their technical proficiency, many of the specialized skills consultants offer
are overestimated and their role in helping shape legislation is dubious.
The unrelenting drive to sustain a positive public image and disseminate policy
arguments to the general public has led the President and Members of Congress to call
upon political consultants. Yet, their introduction into the legislative process has
potentially harmful consequences for executive/legislative relations.' The nature of a
campaign is fundamentally different from governing: campaigns have endings resulting
in a final victor; governing is an ongoing process without a clear-cut winner. Thus,
successful campaign methods, such as negative advertising, are ill suited to governing,
which requires a modicum of comity and reciprocity among the participants. Consultants
are not responsible for feelings of hostility between the two parties, nor are consultants
liable for personal traits such as stubbornness and arrogance that make cooperation
difficult. However, as the 1994 health care reform and the Contract with America
demonstrate, while consultants may not create animosity, their modus opercmdi can
amplify it.
A serious eoncern for any political observer is the nebulous position consultants
occupy in the policy process. Consultants, by advising politicians on the content and
direction of public policy are in essence quasi-public officials, are beyond the scope of
democratic accountability. Political consultants, for example, are not regulated by the
financial disclosure provisions, income restrictions, and ethics rules that elected officials
and their staff must follow. The relationship between the professional consultant and a
politician is more nuanced than a simplistic rendering of the politician as the puppet and
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the consultant as the puppet master and, despite the source of the idea, the elected official
remains answerable to his constituents. But consultants, using their technical skill and
political expertise, wield considerable influence over public policy and yet thrive outside
the reach of public oversight. Concern about democratic accountability is also the focal
point of criticism from interest group scholars who argue that political consultants further
tip the balance of political power in favor of the wealthy.’ In the latest policy battle over
prescription drugs, for example, consultants hired hy pharmaceutical manufacters
launched a multi-million dollar advertising and direct mail campaign to forestall
legislation at the state and federal level that would have imposed price controls on drugs.
Consumer advocates, as well as neutral observers, claim that this campaign was
instrumental m slowing legislative progress despite continued popular support for some
measure of government intervention.*
For political elites, a policy battle is often reduced to how the conflict is
understood by the general public, with each side attempting to frame the debate to its own
advantage. Consultants, by virtue of their command over communication media and
mastery of polling techniques, are an integral participant in the effort to stimulate, mold,
and channel public opinion. Political science is replete with arguments about the merits
and deficiencies of the practical application of social science. I do not wish to add to
them by engaging in an ad nauseam discussion regarding the intrinsic value and
normative implications of polling and focus groups for American politics. My concern is
not polling and focus groups per se, but their use by consultants to shape policy and
coordinate public campaigns.
Many critics contend that polls are at best an uncertain snapshot of the public
mood at a point in time and are often self-serving, misleading, and inaccurate. Moreover,
even well crafted polls can obscure public sentiment rather than illuminate it. The
Clinton health care reform effort provides a telling example. Throughout the debate
public ambivalence was the rule, with a vast majority expressing satisfaction with their
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own health care but simultaneously declaring a nationwide health care crisis.’
Consultants can cloud the polling results by “spinning” and skewing data to reOect
certain policy preferences. Although a consultant who presents a client with a rosy
scenario may be accused of professional dishonesty, the consequences for the policy
maker who utilizes a questionabie poll are more severe. During the 1995 budget
confrontation with President Clinton, members of the House Republican majority were
bolstered by poll ratings indicating that the public supported their uncompromising
position. But Republican consultants who conducted the polls were later accused of
presenting a sanitized version of the results that produced an inaccurate portrait of the
public mood.'” Meanwhile, President Clinton, under the influence of consultant Dick
Moms, was accused by members of his own party of abandoning traditional Democratic
concerns in a cynical bid to capture Republican issues.
Despite its malleable nature, public opinion polling has a valid scientific
foundation. The same cannot be said for focus groups, a popular complement to polling
among the consulting profession. The focus group, a small non-random sample of
citizens, provides qualitative depth lacking in a poll and can reveal the primal emotions
that animate public sentiment. Focus groups are a useful way to gain beneficial insight
from ordinary people, but they are unscientific and can lead to dubious assumptions about
public opinion. Consultants who generalize results to the greater population and base
policy recommendations on focus groups are essentially reading tea leaves. The
prevalence of focus groups is not inherently dangerous, provided the limitations of the
methodology are acknowledged by the consumers. The danger is over reliance and
misappropriation of the data.
Other techniques used to stimulate public support for an issue, such as direct
mail and media advertising, can obscure and corrupt public sentiment as much as reveal
it. One of the common invectives hurled at consultants is that they manipulate voter
emotions and cater to the basest instincts of the electorate." Some cynical consultants, in
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their more candid moments, confess that they do not respect many of their political
clients nor do they hold the voters in high esteem. Their disdain for the public is
motivated by the belief that voters tend to ignore rational arguments, responding instead
to visceral emotional appeals. Rather than elevated debate on the merits of the issues,
consultants encourage their clients to speak in the coarse language of demagoguery. As
Paul Corcoran points out, contemporary political discussion requires “the virtual
abandonment of sustained argument in favor of one sentence paragraphs, bold emotional
assertions, and cliches.”'^ Critics contend consultant methods foster ambiguity and the
politics of symbolism through euphemism, metaphor, and puffery.'’ Through media
advertising and direct mail, consultants can reach out and energize a significant number
of citizens. Contrived grassroots activity (what is mockingly referred to as “astroturf
campaigning”) is an increasingly popular tactic engaged by interest groups seeking to
influence legislation as it moves through Congress. These so-called outside strategies are
rapidly becoming just as important as conventional Washington lobbying. But a
partnership between political consultants and interest groups to mobilize an army of
grassroots supporters presents a warped vision of constituent pressure and calls into
question the authenticity of contact between the voter and the legislator.
The concerns outlined previously should not be misinterpreted as a broad
indictment of the consulting profession. In my study I will endeavor to avoid the
mistakes of earlier authors, who readily blamed consultants for a variety of problems
based on their proximity, and will seek to evaluate consultants without malice
aforethought. There are plenty of bad things to say about consultants and many are well
deserved, but consultants, it should be remembered, are servants of their political masters.
Even in their most rarefied state they are not the architects of public policy. Their role in
the legislative process, while it should be examined carefully, should not be treated
casually as a corruption of the system without firm evidence.
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Literature Review
The political consulting literature is a patchwork ofjournalistic exposes, insider
chronicles and isolated academic treatises. According to James Thurber part of the
reason that the literature is so sparse and varied is due to the confusion over “what
subfield houses the study of political consulting: elections and voting behavior; political
parties; political communication; political advertising; or campaign management.” To
make matter worse much of the work is atheoretical, consisting of “insider accounts and
how to books.”'^ The diversity can be viewed in a beneficial light, since a wide
assortment of commentators should lead to a rich variety of insights. Journalism brings a
dynamic perspective and enriches academic understanding by presenting accessible
examples of political issues. Journalists are not bound by the conventions of social
science and thus possess a greater interpretive range. A nimble writer can often tie
disparate events together and make an extremely compelling and engaging argument.
But journalistic reliance on narrative, anecdote and vignette to support sweeping
generalizations may cast doubt on the substance of their conclusions. Fortunately, the
empirical void left by journalists can be filled by political science. What political science
lacks in breadth and rhetorical flourish it makes up for in depth and prosaic exactness.
Good political science moves beyond description and strives to explain the causes and the
effects of a phenomenon through careful analysis and a theoretical foundation. Ideally,
the two styles complement each other, providing a holistic picture of the subject.
Regrettably, much of the journalistic and academic writing about political consulting is
compromised by a normative bias toward the profession.
A review of the scholarly writings discloses more polemical indictments than
sober evaluations. Some academics seem to approach political consulting with a
disconcerting antipathy, resulting in value-laden conclusions exaggerating the negative
aspects of the profession. Consultants are blamed for, among other things, hastening the
collapse of the party system and fostering the banality of campaign rhetoric. Their
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prox,m,ty to a number of systemic problems has encouraged a guilt by association effect.
Larry Sabato contends “political consultants...have innicted severe damage upon the
party system and maslermindecH'ne modern triumph of personality cults over party
pohtics m the United States”'* (italies mine). W. Lanee Bennett states “the dependence
of candidates on marketing consultants has blown open the gap between politieians and
the last vestiges of ideologieally coherent, disciplined, broadly representative party
organizations.”'* Throughout the literature authors characterize consultants as a problem
within the democratic system. The negative image is reinforced by magazine and
newspaper articles that strenuously condemn professional political consultants." The
most critical works also invest consultants with an enormous, some would say
unwarranted, amount of power over campaigns and candidates. Consultants have not
done themselves any favors with their penchant for self aggrandizement and alarming
disdain for political idealism.
Political consultants need to be held accountable and should be examined
critically. Some recent articles raise important questions about the nature of the
profession and their role in a democratic society.'* Unfortunately, too many authors
begin with an a priori assumption that political consultants are bad. Although it may be
gratifying to blame consultants for failures in our political system, it is not especially
informative. Some authors compound their initial misconception by using caricatures to
describe other political actors. In order to elevate consultants to “kingmaker” status,
voters and politicians must be reduced in kind. It is fairly common to stumble upon
descriptions of the politician writ large as venal, self-serving, cipher waiting to be told
what to say by his consultant. Voters are characterized as an ignorant, passive mass that
is easily duped by clever campaign tricks.
Despite the evident shortcomings, there are several influential treatments of
political consulting. The works can be divided roughly into four categories: academic
writings prior to 1980; academic writings after 1980; journalistic exposes written by
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practitioners or reporters; and closely related writings stemming from work done in the
field of political communication. This division is not based on methodology, but rather
on stylistic similarities exhibited by the authors in each grouping. Scholars in political
communication, for instance, share a eommon lexicon and employ standard terms to
describe the behavior of political consultants and the effect they have on the democratic
process. Academic writings prior to 1980 tend to be more descriptive than those
appearing over the last two decades. Finally, journalistic accounts distinguish themselves
with a here-and-now, insiders perspective.
Early Works
The first significant work to address the development of political consulting is
Stanley Kelley Jr.'s Professional Public Relations and Political Power. The book
contains an in depth analysis of five cases in which the author believes public relations
played a critical role.'^ When Kelley wrote in 1956, the party system in the United States
and the electoral process in general were in a transitional period. The bossism and
autocratic party machines that typified the politics of the latter 19th and early 20th
century were in decline, yet “candidate centered” campaigns were still two decades from
becoming the dominant paradigm. Parties were still the most important unifying force in
electoral politics, but the regional power brokers who dominated elections in the past
were losing their influence. As the bosses faded into the background, a new generation of
campaign operatives skilled in the ways of mass communication and marketing emerged
as the driving force behind campaigns.
Kelley claims that the first truly professional political consulting firm was
founded in California in 1935 by Clem Whitaker and Leona Baxter. Whitaker, a former
political reporter, and Baxter, a corporate publicist, understood the nascent power of new
communications technology and were pioneers in mass media campaigning. In their first
major statewide race Whitaker and Baxter used movie shorts and mass mailings to defeat
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populist gubernatorial candidate Upton Sinclair. Their professionalism and staunch
independence from political party hierarchy was a harbinger for things to come.'«
The successful presidential campaign conducted by Dwight Eisenhower
exemplifies a transformation of American electoral politics. His campaign was the first
to incorporate Madison Avenue style advertising effectively and devise a strategy based
on the insights of business marketing.^’ Although presidential candidates since Herbert
Hoover solicited advice from the business community (Thomas Dewey even employed a
advertising agency in his unsuccessful 1948 presidential bid), the Eisenhower campaign
transcended these earlier examples by the sheer magnitude of its involvement. According
to Kelley, during the 1952 Eisenhower campaign public relations became an irreplaceable
tool. A sharp ad campaign allows campaigners to present a vibrant, vigorous image even
if the candidate is lackluster. Eisenhower was never considered an especially energetic or
forceful campaigner, but his wooden demeanor was cosmetically suppressed by a team of
public relations specialists. Their role was not limited to aesthetic presentation. Public
relations men were instrumental in shaping Eisenhower campaign themes targeted to the
undecided or disaffected voter.
Kelley saw a natural affinity between modem campaigning and professional
public relations. Beginning at the turn of the century, when industrialists created the
demand for public relations in order to counter an increasingly negative public image,
public relations always had a latent political dimension. Drawing upon earlier
observations made by Edward Bemays, the acknowledged father of public relations,
Kelley believed the marriage of politics and public relations was a logical and inevitable
outcome. Cultivating and maintaining a positive public image is just as important, if not
more so, for political leaders as it is for corporations.^^
Despite its vintage. Professional Public Relations and Political Power remains a
crucial work in the political consulting field. Kelley was the first academic to identify the
public relations “man” (a forerunner to today's political consultant) as an autonomous
actor in the political system. He described a person independent of the party hierarchy
and, who, unlike a candidate’s personal confidants obtains his position through
professional expertise. Kelley’s eontemporary relevance is reflected in the actions he
describes in his case studies which retain useful insights for current scholars. Strategies
developed by 1950’s public relations experts - mobilizing publie sentiment, defining the
terms of a political debate, and manipulating statisties - are familiar to today’s political
consultants and suggest a remarkable continuity within the profession.
Although his work lacks the transparent hostility toward political consulting that
animates future scholarly writings, Kelley approaches the subject with wary skepticism.
Due to the close connection most public relations men have with big business, Kelley
expresses grave concern for the future in which electoral politics is shaped by corporate
culture and dominated by their communications techniques. Kelley’s trepidation is
reinforced by the case studies he selected that reveal a strong conservative bent to public
relations activities. Kelley contends public relations men in the service of elite interests
can circumvent the will of the majority. His argument gives the publie relations man too
much credit, but Kelley’s writings in 1956 are an uncannily accurate description of the
contemporary situation:
At present the activities of PR men impinge on the political process in a
variety of ways. He helps clients adopt policies designed to earn public
confidence and insure against government interference. He stages
propaganda campaigns so that legislators will find it easier, or more
difficult, to pass particular laws. ..He manages campaigns for pressure
groups desirous of putting initiative and referendum measures into the
codes of public law.^^
Despite Kelley’s valid eoncems, he is unwilling to demonize the profession.
Unlike later writers, he does not characterize public relations men as the arch enemies of
political parties. Some readers may find his tepid speculations are a poor substitute for a
clear argument, but Kelley’s reticence to come to steadfast conclusions is understandable
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given the novelty of the phenomenon he was describing. His book is a superb descriptive
account and he wisely left judgments to a future generation of scholars.
Fourteen years after Stanley Kelley Jr. published his groundbreaking analysis of
professional campaign operatives, Dan Nimmo, a political communications scholar,
revisited the topic in The Political Persuaders. He claims that in the intervening period,
political consulting was transformed from a amateur past time into a full-fledged cottage
industry. The expansion and maturity of the profession allowed Nimmo to write with
more confidence. Whereas Kelley explored political consulting cautiously and demurred
from bold statements, Nimmo exhibits none of Kelley's timidity and does not shy away
from provocative statements. In Nimmo’s estimation, political consultants wielding
social science and unbridled technological power are a serious threat to the sanctity of
participatory democracy. Under the auspices of professional campaigners “elections are
approached neither as conflicts between parties nor as confrontations of principle. They
are viewed instead as contests of personalities and, even more basically, they offer a
choice between sophisticated engineers working on behalf of those personalities.”^^ In
other words, political consultants devalue the meaning of elections, a problem Nimmo
associates with the palpable gimmickry practiced by candidates under the guidance of
professional campaign figures. Nimmo's writing is insightful, but he takes a dim view of
the tactics employed by political consultants and introduces a pessimistic tone that
permeates the literature henceforth.
Nimmo is troubled by the declining influence of political parties as the principal
organizing force behind campaign activity. In the 1970's personality-driven, candidate
centered campaigns became the norm to the dismay of many political observers. Parties
provided consistency and order to the electoral process. More importantly, they provided
“honest” cues to voters in contrast to the cynically contrived images developed by
consultants. Nimmo clearly prefers the old style campaigning to the new style, which he
characterizes throughout his book as impersonal, insubstantial and deceptive. Nimmo
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should not be chastised for lamenting the diminished stature of political parties, but the
extent to which his romanticized vision of the past unfairly colors his perceptions of the
current state of affairs must be noted. He is, for example, the first author to use the
loaded term “mercenary” to describe political consultants. Although Nimmo does not
blame consultants for political parties diminished stature (for him the relationship
between party decline and consultant rise is correlational) his arguments lay the
foundation for future scholars to imply a causal connection.
Nimmo's apprehension is not solely based upon stylistic changes brought on by
political consultants. The crux of his argument rests on the reasonable assumption that
we live in a mediated political society, whereby information is transmitted and filtered to
the mass electorate through a host of interlocutors rather than directly from the politician.
Nimmo contends, “instead of direct, spontaneous, personal contact between candidates
and voters, we find professional management firms, pollsters and communications
specialists mediating between political leaders and followers.”^’ In the mediated world,
those who possess sophisticated communication skills (i.e. political consultants) have
disproportionate influence over the electoral process. Nimmo's concern is genuine and
understandable. Entrepreneurial consultants who enjoy great influence over the electoral
process can pose a threat. It does not take a pessimist to envision a scenario in which the
voters are duped by a slick public relations campaign. However, Nimmo falls short in his
argument because he fails to present evidence to support his assertions. None of the
examples cited in his book reveal malevolent intent on the part of consultants or outright
dishonesty during a campaign. Furthermore, Nimmo ignores the likely possibility that
voters determine the issues and consultants generally react to their preferences.
Consultants bear the brunt ofNimmo's pointed criticism, but his broadsides are
not exclusively aimed at the industry. In fact, consultants appear to be a symptom of the
real danger to democracy: technology. Lodged within the subtext of The Political
Persuaders is a critique of rampant abuse of technology in campaigns. Nimmo is no
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Luddite, yet he is a, great pains to illustrate the potential hazards created by television and
other innovations. It seems incongruous that a communications scholar would express
reservations about advancements in commun,cations technology, but given Nimmo's
suspicion of elite bias it is consistent with his earlier arguments. Like campaign
specialists who peddle their expertise, the new technology will be employed by those
who can afford the cost. Although Nimmo does not go so far as to claim technology will
be used by the wealthy minority to oppress the majority, he assumes the obvious
beneficiaries will be individuals with vast financial resources.^*
In terms of content and analysis, The Political Persuaders is an improvement
from Kelley’s work. Nimmo presents a more theoretical argument pertaining to the
effects that consultants have on the electoral process. Consultants, he argues, are one of
several variables in a mediated polity. Nimmo identifies a number of mitigating factors
such as party affiliation, social preconceptions, and media saturation as barriers to
“professionally mediated campaigns.” In order to motivate voters, consultants must
suppress unfavorable factors and assimilate favorable factors. Although Nimmo grants
consultants a broad range of powers, his argument confines their influence within a
predetermined context. In other words, consultants cannot change the nature of the
voting population, but they can stimulate voters and manipulate their natural tendencies.
Nimmo also broadened the discussion of professional campaign operatives. Whereas
Kelley limited his discussion to professional ad men, Nimmo included pollsters and other
technical specialists.
David Rosenbloom was the first scholar to connect a change in the tempo of the
electoral process with the professionalization of the campaign corps. Until the 1960s,
Rosenbloom argues, campaigns had a predictable cyclical rhythm, typified by long
periods of inactivity and short periods of frenetic action. But as campaigns became a
business enterprise complete with their own professional class, the campaign cycle
shortened and the lulls between elections disappeared.^^ The perpetual election wheel is a
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familiar phenomenon to congressional scholars and House members where the two year
term lends an air of urgency to every member's efforts.” In the 1980s, scholars noticed a
similar trend in presidential politics. Rosenbloom is careful not to attribute the alteration
solely to political consultants. Changes in fundraising laws and the advent of the open
primary system are also responsible for the unceasing campaign, but he rightly suggests
that consultants are the only people who have profited from the new system and have a
clear financial stake in maintaining it.
Rosenbloom's 1973 book contributes to the study of political consultants and is an
early survey of the practitioners. Kelley, and to a lesser extent Nimmo, conducted
interviews with several full-time campaign operatives, yet neither author attempted to
gam a sweeping view of the profession from them. Rosenbloom surveyed over fifty
firms and received detailed responses from almost all of them. The survey results
allowed Rosenbloom to look inside an evolving profession. Unfortunately, Rosenbloom’s
analysis is one-dimensional. Given the richness of his data, it is extremely disappointing
that his portrayal of consultants flirts with caricature. He describes consultants as
competitive political junkies who thrive on the energy of the campaign, committed to
their profession but indifferent to post-electoral policy consequences. The campaign is
analogous to a high stakes sporting contest where victory is the singular goal. “The
professional pollsters and campaign planners,” he argues, “do not care about the
substance of the issues or about what the people really think.”^’ His characterization is
not wrong, it is simply incomplete and does not account for other motivating factors such
as ideology. Stanley Kelley s case study of the California firm Campaigns Inc. revealed
ideology to be a very important part of their decision to take on new clients. Profit may
be a primary incentive, but it is erroneous to claim it is the only impulse. Ultimately
Rosenbloom, like Nimmo, affirms the notion of the consultant as a single-minded
profiteer, a political mercenary in the service of the highest bidder. He maintains “the
people who run professional campaign management firms are professional politicians
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who have set up companies ,o enjoy the action of politics, get rich, gain political and
organizational independence and to bask in the warm light of professional recognition
and respect.’
By the time Rosenbloom wrote his book in 1973, a number of political
consultants had achieved celebrity status. Men like Joe Napolitan, Matt Reese, David
Garth and Roger Ailes were the focus of magazine articles and newspapers stories,
crediting them with electing their clients. High profile consultants, exhibiting a knack for
self-promotion, used the new found attention to expand their client base. Through media
exposure consultants earned a reputation for being bombastic and for having a high
regard of themselves. Many consultants were equally outspoken in Rosenbloom's survey.
Their candid comments about voters, politicians, and democracy are jolting, especially to
someone who cherishes the nobility of democratic participation.^^ As a group,
consultants appear cynical, narcissistic, and arrogant. Therefore, it comes as no surprise
that Rosenbloom fears their negative traits will poison the electoral process.
In his concluding chapter, Rosenbloom offers his own interpretation of the
negative impact professional campaign consultants will have on American democracy.
Rosenbloom, echoing a refrain that guided the Founders, believes consultants violate the
principles of democratic accountability. He points out, “today many of the crucial
decisions of elections - who shall run and what they say - are decided not by the people
or even by their organizational leaders, but by small groups of professional managers and
money men. Who is to check the professional campaign managers?”^^ His concern is
laudable, but it is a weak argument since it speciously distinguishes political consultants
from other “unaccountable” figures such as party bosses and non-professional
fundraisers. His second worry is more compelling. He argues that the consultants
overriding commitment to profit will inculcate a myopic view of public policy. Under
the guidance of political consultants, unglamorous policy proposals will be abandoned in
favor of pithy phrases and promises of instant gratification.
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Recent Works
The dark view of political consulting reached its apogee in Larry Sabato's book.
The Rise ofPolitical Consultants. Since Kelley first wrote in 1956, the authors
examining political consulting have grown progressively more negative. The basis for
the animus is threefold. First, consultants cultivated a public image that inspired loathing
among serious political scholars. Their cavalier approach to the linchpin of democracy
and their tendency to mock the sanctity of elections offended many political scientists.'^
Secondly, consultants were rightly blamed for cultivating the commercialized campaign
system. High priced, glitzy, yet vacuous campaigns were seen as the trademark of the
political consultant. Lastly, by 1981 their virtual conquest of the electoral process
seemed to be a foregone conclusion and with their dominance came renewed calls for
some sort of regulation. Consultants were no longer operating on the periphery and had
become central figures in campaigns. Sabato expresses ambivalence in his book. He
approaches consultants with a mixture of grudging admiration for the way they have
exploited their environment and barely concealed contempt for their methods.
The Rise ofPolitical Consultants is an important book for a number of reasons.
Foremost, Sabato is the first author to offer an operational definition of political
consulting. He presents a concise, yet expansive definition of a political consultant as “a
campaign professional who is engaged primarily in the provision of advice and services
(such as polling, media creation and production, direct mail fundraising) to candidates,
their campaigns, and other political committees.”'^ To this point, scholars had used terms
like “professional campaign operatives” or “political public relations men”.
Unfortunately, these terms are not always synonymous and can lead to misunderstandings
when they are used interchangeably. Is a pollster, for instance, considered a consultant?
What about a person who provides strategic advice on a part-time basis or a person who
volunteers his services? Sabato's definition introduces a reasonable standard and helps
resolve some confusion when discussing consultants as a group. Sabato's other
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noteworthy contribution is a massive compilation of primary research including
interviews with high profile consultants, a lengthy list of historical examples, and a
thorough description of the craft. He is particularly effective dissecting the profession
and explains every facet, from the solicitation of clients to the application of techniques,
with great detail.” Sabato’s description is a service to scholars and lay observers alike
since It dispels the aura of mystery surrounding political consultants. As Sabato points
out, there is no magic formula for winning an election.
The Rise ofPolitical Consultants is divided into two parts; the first half describes
the consultant and “his wares” and the second half attempts to asses political consulting
m the democratic process. In the latter portion of the book, Sabato displays an
unfortunate tendency to infuse reasonable claims with shrill invective. He raises
thoughtful questions, for example, about the proliferation of public opinion polls, which
he argues should not be embraced as an accurate reflection of public sentiment due to
methodological inconsistencies and their vulnerability to manipulation. Yet, he follows
this cautious warning with an inflammatory, unsubstantiated claim:
The American mania about polls in itself is somewhat worrying,
suggesting some sort of societal insecurity that encourages almost daily
temperature and blood pressure readings via surveys. The most disturbing
aspect, though, is the tendency of public opinion polling generally, and
campaign polling in particular, to reinforce a potential incumbent
officeholder s role as a constituency delegate while weakening his role as
governmental trustee.^*
On occasion, Sabato seems enveloped by the hype and brazen self-promotion practiced
by political consultants, as when he accepts without qualification or empirical evidence
the assertion that consultants have become “preselectors in the nominating process,
encouraging and dissuading candidacies often with the mere announcements of their
choices of clients in a race.”^^
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Although consultants are the main focus of Sabato's jeremiad, there are a number
of ancillary issues that concern him. The video culture and the press must shoulder some
blame for the debasement of electoral politics. Television, Sabato argues, is a font of
deception and ehicanery. His argument is filled with familiar indictments such as
television's role in the triumph of image politics and its culpability for the shortened
attention span of the average citizen. Sabato's quixotic attack on television is
understandable given his contempt for negative advertising and sound-bite politics, but he
assigns too much blame to an inert medium. Despite Sabato's legitimate concerns,
television is not an inherently malignant force in American politics. Sabato unfortunately
conflates his argument against the misuse of television with television itself Moreover,
if his description of the video culture is accurate, it presents an unflattering reflection of
the voting populace. Is he suggesting that we are all mindless zombies waiting to be
duped by clever advertising? Sabato leaves his strongest criticism for journalists whom
he believes have abetted consultants in a variety of ways. He questions the cozy
relationship some reporters develop with political consultants. In their zeal to obtain
good copy some reporters have inadvertently allowed themselves to become mouthpieces
for the candidate they are covering. He also takes them to task for enabling political
consultants to build up a mythology about their effectiveness. Reporters should be held
accountable, Sabato maintains, for “not publicizing the shockingly unethical practices
that are so pervasive in the consulting profession.'*^’ Their inaction has made them
complicit in the rise of political consulting.
Sabato concurs with Adlai Stevenson who once said “the idea you can
merchandise candidates for high office like breakfast cereal is the ultimate indignity to
the democratic process.”^' Sabato's main proposition, briefly put, is as follows:
consultants, whatever else they do, insult the integrity of the democratic process.
Although he is careful not to present a causal link between political consultants and the
series of problems with the electoral system that he identifies in his book, his tone implies
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something else. His desire to cast political consultants as a the villain in a political drama
creates a confusing set of contradictions. In one hreath he absolves political consultants
of blame for the declining significance of parties in elections, but in the next sentence he
claims “they have helped grease the slippery poll down which the parties have slid.”"
Sabato's book is comprehensive, but it is compromised by the hostility that animates the
author.
Not every author embraces the prevailing characterization of political consultants
as soulless profiteers and political mercenaries. Frank Luntz, who would gain notoriety
as the principal consultant behind the Contract with America, brings a new perspective to
the subject m his book, Candidates, Consultants and Campaigns. In a refreshing change,
Luntz does not evince the same distaste for consultants that inspired some previous
authors. Luntz may not present a superior analysis of the profession, since he sidesteps
thorny issues such as the inflating costs of campaigns and the persistence of disingenuous
advertising, but he distinguishes himself from the chorus by making several notable
claims. First, he disputes the notion that technology is a threat to democracy. On the
contrary, he believes that technological advancements ultimately benefit democracy by
leading to a more informed electorate. Second, Luntz does not hold consultants
responsible for new campaign styles. Instead he blames the campaign legislation of the
1970s for indenturing candidates to campaign professionals. Lastly, Luntz dispels a
popular myth that consultants ignore ideology when considering clients. Earlier works
portrayed consultants as single-minded entrepreneurs, indifferent to a candidate's views.
Most of the previous commentators would agree with Luntz's assertion that
“modem campaign technology has changed - completely and forever - the traditional
style of campaigning once common in American politics.”^^ Where they diverge from
Luntz is in their assessment of the change. Several authors were at pains to point out the
hazards posed by new technology and how it could be appropriated by those with means
to dominate the mass electorate. Luntz, on the other hand, prefers to look on the bright
21
side of innovation. He maintains “modem campaign technology exposes candidates to
the electorate and renders office holders accountable to their constituents.”" The
exponential expansion of news outlets, gavel to gavel coverage of House and Senate
proceedings, and satellite communications enable people to leam a tremendous amount
about their elected representatives. Perhaps the quality of the information is in question,
but there can be no debate about the quantity. Luntz's cheery optimism may strike the
reader as naive, yet it serves as valuable counterbalance to the anti-technology positions
Staked out by earlier authors.
Political consultants have been censured by journalists and political scientists for
corrupting the electoral process and for cultivating an environment where money and
imagery trump substance and integrity. Luntz makes a subtle, persuasive argument that
the real culprits are the well-intentioned reformers of the 1970s. Campaign laws that did
away with big contributions did not eliminate the need for money nor control campaign
costs. Thus, candidates were forced to spend more time raising money, especially after
limitations on campaign expenditures were struck down by the Supreme Court."^ Luntz
argues, candidates, unless independently wealthy, had no choice but to turn to direct
mail consultants and other fundraising specialists for the then primitive - but nevertheless
proven - technology needed to raise the significant sums required to replace the now
illegal large donations.”^^ Political consultants certainly took advantage of the situation,
but they had no hand in creating it.
Since Dan Nimmo described political consultants as mercenaries a popular image
of them as rogue operatives searching for the easy dollar has persisted. Without question,
most political consultants aspire to earn large fees, but Luntz presents evidence that profit
can take a back seat to ideological concerns. Luntz's survey indicated that 50 percent of
the consultants considered ideology a highly important factor in their decision to take on
a client and only 21 percent considered it not important at all, the remaining 29 percent
claimed that it was important. The survey results cannot single-handedly transform the
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image of the profession/’ However, it does call into question the characterization of the
consultant as a hired gun, indifferent to political consequences. It appears consultants
want people m office with whom they agree on the issues. In that limited sense, they are
no different from party workers or other politically active individuals.
In retrospect some of what Luntz says can be viewed as self-serving. I le went on
to become an influential political consultant in his own right and his favorable analysis
may be, in part, a manifestation of his desire to join their ranks. His fascination with
demographic information and the specially tailored voter outreach practiced by direct
mail consultants is a case in point where his own analysis clearly influenced his
professional behavior. In his book he describes the advantages of using survey research
to determine which issues and phrases are most important to voters and which ones
candidates should avoid. As a consultant, Luntz earned a reputation in Republican circles
for his creative use of focus groups and polls to craft messages and phrases that resonate
with voters.” Despite Luntz's benign, occasionally fawning, approach to political
consulting, his book is an important work because it presents a different perspective and
challenges the consensual assumption that consultants are a malevolent force in American
politics.
To date the most empirically grounded study dealing with political consulting is
Stephen Medvic's Ph.D. thesis, Is There a Spin Doctor in the House?^^ His contributions
to the literature are twofold. First, he offers a novel explanation of consultant behavior
and its relationship to voters and candidates that challenges the prevailing understanding
of consultants as manipulators. Medvic also provides strong empirical evidence
demonstrating the value of a consultant to a successful congressional campaign. Some
critics suggest that his work simply reiterates commonly held assumptions, but Medvic
establishes an empirical basis. Prior to his work, no one really knew whether consultants
were instrumental or whether their reputation as king makers was the result of savvy self-
promotion and candidate fear.
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The cornerstone of Medvic's work is the theory of “deliberate priming.”
Deliberate priming posits consultants, as experts m political communication, are
singularly capable of stimulating voters. The stimulation occurs through the intentional
use of symbols that trigger a reaction in the targeted set of voters. The difficulty, Medvic
maintains, lies m determining the precise issues, since only a small number ever raise
wide interest among the voting populace. At first glance, this appears to be a
conventional interpretation of political consultant activity; consultants manipulating
voters through clever communication techniques. In actuality, Medvic refutes this
representation, arguing that voters drive the campaign agendas and that consultants
merely react to voters’ wishes. Far from being manipulators, the consultant is a translator
who takes cues from the voters and uses them to create a sound campaign strategy for the
client. Medvic's argument is important and persuasive because it elevates the public's
role m elections. Moreover, it presents a reasonable description of political consulting
that IS not freighted with claims of fraud, voter manipulation and the like.
Medvic's other major contribution is empirical. Using data from the 1992 House
races, Medvic charts the number of candidates who hired consultants, the money they
spent, and their success rate relative to candidates who did not employ consultants. After
controlling for variables such as campaign spending, district partisanship, and
presidential election year, Medvic discovered several statistically significant
relationships. Although consultants did not appear to affect voter turnout, there is
evidence of a positive relationship between consultant use and a candidate's chance of
winning, their ability to raise funds, and the overall cost of the campaign. For the first
time there is solid evidence that consultants can make a difference in a campaign.
Medvic's research design is innovative and his observations are astute, but in his
conclusion he makes it clear there is a lot more research to be done. Echoing a familiar
cry, Medvic makes a plea for more investigation and claims his work should be viewed as
“something of a springboard into further exploration.”^®
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Medvic’s plea for more substantial research by politieal scientists has been
answered in recent years. In 1999 and 2000, two edited compilations were published that
addressed political consulting and the maturation of the permanent campaign
phenomenon. The first, Campaign Warriors, edited by James Thurber of American
University, is a landmark survey of the consulting profession." With funding from the
Pew Charitable Trust, Thurber and his collaborators were able to render an accurate
portrait of the profession based on exhaustive primary research. In addition, the book
contains a number of essays that challenge conventional stereotypes of political
consulting. Robin Kolodny of Temple University, for example, debunks the myth of the
political consultant as an anti-party mercenary. She argues impressively that many
political consultants were trained by the national party organizations and retain strong ties
with them. The second book. The Permanent Campaign and Its Future, is the first
scholarly analysis of the permanent campaign.^^ Since Sidney Blumenthal coined the
term in the early 1980s (roughly, the idea that everyday governing has taken on the
trappings and tempo normally associated with a political campaign), journalists and
political scientists have bandied it about without a clear understanding of its meaning or
its implications for governing. In the book, a number of eminent political scientists such
as Hugh Heclo, Morris Fiorina, and Charles O. Jones address the permanent campaign
and its impact on political institutions. Each book is an important step forward in the
study of political consulting.
Political Communication
In an earlier passage I mentioned political consulting is an eclectic profession.
Not only are the specialties diverse - ranging from public opinion polling to television
advertising - but the backgrounds of the practitioners are equally varied, as advertising
executives, journalists and political scientists are all represented in the upper echelons of
the profession. For that reason, it seems appropriate that the academic field that has
produced a major portion of the scholarly material devoted to political consulting is one
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has been described by its adherents as “self-consciously cross disciplinary.””
Scholars specializing in political communication draw upon sociology, psychology, and
journalism as well as communications and political science in their quest to interpret
political discourse. Traversing disciplinary boundaries is understandable considering the
key areas of interest include rhetorical and propaganda analysis, vote studies, political
learning, news media, communications technology, campaigns and elections, polling,
marketing, and advertising.^'*
In terms of its contribution to the study of political consultants, political
communication provides a basis for understanding how they have emerged to become
powerful figures in our political system. Consultants, and most politicians, intuitively
understand the importance of setting the terms of a debate. They know that the party that
successfully defines an issue has a distinct advantage over its adversaries. This is best
illustrated by rhetorical gamesmanship emanating from the Congress at the outset of a
major policy initiative. Republicans, for example, want the public to know that they are
trying to save Medicare for future generations, while the Democrats counter that the
Republicans want to cut benefits to the elderly to allow a tax cut for the wealthy. In this
respect, the technical details of the competing proposals are irrelevant. The crucial matter
is owning the terms of debate and successfully casting yourself as the public's advocate,
while simultaneously portraying your opponent as its enemy. Robert Denton and Gary
Woodward summarize the nature of political communication as follows;
On most political questions (i.e. questions analyzing choices with
competing advantages to different constituencies) the Truth (sic) is not
easily located. This is because politics is not primarily about truth telling,
but consensus seeking. Political conflict typically concerns itself with
decisions implying values or preferences rather than determinations of
fact, even though there may indeed, be relevant facts that should inform
our political debate. The bulk of most practical discourse is centered on
mobilization of public opinion: a process that involves fact finding but
frequently denies a superior point of view.”
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According to this logic, political reality is subjective and, like physical beauty, in the eye
of the beholder. In this arena, those who possess the greatest persuasive skills and the
most sophisticated means to express their message are dominant aetors. Political
consultants, whether they specialize in direct mail or television advertising, not only
shape the context of debate they provide the vocabulary. As the interpreters and
amplifiers of the messages, they serve as a bridge between the politician and the general
public. In a mediated political world, the person who creates the policy message is just as
important as the person who crafts the policy.
Political communications scholars are intimately familiar with the value of
symbolic interaction between public leaders and the general populace. Candidates on the
stump and leaders in times of crisis often deliver speeches laden with symbolic imagery
as a means of unifying and inspiring the audience, or to convey complex abstractions.
Although politicians throughout American history have used evocative metaphors, some
critics contend modern leaders exploit national symbols, delivering them to the public as
palaver and a substitute for honest public policy. According to Murray Edelman, a
pioneer in the political communication field, a new leadership strategy emerged in
American politics after World War II that encouraged inauthenticity. The new strategy is
embodied by leaders such as Ronald Reagan. Reagan was notorious for his excessive
reliance on symbolism and was often criticized for cynically appropriating revered
images such as the Statue of Liberty and the flag to advocate his conservative philosophy.
Some authors linked the increased use of political symbolism to the campaign techniques
practiced by political consultants.'" These authors decried the artful use of imagery
encouraged by consultants during campaigns because they tend to crowd out “real
issues. In essence, the antagonism toward political consultants stems from an idealistic
vision of campaigns. Campaigns should present voters with reasonable and well-
articulated, programmatic policy choices, not vacuous, image-laden slogans.
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The subtle migration of consumer marketing techniques to the political campaign
has given political communications scholars another opportunity to evaluate political
consultants. While some authors are simply concerned with presenting “practical
procedures for identifying effective strategies based upon marketing principles and
techniques, others are concerned with the normative implications. The arguments
posed against marketing are familiar variations of those against symbolic politics; that
marketing begets fakery and superficiality. The attitude is summed up by Nicholas
O Shaughnessy who states that, “the art of politics becomes an exercise in the judicious
manipulation of symbols to which task the pseudo-science of marketing lends its
nefarious lore.”” Most authors, however, do not believe marketing is inherently
“nefarious.” Gary Mauser argues that marketing suffers from an academic bias against
realpolitik stating, “political marketing, like Machiavelli, is reviled, not because it is evil,
but because it dares to analyze publicly what many political leaders prefer to discuss in
private.”*” One scholar goes so far as to suggest that “it is possible that despite the self-
serving nature of political advertising, it makes a positive contribution to the civic
education” by providing heuristic shortcuts for voters.*' In short, marketing only
becomes harmful in the hands of amoral political consultants who use it without
conscience.
References to political consulting within political communications literature
disclose a reoccurring theme. According to this line of reasoning, the citizenry, by and
large, are an undifferentiated mass who are easily duped by pleasing, yet insubstantial,
narratives and political consultants are corrupt, or at least morally indifferent, profiteers
who dole out the propaganda. This section is not the proper forum to discuss if these
assumptions are valid and constructive, but it is important to note that the assumptions
inform subsequent observations about consultant behavior. In this sense, political
consulting has been tarnished by critieisms that precede rather than follow sound
analysis. I should be clear that I am not aecusing political communications scholars of
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deliberately castigating political consulting, yet it seems many of them have opted for the
easy way and linked consultants to a number of supposed problems in American polities
(elite bias, voter apathy, etc.) with scant empirical evidence. Writers who parrot this
theme without reflection are, to paraphrase Kenneth Burke, contributing more to our
gratification than to our enlightenment.
.lournalistic Works
A review of the political consulting literature would be incomplete without
mentioning two important journalistic works, Sidney Blumenthal's The Permanent
Campaign and David Chagall's The New Kingmakers
N
Published in 1 980 and 1 98
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respectively, both books use presidential campaigns as the backdrop for their analysis of
political consulting. According to the authors, the Nixon, Carter and Reagan campaigns
are edifying snapshots of the evolutionary change in electoral politics. Like time lapse
photography of a growing flower, the campaigns show the incipient, middle, and mature
stages of the consultant phenomenon. Blumenthal and Chagall distinguish themselves
from the academics who preceded them by abandoning the stilted, detached vocabulary
used by social scientists in favor of the brash, often vulgar, language used by political
consultants. They want to tell the story in the words of the people who created it.
Neither work presents a “theory” of consultant activity or endeavors to go beyond vague,
general observations about their effect on the political process. Nevertheless, the books
make a significant contribution due to the penetrating and colorful depictions of industry
leaders. The vivid portraits found in each book reveal a complex culture shaped by
elitism and cynicism; by capitalist impulses and ideological loyalty; and by technical
acumen and sharp political instincts.
Although not written as a series, the books bear a striking resemblance and
complement each other well. Aside from the obvious parallels drawn from the writing
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styles and interview subjects, a subtle yet palpable undercurrent guides both works. Each
author is captivated by the success of Ronald Reagan and their reflections about the
influence of political consultants is, in part, derived from the lessons of the Reagan
revolution. Reagan, as a politician and public leader, represented a crowning
achievement for political consulting. More than any other politieian before him, Reagan
embodied the triumph of image over substanee. He was smooth, amiable and possessed
an effortless charm in front of a camera. Most importantly, owing to his career as an
aetor, he was eminently coachable and took direetion well. However, his critics
contended behind this genial facade was a vacant mind. His fiercest opponents claimed
his policies revealed a shallow, obtuse reactionary with a muted sense of compassion and
a warped vision of reality. The Reagan ambivalence - the jovial grandfather figure who
cuts social programs for the poor - is a source of frustration and fascination for both
Blumenthal and Chagall." Some of Reagan's uncanny ability to distance himself
personally from unpopular political actions is attributed to his charisma and intuitive
understanding of his audience. But Blumenthal and Chagall correctly point out the
imperative role played by political consultants. The Reagan team was an efficient,
effective PR machine that deflected blame for failures and ably took credit for successes.
In Blumenthal's estimation, Reagan demonstrated “that success does not depend upon
accomplishment, but on the projection of image and ideology.
The image Chagall and Blumenthal paint of political consultants is harsh and
uncompromising. The interviews they conducted show leading industry figures as self
confident bordering on arrogant. Some consultants believe they have rightfully taken
over for the party and function as unofficial gatekeepers; discouraging “unworthy”
candidates and assisting talented ones. Pat Caddell, President Carter's former pollster and
political advisor, is typical. Without a trace of guile, Caddell told Blumenthal
“consultants really are serving as preselectors of the candidates, we decide who is best
able to use the technology, who understands the technology.”^^ Given their lucrative
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trade and impressive success rates, a degree of over eonfidence can be excused.
However, other interviews reveal a disturbing disdain for the sanctity of the democratic
process. Consultant Hal Evry's comments to David Chagall have the bracing effect of a
bucket of eold water and go a long way toward explaining the antipathy many academics
el toward the profession. Evry, who makes a comfortable living by electing candidates
stated ‘Tve never voted in my life. And I never intend to vote. It doesn't make any
difference to the system who gets elected. The society runs its own way, with or without
politicians.”^ This level of cynicism is disturbing coming from an average citizen, but it
is especially jarring coming from a professional political operative. Evry's indifference to
political outcomes is hard to reconcile with his career choiee unless one embraces the
conception of the consultant as a mercenary.
The Permanent Campaign and The New Kingmakers are not ground breaking
works. By that I mean they do not present an innovative argument about political
consulting. However, the books succeed in a more significant fashion by bringing the
topic to a broader audience. Their writing style is accessible and easy for the average
citizen to comprehend, yet it is perceptive enough to interest a more sophisticated reader.
Blumenthal, Chagall, and other journalists who write about consultants, cast light on the
profession and introduced the American public to a character type. Celebrity consultants
- like James Carville, Ed Rollins, and Dick Morris - owe their exalted status, in part, to
intrepid journalists who brought them out from behind the scenes.
In the 1 990s political consultants have become pop culture icons. James Carville
and his wife Mary Matalin pitch cotton sheets and antacid tablets on television and Dick
Morris is a regular guest on the syndicated radio show, Imus in the Morning. In many
campaigns consultants are more well known than their clients. But the greatest indication
that political consultants have become part of the Zeitgeist is the development of a
Hollywood stereotype. Beginning with The Candidate in 1972, political consultants have
been represented in movies as amoral, cynical puppet masters who manipulate the
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political process Bob Robens, Tim Robbins biting account of a fict.onal
Pennsylvania senatorial race, consultants are depicted as either buffoons or nefarious
crooks. In Po«er, the political consultant portrayed by Richard Gere is a ruthless,
egomanical mercenary bereft of a moral compass. Even in more benign roles, such as
Kathy Bates character in Rnmory Colors, the political consultant is presented with a
shifting sense of morality. All of these characters make for good drama, but they reflect a
distorted image and unfortunately reinforce the negative characterizations that appear in
the literature.
Organization of the Dissertation
In 1989 Mark Petracca offered several explanations why political science had
overlooked political consulting. The silence, he argued, is attributable to a number of
factors:
First, compared with voters, PACs or interest groups, consultants are far
more difficult to study. There are no readily available data sources to
either identify consultants or document their activities. Second, the
considerable variation in what it means to “consult” and in the activities of
professional consultants makes it difficult to identify the essence of
consulting.^*
The gap was a source of frustration to scholars as Stephen Medvic noted:
Missing from political science journals are both quantitative and
qualitative analyses of political consulting (or, for that matter, any
reference to consulting at all). Furthermore, even the few books that have
been written on the subject lack a theoretical foundation with which to
explain the role of political consultants in American campaigns.
Fen years later it appears this shortcoming is being rectified, albeit slowly. A growing
number books and articles are using primary interviews and the rich data provided by
mandatory FEC reports to explore political consulting. The new works are tackling
important questions such as the relationship of consultants with the political parties, their
responsibility for escalating campaign costs, and their role in initiative drives and
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rcterendums. A larger bibliography wUl probably solve ihe other maior problen, with the
lt.era.ure: the prevalent bias against the political consulting profession. As nrore
scholars analyse political consulting, a wider speetrun, of opinion is likely to emerge, b.,t
one notable blind spot still remains. Most of the literature dealing with political
consultants, whether impressionistic or empirical, limits the analysis to campaigns. I. is a
reasonable parameter since the campaign has been the consultants professional reason for
being. Consultants, however, do no. g„ into hibernation after the election; they d.t not
sever ties with successful clients, as some earlier works suggest. In fact, a growing
number of consultants remain closely involved with their clients in ofllee, providing
advice and plotting strategy. Elected officials are not the only figures in the policy
process who are using consultants. Interest groups are discovering the advantages of
grassroots lobbying to augment their usual Washington activities. Through consultants
wtth experience in political campaigns and mass communications, interest groups are able
to take their argunten.s directly to the voter in the hope that voters turn contact
their legislators on behalf of the interest group. As the profession continues to expand,
one area sorely in need of attention is the role eonsultants play with respect to the policy
process after the election.
I he focus of this study is on issues that arc qualitative in nature and not easily
reducible lor statistical analysis, d’his study, therefore, docs not purport to present a
theory” ol post-electoral consulting, meaning a procedure to predict future consultant
activity in governance based upon established, quantifiable criteria. Rather, it focuses on
a descriptive account of consultants emerging from the campaign to play an important
role in governing. Using several ease studies in combination with elite interviews, the
goal of this study is to demonstrate the changes wrought on the legislative process by
political eonsultants.
fhe study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides a brief history of
political consulting. Although some of the services political eonsultants perform have
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deep historical roots in Antertcan politic, a class of professionals devoted to providing
strategic campaign advice for a fee is a 20th century phenomenon. Their rise to
prominence has been abetted by a number of well-documented changes m our political
culture such as the declining significance of political parties, the concurrent rise in
candidate-centered campaigns, and the emergence of television as the dominant
communications medium. The second chapter also includes a detailed description of the
direct mail, mass media advertising, and polling techniques and strategies practiced by
political consultants.
Chapter 3 presents the first case study and illustrates the extent to which political
consultants are currently involved in the governing process. In many respects, the
Contract with America represents the culminating achievement of political consulting.
Consultants were enmeshed with the Contract from its creation to its transformation into
legislation. In terms of policy, the ten plank platform signed by 367 House Republican
candidates is a summary of conservative boilerplate - tax cuts, welfare reform, tort
reform, business incentives, etc. What made the Contract unique was the formidable
marketing and polling scheme buttressing the ideas. Although the objectives were
familiar, the language and themes were a synthesis of focus group information and public
opinion polling designed to provoke a positive public reaction.™ The election did not halt
the marketing juggernaut, m fact it picked up speed. Many of the consultants who were
instrumental m crafting the Contract remained active advisors to the new majority as they
shepherded the agenda through Congress.
In order to evaluate the impact of political consultants on the legislative process, a
baseline needs to be established. In chapter 4 the Medicare case study provides an
example of lawmaking before consultants became involved. It exemplifies the traditional
understanding of the legislative process typified by behind-the-scenes negotiations
between the White House and congressional leaders, relentless lobbying of legislators by
vested interests, and the horse trading that occurs between legislators. The fight to pass
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Med.care pitted President Lyndon Johnson and his numerous allies on Capitol Hill
agatnst powerful organized interests and conservative legislators who were skeptical of
Johnson's program. The American Medical Assoc.ation, which had twenty years cari.er
defeated Pres,dent Truman's health care initiative by presenting it as “socialized
medicine,” vociferously opposed Med.care. They were joined by a phalanx of drug and
msurance companies who feared a large government presence in the health care
industry.’' The political battle between the two camps was fierce, but it was waged
within the corridors of power and was not augmented with the consultant-led public
relations campaign characteristic of later conflicts.
Chapter 5 chronicles another ambitious attempt to reform the American health
care system. Unlike Johnson's proposal, however, the Clinton health care refo,m resulted
tn a humiliating defeat for the President and the congressional Democrats.” Aside from
the outcome, the Clinton proposal differed from Medicare by virtue of the massive media
and grassroots war coordinated by political consultants. During the year long effort,
America witnessed one of the most intense public policy campaigns in history. Hundreds
of millions of dollars were spent by supporters and opponents of the Clinton plan through
political consultants in an effort to stimulate, massage, and shape public opinion.” Given
the public ambivalence toward the state of American health care. President Clinton and
his supporters were convinced that they had to “sell” the proposal to the American
people. But the debate was defined by the opponents who successfully played upon
public fears of bureaucratic control and incompetence. Throughout 1994, anxious
legislators watched public support for the Clinton initiative evaporate.
Chapter 6 will assess the influence political consultants have had on the
legislative process by gauging the impressions of select individuals who are intimately
familiar with the events described in the case studies. Interviewees will be asked to
comment on the three questions presented at the outset of the study. First, what effect has
the introduction of public, campaign-oriented strategies had on the prospects for
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cooperation anrong elected off.eials? Second, do pol.tical consultants violate the
principles of democratic accountability? Finally, are their methods suitable for
governing?
The seventh and final chapter offers concluding remarks and speculation for the
future. Over the past thirty-five years the legislative process has become more
complicated. It would be irresponsible to claim this change is due simply to the
introduction of political consultants. Yet, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that
the multi-million dollar advertising campaigns, the direct-mail salvos, and the incessant
polling conducted by political consultants have managed to alter the nature of the
legislative process. Along with the conventional activities that mark the process -
committee hearings, negotiations between the White House and Congress, and interest
group lobbying
- public relations campaigns are a regular feature.
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL CONSULTING: HISTORY AND METHODS
Introduction
Behind-the-scenes political advisors have been fixtures in American elections
since the early days of the republic. In the 19th century, the national party system
provided an opportunity for savvy, reg.onal power brokers to influence elections from the
shadowy confines of political clubs. During the halcyon days of the party system
political bargains were made in legendimy
‘•smoke-filled rooms” by party bosses. The
party bosses were in effect the men who chose the candidates and supplied the
organizational talent and political know-how to get them elected. Although bossism
came to be embodied by the cigar-chomping characters of Tammany Hall, they were
actually a diverse lot. Martin Van Buren, for instance, the skillful tactician who ensured
the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, was a party builder and a man with his own
national ambitions.' Republican party activist, Mark Hanna, was a wealthy Ohio
financier who masterminded William McKinley's campaign for the White House.
Backroom advisors were so prominent in American politics that toward the end of the
1 9th century they became part of popular culture, exemplified by the satirist Thomas
Nast's famous caricature of the party boss as an unscrupulous, corpulent, money grubbing
fixer. These early party advisors performed many tasks that are familiar to modem day
political consultants, such as fundraising and campaign strategy. However, it would be
inaccurate and perhaps disingenuous to claim Martin Van Buren and Mark Hanna are the
forefathers of political consulting since it ignores a critical difference between political
consultants and 19th century party bosses. Their personal motives notwithstanding,
neither Van Buren nor Hanna considered campaign advising to be a vocation. The
campaign was always a means to an end, not the defining moment. Consultants, on the
other hand, are transfixed by the campaign and, even though a growing number remain in
close contact with clients after the election their post-electoral activities, are not
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mterested in party building. Consultants may perform an age old service, but they
fact a new breed of political actor.
are in
The powerful party stalwarts who dominated American elections in the 19th
century have disappeared and it seems political consultants have taken their place
Whether consultants are partly to blame for party decline, or whether consultants are
simply opportunists who took advantage of a decrepit system is a point of contention.
There is no question that industry pioneers had little use for party organizations and
despite a recent trend toward cooperation with party leaders, consultants still fiercely
guard their independence. But the historical record suggests that consultants owe their
preeminence to fortune as much as to their ambition. The meteoric rise of political
consultants from obscurity to notability is due to the confluence of several unrelated
political, social and technological developments. Assorted political reforms, intended to
“clean up” politics and give citizens greater influence, weakened political parties and
ushered in the era of the candidate-centered campaign. New laws opened a window for
entrepreneurial consultants as candidates replaced party regulars with freelance campaign
advisors. Consultants also benefited from the greater social and geographic mobility
enjoyed by average citizens. Fluid migration from state to state created large blocs of
voters with enervated ties to the community. Meanwhile, a permeable social strata
diminished traditional party loyalties among citizens. Lastly, technological advances in
communications, most notably the arrival of the television age, altered the venue of
political activity. Campaigns that are fought largely on the airwaves created a marked
demand for advisors with experience in the new media technology.
According to Dan Nimmo, modem political consultants are the direct descendants
of public relations specialists of the 1920s.^ The business discipline of public relations
was created out of a corporate necessity to rehabilitate a tarnished public image. Prior to
the turn of the century, dominant industrialists and financiers had little to fear from public
approbation since the government was unwilling to interfere with the free market. But in
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the early ,900s publ.c outrage, fed by a series of inflamnta.oty exposes recounting
predatory business practices, posed a threat to corporate power. With the emergence of
the Progressives as a political force willing to use the state to limit the excesses of
corporations, companies began to curry support from the general public as a means to
protect them from government intervention.’ Initially, public relations was intended as a
defensive strategy to counter unflattering newspaper reports, but it shortly became a
crucial offensive weapon as businesses sough, ,o enlarge markets for their products. By
the 1920s, public relations and mass marketing were an integral part of the corporate
culture.
It was not long before the public relations specialists who transformed conrorate
images gained the attention of politicians. Edward Bemays, a pioneer in modem publ.c
relations, was an early advocate of public relations in government service and he offered
his insights into public behavior, honed by selling Ivoo- soap and Lucky Strike cigarettes,
to President Calvin Coolidge.- In his books Crystallizing Public Opinion {mi) and The
Engineering ofPublic Consent{mS), Bemays outlined the practical necessity of
governmental public relations in a democratic society. He even went so far as to suggest
a cabinet level position for a PR expert. As the advertising profession matured into a full-
nedged industry, politicians tapped ad agencies for talent during presidential campaigns.
As recounted by Stanley Kelley Jr. in Professional Public Relations and Political Power,
the Eisenhower campaign relied heavily on marketing expertise provided by the New
York firm Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn (BBD&O). Subsequent campaigns by
Kennedy and Nixon also used professional ad agencies.’ By the early 1970s, however,
most commercial ad agencies abandoned overt political activity. Concerns about
profitability and competition from specialists such as political consultants convinced
marketing executives to quit campaigning.
Nimmo's political consultant family tree identifies the public relations man as the
patriarch, but in doing so he neglects another important branch - the academic ancestors.
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Polmcal consulting owes as much to social science as it does to business marketing.
Polutcal consultants have profited directly from the development of scientifically valid
pubhe opinion polling and benefited generally from the vast literature concerning voter
behavior and elections. Despite the overt hostil.ty exhibited between some scholars and
pohtrcal consultants, their relationship
,s more symb.ot.c than antagonistic. Consultants
prov.de topics and data to study and analyze, while academics supply consultants with
the theoretical foundation that guide their analysis of voter behav.or and public opinion.
The advent of reliable, scientifically sampled opinion polls in the 1930s was a
landmark event in the history of political consulting. Although it would be several
decades before commercial pollsters emerged as influential political figures in their own
right, polls quickly became ubiquitous features in campaigns. The value of in house
pollsters was clearly illustrated in the 1960s, when John F. Kennedy hired Lou Harris to
be his public opinion analyst for his presidential campaign. Harris wasted no time
proving his worth. Conventional political wisdom held that Kennedy, based on his
Catholicism and his guilded background, would do poorly in an impoverished.
overwhelmingly Protestant state like West Virginia. But Harris convincingly shattered
this presumption with polling data indicating Kennedy's message resonated with West
Virginia voters.* Kennedy won West Virginia and Harris silenced the skeptics. In later
presidencies, pollsters moved beyond providing strategic analysis and became intimate
political advisors. Pat Caddell was a member of Jimmy Carter’s inner circle and Richard
Wirthlin performed a similar function for Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, nearly every
influential politician retains the services of a pollster.
It should come as no surprise that the first full-fledged political consulting firm,
Campaigns Inc., would emerge in California. In many respects, the trends that shaped
California politics m the early 20th century presaged national events. California was
home to an anemic party system further debilitated by an atomized, highly mobile
electorate. Moreover, the vast size of the state encouraged candidates to explore new
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ways of reaching
.he veers. By the 1930s, rad.o ads and five minute movie shorts - the
precursors to television ads - were used in statewide campaigns. Ca,npaigns Inc was
founded by Cem Whitaker and Leona Baxter in the mid 1930s. Whitaker, a former
pohfieal reporter with the Vn^on, and Baxter, a corporate publicist, quickly
became
.mportan, figures in California politics. Their first major success was a 1933
campaign in support of a flood control and irrigation development project in northern
California. The plan was opposed by utility companies who believed i, posed a threat to
private power. Ou,spent by a 4 to 1 ratio, Whitaker and Baxter nevertheless prevailed
t hty companies by using clever radio and newspaper advertising In 1 934
Whitaker and Baxter confiimed their reputation as extraordinary political strategists by
assisting in the defeat of populist gubernatorial candidate, Upton Sinclair.’ From the
1930s to the late 1950s, Campaigns Inc. worked on dozens of statewide campaigns and
built an impressive winning record. Although, Whitaker and Baxter were conservative
and worked primarily for Republican candidates, the couple disdained the official party
apparatus. They made it clear they served candidates out of ideological sympathy and
financial interest, not out of a sense of partisan loyalty. According to Stephen Medvic,
“[they] radically broke from convention by not only controlling every aspect of a
campaign, but doing so without any reliance on parties whatsoever.”* Whitaker and
Baxter were also innovators in the technical aspects of campaigning. Their use of film
and later television ushered in a new era of media based campaigning. Whitaker and
Baxter were not simply perfecting the way campaigns were run, they were
revolutionizing the process.
In the decades following World War II, the circumstances that propelled
Campaigns Inc. to the heights of political power in California spread rapidly across the
nation. The profound transformation of the American electoral process can be attributed
to a variety of causes, but with regard to political consultants there are two fundamental
factors that transcend all others. First, the invention and proliferation of television.
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coupled with the inevitable develoDiTientP media-driven politics, created a demand for
mdividuals with experience with the new mediunr. Television, among all other 20,
h
century communications innovations, has arguably had the greatest impact on American
pohttcs. It transformed the way elections were conducted, it changed the way politicians
behaved, and, perhaps most importantly, it altered how voters viewed the pohtical
process.’ Second, the weakening of the party system - brought about by an institutional
shift away from party organizations and toward primary elections as the method for
choosing party nominees - encouraged entrepreneurial candidacies, what Martin
Wattenberg refers to as “the rise of candidate centered politics.- The entrance of novice
candidates was a boon to political consultants whose advice-for-hire business filled the
gap created by party absence.
For better or worse, television is inextricably tied to the political process.
Although it is often lampooned for, among other things, fostering a false sense of
melodrama and reducing politics to sound bites, television has succeeded in bringing an
abundance of political information to the general public. Unfortunately for elected
officials, the television age has complicated politics. Effective communication through
television requires a cadre of experts who understand the artistic and commercial aspects
of the medium. As television became the dominant means of communication between
politicians and the general public, political consultants, some with experience in
commercial advertising, thrived. Media-driven campaigns forced amateurs out in favor
of professionals. As Paul Herrnson notes, “the overall effect of technological change was
to transform most campaigns from labor intensive grass-roots undertakings at which local
party committees excelled, to money-driven, merchandised activities requiring tbe
services of skilled experts.”"
Television is partly responsible for tbe professionalization of campaign advising,
but tbe decline of tbe political parties is tbe reason wby professionals are sucb great
demand. In tbe post-war era, parties lost tbeir bold on voters. Tbrougbout tbe latter half
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I
of .he .wemich century the number of unaffiliatcd voters has rtsen. while the party
rcgtstration dwindled. By the 1960s and 1970s, public perception of the parties had
changed. Survey research indicated that many citi^ens did not believe there were
important differences between the Democratic and Republican parties. The parties
exacerbated the situation with self-tnllicted wounds. The well-,ntentioned, but damaging
efforts to reform party structure took power away from the leaders and essentially
crippled them. As a result of the reforms, individuals could seek and gain the party
nomination without any cooperation with party leaders. William Crotty and Gary
lacobson describe the new environment thusly, “a prospective candidate with suflicient
personal wealth or PAC resources can run for office wherever he decides, lie need have
no political experience, no ties to the party whose nomination he seeks and no particular
roots in the community or bond to the people he seeks to represent."'^ With their gate
keeping function removed, party leaders became superlluous. Jacobson further adds,
“primary elections have largely deprived parties of the most important source of innuence
over elected otticials. Parties no longer control access to the ballot and, therefore, to
political office.”'’ But weakened parties did not decrease the demand for expert political
advice. On the contrary, the unprecedented number of political novices who captured
party nominations through primaries magnified the need for professional advisors.
As a group, pohtieal eonsultants have proven to be innovators and risk-taking
opportunists. Political consultants have been at the forefront of the transformation of
American electoral politics, from the Incorporation of business marketing techniques into
campaigns to the establishment of polling as a irreplaceable campaign tool, fheir value
to candidates and their exalted position in politics is predicated on the mastery of a
specific skill subset. Some of the skills, such as polling, require technical knowledge and
an understanding of scientific methodology. Other skills are based on keen political
intuition and a firm grasp of business marketing principles.
I
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Techniques and Tactics
The greatest tndication that political eonsulting has reached industrial maturity is
the wide range of services offered by professional finns. In the latest edition of The
PoliUca! Pages, a listing of professional eonsulting firms compiled by the trade magazine
Campaigns & Elec,ions, there are 38 subdivisions ranging from television post
production to direct-mail services. Technological innovations have made campaigns an
exceedingly complicated enterprise. A contemporary campaign involves complex tasks
such as conducting a poll or focus group, media advertising, and direct-mail that often
require professional help. Political consultants provide a unique service just like lawyers
who dispense advice on campaign regulations or accountants who manage the books.
The degree of specialization in political consulting parallels their deep penetration of the
electoral process. At the federal level, it is becoming increasingly rare for a candidate,
particularly an incumbent, to forgo the services of a political consultant. Presidential
candidates and, more recently. Senate candidates usually hire several consultants. In
1996, for example, the Republican presidential candidate. Bob Dole, employed over fifty
professional consultants from around the country." In his failed bid for a California
Senate seat. Republican candidate Michael Huffington passed $21 million through
political consultants." Judging by the enormous sums of money that are funneled
through political consultants, their services are in great demand." However, the robust
growth enjoyed by the industry cannot be solely attributed to candidates' willingness to
hire them. Political consultants are also profiting from the explosion of grassroots
lobbying.
It is not unusual for a major policy initiative to be followed by an elaborate public
relations campaign, complete with television ads, focus groups and staged public events.
As policy battles have come to resemble campaigns, the pressure to gamer public support
has driven politicians to seek help from the people best able to cultivate, shape and
stimulate public sentiment. The knowledge and skills of experienced campaign
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operatives are an indispensable part of the publie relations strategy in a high profile
policy debate. Although capturing the debate and selling the issue have not supplanted
the traditional means of policy-making
- committee work, negotiations between political
leaders, and face-to-face lobbying are still paramount - a public relations campaign is a
crucial complementary strategy. Despite the elemental differences between a policy
campaign and a candidate campaign (winning an elective office and winning a policy
debate are not completely analogous), the techniques used by consultants are roughly the
same. Direct-mail, an important fundraising tool during a candidate campaign, is
employed to create grassroots activity. Media advertising performs the same function for
issues as it does for candidates by raising awareness and disseminating information.
Finally, polling and focus groups are used to track public sentiment throughout the
debate. It enables partisans to measure the effectiveness of the media effort and alter
their strategy accordingly.
Direct-mail
At Its core political direct-mail is simplicity. If you peel away the high tech
veneer, direct-mail is a reasonably old-fashioned way for politicians to communicate with
their supporters. The mail does not require satellite uplinks, television cameras, or fancy
computer graphics. In fact, a successful direct-mail campaign consists of two basic parts:
a clever, well-crafted message and precisely targeted list of recipients. Its basic design,
however, belies a complicated mission.
Political direct-mail emerged as a fundraising gimmick at the turn of the century.
As early as 1916, politicians were using the mail to reach supporters. A fundraising
appeal, for example, sent out under President Woodrow Wilson's signature resulted in
300,000 donations to the Democratic National Committee. Direct-mail appeals continued
to be used sporadically during the 1930s, as New Deal supporters were solicited by mail
for donations to the Democratic party.'* The presidential campaigns of Dwight
Eisenhower, Barry Goldwater and George Wallace all utilized direct-mail as a
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supplementary fundraising vehiele and as a way of bypassing the usual money men. The
early efforts, however, were hampered by primitive technology and disorganization in
the 1960s and 1970s, the power of direct-mail was fully harnessed by early pioneers in
the field such as Richard Viguerie, Morris Dees and Roger Graver.'’ These men
combined marketing savvy with keen political insight to create the modern direct-mail
operation. The ingenuity and entrepreneurial skill of early direct-mail consultants was
abetted by two unrelated historical events; rapid innovations in computer technology and
campaign finance regulation. Computers and sophisticated laser printers allowed direct-
mail consultants to produce prodigious amounts of high-quality mail (the importance of
the aesthetic will be explained later in greater detail). Computers also enabled direct mail
consultants to produce increasingly precise lists based on demographic information.
During the 1970s, direct-mail operatives received an unintended boost through campaign
finance reform laws that limited the amount of direct contributions to candidates. The
legislation limited individual contributions, but language controlling expenditures was
struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. The failure to contain costs was a
boon to direct-mail consultants who became indispensable fundraisers. According to
Larry Sabato, “with individual contributions limited to $1,000 per election, new sources
of funds have become vital, and direct-mail's ability to tap small, grassroots contributions
in great volume has seemed increasingly attractive.”^®
Although direct-mail emerged as a fundraising device, raising money is only one
aspect of contemporary direct-mail activity. Lobbyists and political parties employ
direct-mail as part of a grassroots strategy to win support for a particular policy issue.^'
Issue mailings are not intended to solicit funds, but to sway public opinion. The mailings
are explicitly designed to create a ground swell of public sentiment around an issue that
will m turn translate into pressure on elected officials. But an issue mailing is not an
innocuous method of persuasion and it has spawned controversy by employing
inflammatory and, some say, deliberately misleading language. Direct-mail whether it is
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inforcement, encouraging recipients to call or write in support of a policy or
whether i, is a negative call to arms all rely on visceral emotions to spur the reader to
’
action. Direct-mail consultants understand a truism of human behavior: fear and anger
are powerful motivating forces. Critics argue that the cynical, calculated manipulation of
voters' emotions harms the political process by polarizing policy debates and coarsening
public dialogue. Moreover, by inciting voters to sound off to their elected representatives
direct-mail consultants “have made it hard to tell the difference between manufactured
public opinion and genuine explosions of public sentiment.”^'
The critics may be unduly alarmed. Prompting a reader to action is only the first
link in a causal chain that must remain unbroken for the letter to be considered a success.
Direct-mail consultants endorse the conventional wisdom, buttressed by numerous
congressional scholars, that politicians care about their constituents' opinions and will
tread cautiously when a substantial number express an unambiguous position on an
issue." Despite the well-documented validity of this proposition, channeling public
pressure through a direct-mail campaign is not easy nor is it simple to trace. A mass
mailed fundraising appeal can be evaluated based on the amount of money that comes in
as a result of the letter. Unfortunately, such facile calculus is not applicable to an issue
advocacy letter. Direct-mail appeals compete for voters' attention with more immediate
concerns such as working, family and leisure time. The mailing must overcome these
natural harriers as well as voter apathy and provoke a sufficient number of recipients to
contact their legislators. Furthermore, contact must rise above a subjective threshold or
else It may never capture the attention of the legislature. But raising an issue to
prominence is no guarantee legislators will respond in accordance with the mailing.
Indeed, some legislators are suspicious of contrived mailings and dismiss the flood of
letters and phone calls urged by a mailing." Despite the fragility of this arrangement,
political consultants use direct-mail because it plays on the instinctive fear most
legislators have of public disapproval.^^
54
successful direct-mail effort is an artful combination of statistical inference and
.mpassioned prose. To create a viable mailing list, direct-mail consultants use detailed
demographic information and behavioral assumptions based on selected characteristics of
.he audience. Quasi-scien.ific generalizations enable mailers to eliminate segments of the
population and concentrate on potentially receptive groups. A mailing opposing English-
only instruction in public schools, for instance, would likely target voters with Hispanic
and Asian surnames. If list production has a formula, then letter writing has a feel.
Copywriting relies on intuition and an instinctive sense of what will provoke a visceral
reaction. As Richard Armstrong puts it, “writing a direct-mail letter has less to do with
sheer creativity and more to do with manipulating human emotions and playing upon
basic human needs.- A direct-mail appeal is laden with evocative symbolism and
heated rhetoric expressly designed to trigger a powerful emotional response.
The first step in a direct-mail campaign is generating a mailing list. Political
parties and interest groups maintain in-house lists of contributors and dues paying
members. These lists are sufficient to communicate with known supporters, but if the
issue requires a broader outreach the in-house list must be supplemented with lists
obtained from brokers. Some of the larger direct-mail operations take custody of lists
after a campaign and subsequently rent them to smaller companies.” According to Larry
Sabato these “firms and individuals have an unbelievably wide range of commercial lists
for sale, from magazine subscribers to all people who buy products or enter contests
through the mail, to lists of all the deer hunters and trout fishermen in Arizona and all the
hurley tobacco farmers in Tennessee.”^*
Just like sculptors clay, the list needs to be manipulated before it can be unveiled.
Sophisticated computer software programs enable direct-mail consultants to filter and
enhance the list. By using information provided by government agencies such as the U.S.
Census Bureau and the FEC, direct mail consultants shape the unrefined list. Computers
overlay a template that groups the population into subsets based on ethnicity, gender,
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.nco„e level, or pa«y affillalion. The census, for example, places voters m.o
nerghborhoods or dis.ric.s of 1.000 ,o 1.600 individuals who share similar social and
demographrc traits. Direct-mail consultants benef.t greatly from the sea of data produced
by govermuents at all levels, most of which is part of the pubhc doma.n and inexpensive
.0 obta.n.» Direct-mail consultants can use this information to target specific geographic
areas. G.ven the technology, it is relatively easy to produce a list of all the home owing
regtstered Democrats in a particular county over age 65 with incomes less than $40,000.
A viable list is the basis of a successful direct-mail effort, but the list is worthless
wtthout an effective pitch. The content of the letter mixes crass commercial g.mmickry
w,th an overt emotional appeal. This is a volatile combination that leads some critics to
argue direct-mail is a dishonest and inflammatory campaign tactic. Practitioners make no
apolog.es for the shrill tone that pervades issue appeals and they scoff at the suggestion
that their goal could be accomplished with neutral, dispassionate language. According to
Eva Pusateri, a conservative direct-mail consultant, “All politics is emotional. Each
[political] issue needs to be developed on the voters' level and brought home to
them...Emotlon, either positive or negative, needs to be communicated.”®
Direct-mail copywriting has two component parts: appearance and language.
Commercial gimmicko: is most evident in the design and aesthetic appeal of the mailing.
Direct-mail consultants understand that they face a difficult task in differentiating their
mailing from all other “junk mail.” Consultants pay careful attention to the smallest
detail no matter how seemingly insignificant. Every aspect of the letter is analyzed
deliberately, from the typeface, to the color and texture of the paper, to the placement of
stamps on the envelope
. Direct-mail consultants are also not above subterfuge. In order
to entice the recipient to open and read their mailing, consultants have developed several
clever disguises that mask the true character of direct-mail. Stylistic imitation is common
because there are no civil or criminal penalties for such deception unless the content of
the letter can be proven to be fraudulent.^'
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The false official letter is among the most popular designs used by consultants.
The offieial letter mimics an important government document and grabs the recip.ents
attention with a stern warning about
“penalties for
this doeument not to be forwarded” (bulk mail
misuse and a bold statement declaring
is never forwarded).^' The personal letter
.S another familiar outreaeh method. Whereas the offieial letter jolts the reader with
apprehension, the personal letter invites the reader with an intimate approach. Personal
letters eschew the standard accouterments of mass mailings such as metered postage and
window pane envelopes in favor of “live” stamps and heavier stock paper to simulate
stationary. Advances m laser printing and computer technology enable consultants to
produce mass mailed letters that appear to be handwritten notes.“ The disguises are only
limited by the imagination of the direct-mail consultant and they are constantly searching
for a new eye catching approach. In the early 1990s, fake newspapers gained wide
popularity. The paper contains slanted stories and editorials about an issue, but is
Otherwise difficult to distinguish from other small community papers.^'*
In terms of the language used in the letter there are no hard and fast rules, only
general guidelines. According to practitioners, the most important ingredient is emotion.
Their experience has taught them that appeals to reason are not as effective as appeals to
the heart. A cold, aloof dispassionate discourse on an issue will not arouse the reader, but
an impassioned provocative letter will generate action. Yet, direct-mail consultants are
careful not to overindulge in emotional rhetoric. Sanctimonious letters that browbeat the
reader or letters filled with invective can alienate the audience rather than stimulate it.
The language should be simple and direct and should not include complex abstractions or
obscure vocabulary. A simple letter works best not because the readers are dumb, but
because the scan reader can grasp the main argument without reading the entire letter.^^
Proponents of the Clinton health care reform would undoubtedly agree with Larry
Sabato who claims that. Direct-mail is often nothing more than mass produced, lovingly
refined hate mail [and] is thus the conveyor of misinformation and the purveyor of
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oversimplification and superheated emotionalism, all of which are notoriously destructive
to rational political decision-making.- Sabato's hyperbolic characterization overstates
the case, but there is reasonable concern that direct-mail may have a corrosive effect on
commuication between legislators and constituents. By encouraging people to flood their
Senators' and Representatives' offices with postcards, letters and phone calls, direct-mail
has clouded the distinction between contrived public outcries and unprovoked
expressions of public opinion.
Mass Media Advertising
Of the three activities generally associated with political consulting - media
advertising, direct mail, and public opinion polling - advertising has the deepest
historical roots. Political advertising came about as a practical necessity in a
geographically expansive nation with a far flung population. In the 1 8th century,
newspapers and pamphlets were disseminated among the citizenry, extolling the virtues
of some candidates and, in a precursor to modem negative advertising, trumpeting the
foibles of other candidates. These were essential forms of political communication,
particularly in campaigns for national office where the candidates were often incapable of
traveling to every corner of the territory. In the 19th century, new technologies
supplemented the rustic examples of the founding period. Lithography, and later
photography, enabled campaigners to reproduce the same image with relative ease and
advances in printing technology provided an expansive tableau. Before long, political
slogans and portraits were ubiquitous. According to political communications scholar,
Kathleen Hall Jamieson:
Through most of the nineteenth century, American were able to eat on,
sleep with, wipe their mouths on, or blow their noses in political
advertising, for political aspirants imprinted their likenesses, their slogans,
and their promises on bandannas and handkerchiefs, tablecloths and
coverlets.^^
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The crea„ve use of print mediums notwithstanding, pol.t.cal adveriising d,d not come to
full maturity unt.l the 20th century when techniques invented by bus.ness marketers
began to
.nf.ltrate politics. Although mass market.ng candidates for public office has
been loudly denounced by a succession ofjoumahsts, academics, and pol.ticians as an
affront to principled politics, corporate experience offers important ins.ghts into public
behavtor. Gary Mauser claims,
“marketing has developed a body of knowledge and
expertise pertaining to methods of analyzing and persuading large groups of peoplc.with
appropriate adaptation, these procedures may be extended to political campaigns.’”' If
voters can be considered analogous to consumers and candidates to products, then
marketing and advertising not only make sense, they are necessary.
Twentieth century advances in communications technology also changed the
nature of political advertising. The invention of the radio brought political advertising
into people's homes and enabled candidates to speak to a vast audience in their own
voice. But without question the greatest, most potent medium with respect to political
advertising has been television. In modem campaigns, candidates and issue advocacy
groups still use newspapers and radio for political advertising, but usually as
complementary feature of a strategy focused around television. As Nicholas
O Shaughessy accurately points out, “political marketing employs a constellation of
mediums, but television remains the supreme gift to politicians.”^^
The proliferation of television coincided with the rise of the independent political
consultant and, in a sense, they are an inseparable pair. It is impossible to discuss the
impact of television on the political process thoroughly without mentioning the
acknowledged masters of the medium: political consultants. Nor is it feasible to analyze
political consultants without devoting significant attention to their advertising efforts on
television. Television advertising is the political consultants' golden goose that provides
a continuous supply of money. The enormous sums required to campaign on television
facilitated the expansion of political consulting over the course of thirty years from an
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insignificant part-time occupation to a large scale, multi-faceted industry. It appears
growth will continue well into the next century as issue advocacy campaigns become
more common. Consultants stand to make substantial profits from public policy battles
waged between corporations, trade associations, and public interest groups as they use
advertising campaigns to sway public opinion. Non-candidate related political
advertising is now a staple at many large firms. According to principals at Sawyer-
Miller, a leading consulting firm, “Where once companies tried to influence public issues
mainly by back-door lobbying on Capitol Hill, they now increasingly campaign directly
for mass public support, which they believe will move the legislators more effectively.”*"
It IS not an exaggeration to say that contemporary campaigns, particularly
campaigns for federal offices, are waged largely on television. Television has surpassed
all other media forms to become the primary conduit of political information for the
American people. A variety of academic disciplines, from sociology to political science,
have provided a virtual mountain of statistics concerning public viewing habits and their
implication for political decision making. Without digressing into a tedious recitation of
numbers, there are several figures that illustrate television's pervasiveness. According to
census statistics, 99 percent of American homes own at least one television and the
average citizen watches it roughly four hours a day. As a source of political news,
I
television is unmatched. According to surveys conducted by the Roper Organization, in
national elections 75 percent of those surveyed indicated that they received the majority
of their political news from television.'^' In terms of its impact on voter behavior,
however, the results are mixed. Some scholars have concluded that the persuasive
I
;
capacity of television is limited as it serves simply to reinforce pre-existing attitudes. But
,
other scholars counter that it has a deterministic effect in campaigns, particularly among
I
less educated voters."^ From a political consultant's perspective, the ongoing academic
I
debate regarding television and politics is interesting, but ultimately irrelevant.
I
Television is essentially the only game in town and if your client is not on it, then he is at
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a distinct disadvantage. In the words of political consultant Frank Luntz, “candidates
have come to accept paid television advertising as the primary mode of interaction with
the electorate. The reason is both clear and simple: it reaches virtually every voter.”"
The same logic holds true for issue campaigns.
An effective media strategy is comprised of four components: thorough and
accurate background research; creative story boarding and visual presentation; a well
planned air time strategy; and a concerted effort to amplify the theme via free media.
Political consultants are involved in every stage, coordinating all the activity. According
to Larry Sabato, “a nationally known media consultant typically pledges to furnish a long
list of campaign goods, from the development of themes and strategies to the writing,
production and editing of radio and television advertisements; from the targeting and time
buying of spots to the design of graphic materials for billboards, brochures and news
releases.
Mass media consultants begin with the explicit understanding that television
advertising is extremely costly. In most campaigns it is the single largest expenditure,
taking up the lion's share of the campaign budget. With that in mind, consultants never
undertake commercial production without adequate background research. Consultants
are often criticized for selecting issues based on advertising viability. In other words,
matters that concern the voters which are difficult to encapsulate in an ad campaign are
ignored in favor of visceral, easy-to-grasp slogans. However, consultants commitment to
detailed research reflects a different dynamic. Research-driven commercials put the voter
in charge of issue selection. According to Gary Nordlinger, an experienced Democratic
consultant, the most important facet of political advertising is “the use of survey research
and opposition research to develop an understanding of what concerns the public.”'’^
Once the background research is complete, the artistic process begins in earnest.
An obligation to issue research does not change the fact that television is a visual medium
which works best with evocative imagery. As Robert Denton and Gary Woodward
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response m a viewer. We vote with our hearts, not our minds.”«Although stylistic
differences abound among media consultants, many advocate a stoiytelling approach
when drafting a political commercial. Storytelling connects the candidate with viewers
by drawing on familiar American values such as hard work, family, and patriotism.
Often in this milieu candidates take on the trappings of popular culture figures. During
his 1 992 presidential campaign, for example. Bill Clinton was successfully cast as the
archetypal Horatio Alger character in his “Man from Hope” television commercials. His
hard scrabble life and his up-from-his-boot-straps personal history were tailor made for
this type of appeal. This style works just as well in an issue format without a candidate
centerpiece. During the 1994 health care reform effort Goddard-Claussen, a political
consulting firm specializing in media relations, created the infamous Harry and Louise ad
campaign. This middle-class couple narrated a devastating story of the potential hazards
that could befall average Americans if the Clinton plan were enacted. The commercial
was deemed so harmful to the reform effort that Dan Rostenkowski. Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee, negotiated with the sponsors to have it taken off the air."
In the 106" Congress, the Pharmaceutical industry was able generate public doubt about
the wisdom of stronger government regulation over drug prices by using a battle-tested
political advertising formula. The drug company message was channeled through a
fiesty, elderly named Flo, a character built from the Harry and Louise template."'
Creating a strong visual rendition of the campaign theme is the glamorous aspect
of a media strategy. But the most rousing ad will be useless unless it reaches the proper
audience. In order to ensure expensive commercials have the greatest impact, media
consultants put together a precise time-buying strategy. Media consultants base their
decisions on demographic research, focus groups, ratings studies and pricing data that
target a specific audience. A poorly targeted ad is essentially a waste of money and in
some cases can prove detrimental to your campaign. Robert Nelson, a California based
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polmcal consultant, explains that '‘if you are a host.le, bontbas.ic older nrale (candidate]
you probably shouldn't spend a lot of time buying Murphy Brown television
commercials. You'll be paying to advertise to a group of people who whenever they see
you W.II remember how much they dislike you.”» The emergence of cable television has,
spects, made time buying easier for political consultants. Abundant channels
have depressed the cost of advertising on television and provided several options for
consultants. More importantly, the channels that cater to special interests present a
narrow, demographieally consistent audience. A commercial with an environmental
theme, for example, can reach environmentally sensitive voters by airing on Outdoor
Living, Home and Garden Television and the Discovery Channel.
In order to stretch the advertising dollar, consultants also attempt to capitalize on
the free media provided by television news programs. Amplifying a campaign theme via
free media is difficult, since most journalists are unwilling to become echo chambers for
candidates. Some consultants accomplish this by creating newsworthy commercials.
These commercials are either so controversial in nature or innovative in design that they
attract the attention ofjoumalists. The Harry and Louise ads, for instance, gained a much
broader audience after the Clinton administration and media elites began discussing
(hem.™ Consultants also encourage their clients to parrot commercial themes when they
are interviewed by reporters. Repetition of common words and phrases creates a synergy
between paid advertising and free media. Republican consultant Ed Gillespie likens
repetition to an amplifier. He claims, “It's important to have a lot of smaller megaphones
going off at the same time. If they're going off at the same time with different messages
It s just noise. If they're going off at the same time with the same message, it's an echo
chamber.’”' Some consultants, in an attempt to take advantage of media credibility, try to
blur the line between paid media and free media by creating commercials that mimic
news footage.
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I would be remiss if I did no, mention ihe role newspapers and radio play in a
P relations campaign. Although television is the primary advertising method,
newspapers and radio can be an effective complement by reinforcing the message’
delivered on television. As a print medium newspapers can put forward a more detailed
complex argument than an average thirty-second television spot. Thus, themes presented
on television can be explained in newspaper ads. Furthermore, newspaper space is cheap
and always available. As for radio, it nearly matches television in sheer ubiquity. Radio
ads played on popular stations during “drive time” (morning and evening rush hours) can
reach a vast audience of voters. Moreover, the very nature of radio facilitates much more
precise demographic targeting than television. Station formats such as easy listening or
adult contemporary draw remarkably homogenous audiences. More importantly, radio
draws on a listeners imagination. According to media consultants Don Sweitzer and
David Heller, “radio is the most intimate of all media - its impact is significant because
the images it eonveys exist in the listeners mind.”^^
Political advertising is subject to same sort of criticism leveled at direct mail: it is
overly melodramatic, it champions image over substance, and it is corrosively negative ”
From an academic perspective, the onus is placed squarely on the shoulders of political
consultants. In his book. The Rise ofPolitical Consultants, Larry Sabato questions “their
glorification of style over substance, their hero worship of imagery idols; and their
triviahzation of politics with an over indulgent, insatiable appetite for gimmicks, slogans,
and star pohtics.”^^ Lance Bennett has a more insidious view. He claims political
consultants, through the magic of advertising, preserve an illegitimate status quo.
Bennett states, “when signs of political illegitimacy begin to appear, image-laden
techniques can create the illusion of legitimacy to dispel serious consideration of the
underlying problem.”^^ These scholars grant marketing and advertising an unwarranted
amount of power over the political process. In truth, advertising has a muffled, imprecise
effect. In America, individuals possess a considerable freedom to decide between
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candidates and between public policies. Advertising, far front having a decisive impact,
IS just one of several factors that influence public opinion.
Public Opinion Polling
The role of public opinion in our political system is an historically contentious
topic. Concerns over the nature and volatility of public sentiment animated critical
debates during the Constitutional Convention and were important rhetorical fodder for the
authors of The Federatis, Papers. Two centuries have not cooled the passion
surrounding the debate nor has time solved some of the fundamental questions. Modern
scholars, echoing voices from the founding generation, continue to debate issues such as
the wisdom of majority opinion and the use of political institutions as a buffer between
public opinion and public policy.^ In the 20th century, the dilemma posed by public
opinion has been complicated further by the triumph of scientific polling. When
politicians and thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries engaged in debate about public
opinion, it was amorphous and abstract. Only the brazen or the foolish claimed to know
the public's wishes. But in our era public opinion has taken on a concrete form in the
shape of poll numbers. Contemporary pundits discuss public opinion as if it is
instrument, like a thermometer, to be periodically consulted. The ability to point to
numerical renderings of public sentiment has influenced the course of public policy.
Although it would be an overstatement to assert public policy is the cumulative result of
opinion polls, there is ample evidence to suggest that opinion polls play a strategic role
during policy formulation.
Even before scientific, randomly sampled polls became a fixture in American
politics, politicians and journalists attempted to plumb the depths of public opinion. The
earliest type of public opinion polls were straw polls conducted by newspapers and
magazines during the 19th century. These polls usually consisted of random man-on-the-
street interviews conducted by reporters or, in some cases, mailed questionnaires to
subscribers. The results were unscientific and irregular since the surveyed population
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was invariably ,oo snral, and insufficien.ly heterogeneous to accurately reflect the genera,
popuiace. Despite the.r penchant for inaccuracy, straw po„s renta.ned standard unti. the
In 1936, in an event that eventually took on mythic status, George Gallup, a
young Ph.D. from Iowa, changed the face of polling virtually overnight by predicting
Frankim Roosevelt's reelection with a randomly sampled poll. Gallup's results
challenged a much larger, but less scientific poll, taken by the respected national
magazine. The Literary Digest. Gallup's methodology revolutionized polhng and laid the
foundation for the polling industry.
Gallup was an effusive promoter of the benevolent power of public opinion
polling. According to Irving Crespi, “Gallup claimed poll results can be considered a
mandate from the people that should be followed by the nations leaders because those
results represent what the people want - what legislation they favor, what they oppose,
and what policy directions they want government to follow.”’* But many politicians
remained skeptical and some, such as President Harry Truman, were openly hostile to
public opinion polling. Truman considered polls to be an abdication of responsible
leadership. In his estimation only weak, vacillating politicians pandered to public
opinion.*'' Evidently, this opinion was not shared by Truman's successors in the White
House as every president since Eisenhower has employed a pollster.
Gallup and his contemporaries, Elmo Roper and Arthur Crossley, considered
polling to be a non-partisan endeavor and avoided close ties to either political party. In
the 1960s and 1970s, however, a new generation ofcommercial pollsters emerged who
readily sold their services to candidates. For-hire pollsters such as Patrick Caddell,
Richard Wirthlin, Peter Hart, Lou Harris and Bob Teeter emerged as prominent figures in
political campaigns. Initially, pollsters were relegated to the periphery of the advisor
circle, but some transcended their lowly status and became trusted political confidants.
These men did more than simply report polling results. They interpreted the data.
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developed models and theories of voting behavior and used their nutnbers to plot
governing strategy.^®
The evolution of the pollster from a lower echelon campaign operative to a
prom.nent political advisor has altered the kind of advice they proffer. Pollsters are
frequently asked to assess the popularity of policy initiatives, a role that is qualitatively
different from conducting candidate polls. Even a well designed candidate poll is prone
to error resulting from voter ignorance and ambiguous responses. These problems are
magnified in a policy poll. Depending on the profile and complexity of an issue, there
may be a high number of non-respondents
- people wbo refuse to be interviewed - or of
respondents who give no opinion. With a small number of potential respondents
qualified to give an informed opinion, issue polls often force the pollster to speculate
based on a limited data set. In these instances a pollster is not so much a specialist
providing reliable information as he is an oracle trying vainly to predict the future.
Nevertheless, issue polls are commissioned regularly by elected officials to gauge public
support for new legislation.
Commereial pollsters can provide clients with an assortment of polls that vary in
cost and utility. The baseline poll (sometimes referred to as the benchmark poll) is taken
at the outset of a campaign and is generally used to provide information that will guide
subsequent decisions. The poll probes the public for positions that generate strong
responses, either positive or negative, that can be incorporated into the media campaign.
A poll on immigration policy, for instance, may indicate that people are extremely
uncomfortable with the prospect of government identity cards as a means of curbing
illegal immigration. Opponents to immigration reform can then use the identity card as
the centerpiece of a media campaign against the legislation. The baseline poll is also
used to determine the relative strength of the opposition. During the 1994 health care
debate, for example, a number of polls indicated public support for health care reform
was strong, but pollsters working on behalf of a coalition opposed to the Clinton plan
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discovered that supper, for .he ac.ua, plan was soft and .ha. puhl.c apprehension over
gover„nren.a, eon.ro, was high. Based on
.hese resufts,
.he coali.ion launched a
.nassive
media campaign designed lo exploil public concern.‘'
The basehne poll is crucial ,o eslablishing a s.ra.egie plan, bu. considering
.he
nu.d nalure of a poliey deba.e
.he ini.ia, resul.s need .0 be augi.en.ed by
.raeking polls.
Tracking polls provide campaigns wi.h a means of measuring daily ftuc.ua.ions in public
opinion by con.inuous polling over a four to five day period. The utility of a tracking
poll can perhaps best be described in sports parlanee, where the tracking poll is the
scoreboard telling the players who is ahead and who is behind. Although i. is expensive,
1 . enables eonsul.ants to measure the impact of the other elements of the publie relations
campaign. In other words, a well implemented tracking poll can ascertain whether the
commercials and direct-mail appeals are having the desired effect.
The last type of survey cannot be accurately described as a poll. “Focus groups,”
according
.0 Herbert Asher, “are no. polls bu, in-depth interviews with a small number of
people (usually 1 0 to 20) who often are selected to represent broad demographic
groups.”^ Discussions are led by a moderator who is charged with keeping the group on
topic and facilitating comments from the members. Focus groups perform a reciprocal
function by providing qualitative depth that is sometimes missing from a poll. In terms
of a public relations campaign, focus groups can often supply the vocabulary used to sell
a particular policy. Frank Luntz, the pollster behind the Contract with America, is a firm
believer m the power of focus groups as a means to construct debate language. From his
perspective, the political party that utilizes the terms and phrases that resonate with the
voters has already won the argument." Critics contend this is an exercise in semantics
and reduces policy choices to euphemisms, but focus group supporters remain undaunted.
Stan Greenberg, President Clinton's pollster, employs a high tech version of the focus
group method called dial groups. In a dial group;
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colutr Th':'"'
'
‘•’a.'s connected to aomputer. e vtewers are tnstructed to adjust the dial on a scale of 0 to00 as they react negattvely or positively to the politician's words Theresponses are stmultaneously fed into the computer, which
*at th?"
superimposed on a separate television monitortha e pollster can watch as the politician speaks."*
Focus groups are unscientific and even their defenders acknowledge that they cannot be
used to generalize to a larger population, but they can provide insights into why people
think the way they do.
People tend to grant pollsters, in the words of Larry Sabato, “the right to
philosophize grandly and to pontificate in terms normally reserved for a nations
governing elite.’- Pollsters have secured a coveted spot on the political advisor totem
pole by claiming to offer subjective information as objective facts. But poll consumers
would do well to view these “facts” with a wary eye. Polls are burdened with a host of
weaknesses ranging from flawed methodology to interpretive bias."" Structural defects
are compounded by the fleeting, ever-changing nature of public opinion. Even if a poll is
methodologically sound and free of bias, it is only a snapshot of public opinion whose
value depreciates precipitously over time.
The greatest fear among the critics of public opinion polls is that elected officials
will use them as a substitute for reasoned discourse and that public policy will amount to
a popularity contest rather than a principled search for the sound answers. But the reality
IS more complicated than they imagine and hardly as alarming. Polls are undoubtedly
used by politicians throughout the life span of legislation to provide strategic guidance
and political leaders refer constantly to them as a justification for a course of action.
Polls, however, have a supporting rather than a deterministic role in the legislative
process. Instead of using polls to develop policy, politicians use polls to develop a
marketing approach to sell the policy.
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Conclusion
In an effort to provide a rudimenta^ explanation of the favored techniques used
by political consultants it has been necessary to compartmentalize them. In practice,
direct-mail, media advertising and public opinion polling are part of an integrated public
relations campaign. Insights derived from polls are used to help develop the advertising
and direct-mail efforts, which in turn are designed with the intention of moving public
opinion. The transfer of these campaign skills to the legislative process has required
surprisingly little adjustment on the part of political consultants. Despite the fact that
consultants during a public policy campaign are working on behalf of an idea or abstract
ideology rather than an individual candidate, the talents honed during candidate
campaigns can be applied with virtual ease. According to political consultant Matt Reese
selling a policy is analogous to electing a candidate. “The job,” he declares, “is to decide
what truths to tell to whom, through what channels of communication, and how many
times. You win votes, or win activity by repetitive persuasive contact.”*’ But the nature
of a campaign is fundamentally different than governing: campaigns result in an
undisputed victor; governing is an ongoing process. Thus, successfiil campaign methods
- no matter how well they work in the service of an issue - may be ill suited to a process
that demands conciliation and compromise. In the next few chapters, the case studies will
illustrate the potential hazards of employing campaign techniques in the legislative
process.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONTRACT WITH AMERICA
Introduction
During the first heady days of the 104th Congress. Speaker Newt Gingrieh
oceasionally allowed his excitement at the prospects of a Republican legislative
revolutmn to get the better of him. In these moments, he was given to makmg grandiose
htstoncai comparisons and hyperbohc comments about the s.gnifieance of the 1994
election.' He hkened himself, for example, to Brit.sh prime min.sters of the 19th century,
perhaps forgetting for a moment that we live in a federal system of separated powers. In
mterviews and press conferences, he tirelessly compared the Republican takeover of
Congress to other landmark events in American history.
When Gingrich's statements are viewed in retrospect, they seem either poignant or
prudent depending on your political persuasion. Given the fact that most of the
Contract with America, the legislative agenda the Republicans rode to victory in the
House of Representatives, was not signed into law (see Table 3.2) and that, by 1999,
Newt Gingrich was no longer even a member of the House, it seems unlikely that
historians will place the 104th Congress in the category reserved for epochs like
Reconstruction or the New Deal.
Yet, the Republican victory in 1994 and the party's initial legislative successes are
important from a political science perspective. The Contract with America is an
unprecedented example of a nationalized congressional party platform that ran counter to
much of the academic discussion of congressional electoral behavior.^ Moreover, the
Contract demonstrated a concerted effort on the part of the congressional majority to
wrest control of the political agenda from the president. Since FDR, the theme running
through scholarly analyses of executive/legislative relations has focused on presidential
dominance. According to political scientist Richard Fleisher, “The 104th Congress has
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shown us that the conventional wisdom that Prmor • a .ongress is dependent on leadership from
the president is overstated.”^
Another characteristic that ntade the Contract with Anterica unique and truly
s.gn.ficant is the role political consultants played throughout its transfornration from a
senes of campaign promises and brom.des into legislation. Political consultants were
.nttmately involved in the public relations campaigns that paralleled the Contract's
progress through the House of Representatives. During the first months of 1995, pollsters
conducted focus groups and polls to discover the most effective language to sell the
Republican ideas to the American people. Their efforts were joined by media specialists
and direct-mail consultants who waged a guerrilla campaign for public support.
Democrats, once they overcame the initial shock that followed the election, followed suit.
The White House and congressional Democrats also employed the services of consultants
to counter the marketing juggernaut put together by congressional Republicans." Once
engaged, the public relations battle between the Democrats, Republicans and their interest
group allies was frenzied.
It would, however, be an exaggeration to say that salesmanship overshadowed the
substance of the Republican agenda. Detractors claimed that the Contract was hollow
and cynically derived, but it was not merely a compilation of poll-tested ideas. It was,
underneath the rhetorical facade and slick packaging, a sober articulation of conservative
priorities. The real lasting significance of the Contract is as an illustration of how
politicians at the end of the 20th century, with the help of political consultants, attempt to
cultivate and harness public support for their policies after the election. It also shows
how preoccupied our elected leaders are with the vagaries of public opinion. In this
sense, the 104th Congress is an acknowledgment of the modern political condition in
which selling a policy is just as crucial as developing it.
The Contract with America represents the pinnacle of consultant involvement in
the legislative process and, thus, is a useful test case through which to explore the three
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questions ou.Hned in chapter one. First, are eantpaign ntethods suitable for governing.
Does the pursu.t of pubhc, cantpa.gn-oriented strategies obscure issues with plat.tudes
and encourage style over substance? Campaign-style governing may also exacerbate
partisan and tnstitutional tensions, dividing the political community into polarized
factions. Second, are political consultants involved in the legislative process a threat to
democratic accountability? Political consultants have great influence with their clients
and therefore over the content of public policy, but they are not subject to the same
restrictions and regulations that govern the behavior of permanent staff Political
consultants with private sector clients may possess an inherent conflict of interest on
matters of public policy. Third, several events that occurred during the 104th Congress
call into question the reliability and efficacy of the techniques used by political
consultants.
Foundations of the Contract with America
A common misconception of the Contract with America is that it was the
brainchild of Republican political consultants and pollsters. In fact, the roots of the
Contract are found in the House Republican Conference and in the fledgling conservative
think tanks that emerged during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. In the early 1980s, a
cadre ofjunior Republican congressmen formed the Conservative Opportunity Society
(COS) as an aggressive advocate for the Republican legislative proposals. The COS.
whose charter members included the future Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich,
Majority Leader Dick Armey and several other members of the 104th leadership team,
was a breeding ground for conservative ideas. These legislators were disdainful of
moderate leaders like Bob Michel who worked with Democrats in order to influence
public policy on the margins.
Instead of working within the boundaries prescribed by the majority party, the
COS offered conservative alternatives to Democratic legislation.^ Throughout the 1980s
and the early 1 990s, the COS helped articulate Republican policies and transform ideas
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into viable legislation. Some of the items in the Contract are the progeny ofCOS
proposals. The legislative brainstorming encouraged by the COS was supplemented off
the Hill by several new think tanks devoted to conservative causes. Organizations such
as the Heritage Foundation and the Competitive Entetprise Institute eschewed the
traditional, detached role played by venerable think tanks like the Brookings Institution in
favor of policy analysis conducted expressly to support a conservative agenda.
According to James Smith, a think tank historian, the conservative think tanks functioned
as a “secondhand dealer of ideas” with an admitted bias toward advocacy rather than
objective research.^
George Bush's defeat in 1992 crystallized the need for new ideas and spurred
Republicans to a critical reevaluation of their electoral strategy. Several internal polls
conducted by the Republican National Committee indicated that rank-and-file members
were disillusioned with the GOP and believed that it lacked a vision for the country.
Party stalwarts seemed to be suggesting that it was not enough for the Republican party
simply to stand against the Democratic agenda; they wanted their own platform. Newt
Gingrich and his allies in the House of Representatives drew an important lesson from
this and in 1993-1994 began planning what would eventually become the Contract with
America. The goal was develop a defensible set of alternatives to Democratic proposals
on the basts of which all Republican candidates could campaign. After polling
Republican incumbents and House challengers for ideas, the Republican Conference staff
drew up a list of the ten most popular items.
^
The proposals that form the Contraet with America can be divided roughly into
two categories, standard Republican issues such as tax cuts and strengthening national
defense, on the one hand, and populist measures like term limits and the line item veto on
the other. Issues championed by social conservatives such as abortion and school prayer
were left off the Contract to cultivate support with independent voters. The Contract was
publicly unveiled on September 27, 1994 in an elaborate ceremony on the steps of the
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U.S. Capitol. In a made for television event eoordinated by the RNC and several
Republican media eonsultants, 367 Republican House members and challengers signed a
document pledging an open vote for the ten items on the Contract within the first 100
days of the 104th Congress. It was immediately assailed by Democratic critics who
escribed it as reactionary, obtuse, and misguided. One wag dubbed it the Contract on
America. Journalists were less derisive, but claimed that the Contract was too vague to
serve as a legislative blueprint. Nevertheless, the House Republican leaders could draw
satisfaction from their remarkable success at unifying their candidates under a coherent
party platform/
Although consultants were not responsible for the content of the Contract, they
were heavily involved in the marketing strategy behind it. Republican consultant Frank
Luntz conducted dozens of focus groups and polls in order to find the best way to present
the Contract. Luntz, building upon work he had done for the Republican party during the
1 994 crime bill debate, tapped into populist resentment and anger at the federal
government. He claimed that Americans were alienated from their government and that
they had lost faith in our political system. People were no longer confident that their
lives would be significantly better than those of their parents, and they blamed a
bureaucratic, distant and feckless government created by the hubris of both political
parties and their officeholders.’ His research supplied the vocabulary used in the
Contract. His surveys, for example, indicated that people responded favorably to the idea
of a contract and the legal implications it represented. He also found strong support for
the Republican commitment to balance the federal budget, an idea the average citizen can
readily understand. Once the language was craffed. Republican media consultants
developed an innovative advertising strategy that included a national advertisement in TV
Guide. TV Guide had never been used in national political campaign, but the consultants
ingeniously speculated that if the Contract were in TV Guide it would be seen by every
member of the household several times over the course of a week.'^
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The activities of political consultants on behalf of the Contract during the election
are no, unusual. What is unusual is the continued effort they put forth after the election.
Consultants were called upon regularly during the 104,h Congress to help manage the
public relations campaign for two reasons. First, consultants were brought in to combat
the perceived negative coverage many Republicans leaders thought they were receiving in
the mainstream press. Media bias is a common refrain among conservative politicians.
Once they took power, the Republican leadership was convinced the press would not
report their agenda fairly. Their concerns were bolstered by analysis of the network news
coverage about the Contract. According to Republican estimates, nearly two-thirds of the
network news stories concerning the Contract during the firs, 100 days were negative."
As a way of countering bad press, the Republicans employed media specialists and direc-
ma,l to penetrate, and in some cases bypass, the traditional media. Second, consultants
were employed to maintain control of the public agenda and keep President Clinton and
the congressional Democrats in a defensive posture. Numerous presidential scholars have
addressed the inherent communications advantage the president possesses relative to the
Congress.'^ The president, as a unitary political figure surrounded by a sophisticated
communications apparatus, is able to command the attention of the media and the general
public in a way that dwarfs the most visible, newsworthy senator or representative. GOP
leaders and their interest group allies believed they could diminish the president's media
superiority with a professionally orchestrated public relations campaign.
According to Republican pollsters, each item in the Contract with America drew
majority support from the general public." But public popularity is no guarantee of
passage. Some issues faced serious obstacles in the form of vested interests and
Democratic opposition m Congress. The Common Sense Legal Reform, for instance,
was an expansive bill intended to establish national product liability law limits on
punitive damages awarded in civil lawsuits. The bill was a high priority with an array of
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pro-business organizations namely the National Federation of Independent Bus,,,esses
(NFIB), Citizens for a Sound Eeonomy, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Nattonal
Association of Wholesalers. In the lobbying battle over the legislation, pro-business
forces were opposed by a formidable interest group, the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA).'‘ The ATLA is a classic example of a lobby with influence
dtsproportionate to its size. Interest group theorists from David Truman and James Q.
Wilson to Jonathan Rauch have described similar groups whose small numbers belie a
lightly organized, well-financed, and respected presence on Capitol Hill. In addition,
many representatives and senators are former trial lawyers themselves, giving the
organ,zat,on an unmatched personal connection with lawmakers. According to the the
1998 edition Almanac ofAmerican Polilics, there are 16 members of the trial bar
serving in Congress.’’ Previous attempts to pass product liability reform legislation were
thwarted by vigorous ATLA lobbying. ATLA bolstered its support on the Hill by
remammg a conduit for campaign funds. According to FEC estimates, the trial bar
provtded over $60 million in campaign contributions to opponents of tort reform between
1988 and 1996.“ In 1995, the ATLA retained strong support in the Democratic caucus
and had the sympathetic ear of President Clinton. Thus, even in a Republican Congress
friendly to business interests, passage of the Common Sense Legal Reform was not
assured.
To complement their traditional lobbying efforts in Congress, the pro-business
coalition engaged in an integrated public relations campaign directed by a group of
political consultants. The public relations effort included all of the elements of an
electoral campaign - direct-mail outreach, mass media advertising, and public opinion
polling - in order to put public pressure on legislators to support product liability reform.
The campaign was intended to create public outcry on behalf of the business group's
position and exploit congressional sensitivity to constituent opinion. By casting the trial
lawyers as the villains in a political drama, the business lobby hoped to make opposition
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to product liability reform politically dangerous. The public relations campaign
sponsored by business interests was expensive (some estimates put the cost at over $17
mtlhon) but it was not - to use a crude metaphor - akin to using a sledgehammer to kill a
ny.‘^ The campaign was targeted precisely and followed a cyclical pattern. Public
opinion polls were used to select districts where legislators appeared to be most
vulnerable to a media campaign and advertisements appeared in districts during
congressional recesses when legislators would be home to hear from constituents. Media
events were coordinated to occur in proximity to floor votes and, once the bill moved on
White House, ads were targeted in states where support for President Clinton was
suspect.
In early April 1 995, the pro-business coalition hired the media consulting firm
Goddard/Claussen to create an ad campaign promoting product liability reform; a task
that firm partner Ben Goddard thought they were well equipped to handle. According to
Goddard, the strength of their firm is “boiling down complex issues to a message so
visceral that it inspires viewers to gripe to their elected officials out of fear or anger. We
can create from whole cloth a grassroots lobbying effort.”'* Goddard/Claussen was
joined by the Murphy, Pintak, Gautier Agency, a well-regarded campaign firm
specializing in attack ads. The campaign-style ads produced by both firms are an
example of emotionally manipulative tactics designed to provoke an angry response
rather than provide useful information. One particular advertisement, for example,
depicted a field of Little League ball players who slowly disappeared while a narrator
explained frivolous” lawsuits had made Little League too expensive to insure. Another
more ominous ad featured small town firemen who were reluctant to perform CPR
because of the threat of lawsuits. Neither ad attempted to present the legitimate merits of
product liability reform. Instead the ads tried to energize the viewers with raw emotion.'^
By some accounts, the ads had the desired effect. A spokesman for Citizens for a Sound
Economy claimed that several representatives had contacted the group and requested the
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ads be taken off the air. The group complied only in cases where the legislator agreed in
writing to support tort reform.^®
After Senate passage of product liability reform, the public relations campaign
went on hiatus. The radio, print, and TV ads were revived in 1996 when the bill moved
on to the White House. President Clinton, under enormous pressure from the ATLA,
cited technical disagreements with the bill and promised to veto it. Business groups
countered the ATLA’s executive branch lobbying with another grassroots campaign.
Media consultants working for the business coalit.on bought air time in two important
swing states, Kentucky and Michigan. The ads produced in 1995 were revived and aired
in those states.^' In order to demonstrate to the White House that vetoing the legislation
could cany electoral consequences in 1996, the business coalition even commissioned a
poll. The before and after poll conducted by private pollsters, Public Opinion Strategies,
showed President Clinton's lead over Bob Dole evaporated among voters who saw the
ads. The results were then transmitted to the White House. The business coalition's
efforts were for naught as the President vetoed the bill anyway, but their sophisticated
media strategy, which incorporated polling and advertising, is emblematic of a change in
the way interest groups attempt to influence elected officials.
Several of the legislative initiatives outlined briefly in the Contract were radical
departures from the public policies of the past thirty years. The language used in the
Contract may have seemed benign, but underlying calls for a return to personal
responsibility and traditional American values was a pledge to dismantle many of the
social programs produced during the Great Society. The welfare reform provision, for
example, entailed a wholesale restructuring of federal programs for the poor. It would
transfer welfare responsibility to the states, cap welfare spending, and limit recipients’
eligibility in most cases to two years.^^ The plan was as ambitious as it was controversial.
Other elements of the Contract broached supposedly untouchable social programs. The
spending and tax cuts promised by the Republicans in the Contract forced them to adopt
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cuts in popular enti.lemen. programs like Medicare. Attempts to reform Medicare, the
supplemental insurance program for the elderly, are regarded warily by legislators
because the program has a large constituent base that tends to vote in high numbers. In
short, the policies championed by the House Republicans were bold and could prove
perilous in the next election cycle. As a means of sustaining public support for their
agenda, Republican leaders turned to the same consultants who marketed the Contract
with America during the campaign.
In early 1995, Frank Luntz conducted several surveys at the behest of the House
leadership to discern the proper vocabulary to describe welfare reform. In a memo
addressed to House Republicans interpreting his results, Luntz unwittingly affirmed the
negative description of political consultants offered by Larry Sabato and Dan Nimmo.
His memo is littered with obvious advice, such as stressing the work elements of the
Republican plan, and cynical assesments of the public's understanding of welfare. Luntz
IS manifestly unconcerned with the long range consequences of the Republican plan and
he admonishes his political clients to adopt the same attitude. Republicans, he argues,
should leave the debate about the effects of the bill to “social scientists and moral
philosophers.”'' It is sage advice if you are simply concerned with getting reelected; it is
horribly myopic if you care about the ramifications of public policy.
Frank Luntz's exercise in semantics and his fascination with metaphorical
equivalents and synonyms would be curious except for the fact that his advice was taken
seriously by House Republicans who incorporated his words into their description of the
welfare reform plan. Partisan debates over public policy are necessarily biased affairs.
They are not, as E.E. Schattschneider accurately points out, “intercollegiate debates in
which the opponents agree in advance on the definition of the issues.”'^ Each side
presents a sanitized version of their position while simultaneously denigrating their
opponents' point of view. However, by describing their plan in terms chosen expressly to
maximize public support, politicians have advanced beyond the traditional parameters of
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political rhetoric. Parroting bach nrarhet-testcd themes does not enhance tire political
dtseourse and, ,n some cases, could be construed as an exercise in purposeful
disinformation. The Republican welfare plan was an innovative atte.npt to restructure a
set of programs that many observers, liberal and conservative alike, considered to be
fatlures. It was clearly a plan that deserved to be argued on its nrerits. Bu, the short tenn
strategy advice offered by political consultants encouraged Republicans to avoid
discussing the policy details in favor of pithy slogans and one-sentence sound bites.
Democrats were not merely bystanders in the message battle. In March 1995. the
I louse Democrats scored their lirst signilicant public relations victory over the
Republicans in the school lunch debate. As part of the Contract's eonnnitment to return
powers to the states, the Republicans had proposed replacing the existing school lunch
program with direct cash payments to the states. The plan would save money as well by
removing an unneeded layer of federal bureaucracy. Yet, the debate rarely touched upon
the efficacy of block grants in lieu of federal management. Instead, Denrocrats seized
upon a 1 .8% decrease in future spending and defined the Republican proposal as a cold-
hearted attempt to take hot lunches away from needy children. It was an emotional,
evocative metaphor and one that Democratic consultants encouraged their clients to
repeat at every opportunity. A Democratic media counter-offensive paid for by liberal
tnteresi groups and produced by Democratic consultants portrayed the Republicans as
mean spirited and harped on their callous disregard for the poor. In an ad sponsored by
the AFT-CIO, the Democrats exploited the dark side of Republican austerity. The ad
warned “The new Congress is cutting jobs, wages, health, safety, housing for senior
etttzens, even school lunchcs...so they can give tax breaks to big business and the rich.””
Their argument was strengthened by polls that indicated public support for Republicans
was slipping. According to Democratic pollster Geoff Garin, “people only know one
thing about the Republican welfare reform plan, that it cuts school lunches.”” As a
rallying cry lor demoralized Democratic lawmakers, the school lunch debate fulfilled its
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to use poll-tested words they
mission. Howeve,
,, was a far or, fron. an honest portrayal of the Repubhcan intentions
and ,t d,d much to engender animosity between the two parties. Consultants did not
create this animus, but by encouraging their political clients
may have amplified it.
The rhetorical gamesmanship was not confined to special order speeches and
orchestrated press events. The House Democrats used committee hearings as a venue for
then public relations campaign against the Republican agenda. Instead of offering
Democratic substitutes for Republican bills and engaging in constructive debate during
committee markups, many members simply used the time to decry the “mean spirited"
pnorities embodied in Republican legislation. During the tax reform debate, for example,
Democratic members of the House Ways and Means Committee confined their efforts to
’
villifymg the Republican bill as a “war on the poor” and did not attempt to draft
amendments or even offer a Democratic substitute. The theatrics were evidence of a
public strategy crafted expressly to embarass the Republicans.” The Democrats theme-
driven assault on Republican plans could only work in the modern Congress where gavel-
to-gavel television coverage gives members an opportunity to spread a coherent message
to a larger audience. C-SPAN, introduced in the House in 1981, has turned committee
hearings into parade grounds for media showhorses.^*
The preparations leading up to the Medicare debate reveal how pervasive the
permanent campaign” mentality is among elected officials. Months before the
Republicans introduced legislation concerning Medicare, a select group of party officials
and political consultants worked feverishly behind the scenes to devise a persuasive
message strategy. Speaker Gingrich and the House Republican leadership viewed finding
a compelling way to explain the Republican plan to the general public as important as
crafting the policy details. Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1995, Republican
pollsters Linda DiVall, Bill Mclnturff and Frank Luntz conducted dozens of focus groups
and polls to tease out the vocabulary used in the Medicare debate. They encouraged
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Imembers to drop the revolutionary rhetoric and adopt a soothing tone that evoked
stahihty. According to their research, words like “change, cut, cap and freeze” created
anxiety among voters, but the words “improve, protect, and preserve” engender positive
responses. This advice may seem silly and patently superficial, but these linguistic
maneuverings have real consequences. Consider the objective facts of the Republican
Medicare proposal. If it were adopted, it would lower the projected benefits of future
Medicare recipients as a way of prolonging the life of the program. The size of the
Medicare budget would continue to grow, just at a slower rate. In order to avoid electoral
retribution for “cutting” Medicare, the Republicans needed to convince the voters that
their plan would “preserve Medicare for future generations.” Given the overwhelming
popularity of Medicare and the constituency it serves, any policy that is viewed by the
public as an attempt to change Medicare could result in a disaster at the ballot box.
Meanwhile, Democratic consultants produced a powerful counter argument based
on their own survey research. They urged congressional Democrats and the President to
create a linkage between Medicare cuts and tax breaks for the rich. Focus group data
revealed a strong negative reaction to any policy proposal that benefited the wealthy at
the expense of the middle class. The Republicans inadvertently provided Democratic
consultants with rhetorical ammunition. Speaker Gingrich, in a speech to the American
Conservative Union, used the unfortunate phrase “wither on the vine” while articulating
his hope for a future in which Medicare would be unnecessary. Democratic consultants
captialized immediately on the gaffe. “Within hours,” according to Washington Post
reporter David Maraniss, consultants at the DNC had drafted a response ad that began:
The Republicans in Congress. They never believed in Medicare and now they want it to
wither on the vine. In the White House, erstwhile Republican consultant Dick Morris
advised President Clinton to seize upon popular Republican initiatives like balancing the
federal budget while simultaneously branding the GOP as the enemy of the middle class.
I
90
As it played out over the media, the partisan battle over Medicare proved to be the high
point of poll-tested phraseology.
Political Consultants and Democratic Accountability
Concerns about the accountability of political consultants generally come in two
forms. First, scholars and public interest advocates believe that the new roles played by
consultants come, according to James Thurber, “perilously close to that of a lobbyist -
but without the disclosure requirements that apply to registered advocates.”^' The fear
that some observers have is that corporations and trade associations who lobby Congress
will use political consultants as a means of bypassing regulated contact with elected
offtcials. Second and unrelated to the first, there is growing apprehension that the issue
advocacy work produced by consultants and conducted on behalf of interest groups may
be adulterating existing campaign finance laws. Direct-mail outreach and media
advertising are subject to legal restrictions if they are part of a candidate's campaign, but
the same activities are unregulated for issue advocacy. This sort of electronic lobbying
troubles some scholars who argue that it amplifies the influence of established interests at
the expense of average citizens. Darrell West maintains, “[there] is the potential of high-
tech campaigns to skew public policy making. Not all groups can afford the cost of
electronic advocacy. Resource rich groups are in a much stronger position to use these
new communication technologies.”^^
The Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections proved to be a
financial windfall for many Republican consultants. Those who were directly involved in
selling the Contract with America basked in the reflected glow of the Republican leaders
and soon attracted a number of high profile corporate clients. In early 1995, Frank Luntz
was hired by several groups with keen interest in legislation emanating from the
Contract. Luntz's relationship with private groups and his continued presence as a
political strategist with close connections to House Republican leaders raise questions
about his role. Is he a lobbyist or a political consultant? As a pollster and political
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consultant, Luntz is not covered by lobbying restrictions and disclosure requirements.
Yet. an objective observer could easily eonclude Luntz's work closely resembles
lobbying. Luntz consistently maintained that he never lobbied nor was he asked to lobby
on behalf of his corporate clients.
Subsequent interviews with his corporate clientele, however, show a more opaque
distinction. According to John Tuck, the former executive director of the Competitive
Long Distance Coalition, the coalition hired Frank Luntz, in part, because he represented
a pipeline to the Speaker's office. “Frank Luntz,” Tuck stated, “has a knowledge of the
new leadership of the House of Representatives and the thinking of its component parts,
and that is of value [to us].”“ It would appear, leaving Luntz's protestations aside, that
political consultants in similar circumstances would eventually encounter a conflict of
interest between their political clients and their private sector clients. One can easily
envision private client's interests confiating with the political advice offered to elected
officials. Under these circumstances, political consultants who advocate an interest
group s position under the guise of strategic advice violate the spirit, if not the letter, of
lobbying restrictions.
Frank Luntz was not the only consultant to enjoy the Speaker's confidence.
Republican consultant Joe Gaylord functioned essentially as Newt Gingrich's shadow
chief of staff. Although he did not hold an official position in the Speaker's office, he
was a guiding force at policy meetings. According to a Republican leadership aide, “Joe
IS the closest to Newt. He is the overseer of Newt's life [and] helps select his staff and fix
the payroll.”^^ It was not unusual or improper for political advisors to be present during
official staff meetings or to frequent the legislator's office. Yet, the responsibilities
handled by Joe Gaylord transcended the normal advisory function and appeared to violate
House ethics rules that prohibit using private citizens in an official capacity. Gaylord's
ambiguous presence in the Speaker's office eventually resulted in an ethics complaint
filed by Democratic congressman George Miller. The House Committee on Standards of
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Official Conduct (the Ethics Committee) affirmed the allegations made by Representative
Miller and concluded, ‘dhe routine presence of Mr. Gaylord tn Representattve Gingrich's
congressional office created the annearancr^ •ppearance of improper commingling of political and
official resources and was inappropriate.’- Mr. Gaylord was not accused of using his
relationship with the Speaker to benefit an outside party. However, as the House Ethics
committee pointed out, his unfettered access to the Speaker coupled with his private
business interests is a situation ripe for exploitation.
Issue advocacy campaigns are another element of consultant activity that is
largely unregulated. Direct-mail outreach and media advertising that promote a particular
issue, but do not explicitly champion a legislator or political party are not covered by
campaign finance regulation. The United States Supreme Court, building from a
rationale laid out in Buckley v. Valeo, has consistently affirmed the right of individuals
and groups to spend unlimited amounts of money on issue advocacy. Controlling these
expenditures, says the Court, is tantamount to an abridgment of the 1st Amendment
guarantee to free speech. The loophole created by Buckley v. Valeo has had some
predictable effects. Campaign money, like water rolling downhill, seeks the path of least
resistance. Spending by interest groups on issue advocacy has exploded in the last
decade because, unlike donations to candidates and political parties, there are virtually no
limits on spending and no reporting requirements. Since the EEC is not required to keep
statistics on issue advocacy, a complete assessment is impossible. Nevertheless,
according to study produced by the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of
Pennsylvania, during the 1995-1996 election cycle interest groups spent close to $150
million on issue advocacy.^® But critics, who include members of the FEC as well as
self-styled public interest watchdogs, contend that issue advocacy is simply a form of
mass media lobbying that should be regulated just like face-to-face contact with
legislators. As part of their argument for regulation, these critics point to the deceptive
tactics practiced by interest groups. Corporations, advocacy groups, and trade
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associations often form ad hoc coalitions with benign names like the American Property
Rights Alliance and the Small Business Survival Committee to sponsor issue ads and
coordinate media campaigns. The public and even some members of Congress are
usually unaware of what groups are financing the public relations campaign. The
anonymity covertly intertwines narrow, private interests with broader public concerns.
An advertisement, for example, that decries excessive environmental regulation of private
land may be directed at the small property owner, but is in fact sponsored by industrial
farming and mining interests/^
The tremendous growth of issue advocacy is a concern to scholars studying
interest group behavior, campaign finance, as well as political consulting. Consultants, it
must be said, should not be held accountable for the proliferation of issue advocacy
advertising. It would be more accurate to describe them as the beneficiaries. Their role,
however, cannot be characterized as passive and deserves critical attention. From a
power perspective, consultants collaborating with corporations revives the fears
expressed by C. Wright Mills in his seminal work. The Power Elite, and is echoed by
various authors writing on the consulting industry. They warn that a small group of elites
dominates the communications media at the expense of average citizens. They can make
a credible argument that by virtue of consultants' mastery over technically sophisticated
forms of communication, political consultants provide a megaphone for established
interests and as a result widen the influence gap between the haves and have nots. Darrell
West observes that “high-tech lobbying tools are expensive, and lobbying strategies based
on these models are not equally available to all groups.”'® To paraphrase former Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole, there are no political consultants who work for the poor.
The Efficacy of Political Consulting
As political consultants take on more issue related business and continue to work
closely with their political clients in a post-electoral capacity, one question remains
unasked by the participants: are campaign methods suitable in governing? There are a
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number of inslances related to the Contraet with Ameriea that challenge the
appropriateness of direct-mail and polling as a means of inllueneing public policy.
The grassroots campaign organized on behalf of the Competitive l.ong Distance
Coalition (CLDC) illustrates the pitfalls associated with these tactics. During the 1 04th
Congress, the CLDC, a group of telecommunications companies lobbying for greater
market freedom in telephone service, engaged a political consulting firm to raise public
awareness of their position, fhe campaign was intended to produce constituent pressure
on legislators through phone calls and telegrams, fhe popularity of this strategy is
predicated on the logical assumption that congressmen are inherently risk averse and will
avoid taking an unpopular stand if a significant number of their constituents make their
opinion known. In the ease of the CLDC, the firm they hired perpetrated a fraud by
forwarding telegrams to members of Congress without the approval of the signatories. In
essence, the firm took a list of names, forged their signatures and passed them on to
Congress in order to create the impression that there was a ground swell of public support
for the CLDCs position.*' Firms that specialize in grassroots advocacy steadfastly
maintain that this type of fraud is rare, but there is no way to be sure. In fact, there is
reason to believe the contrary is true. In a fast growing, cutthroat industry like grassroots
advocacy, the pressure to produce for clients could induce some companies to commit
fraud. The temptation is fueled by a lack of legal controls covering correspondence to
Congress, fhe firm that submitted forged telegrams on behalf of the CLDC went
unpunished because no laws exist prohibiting sending false letters to Congress.
Misusing direct-mail is simply one way political consultants can pressure
legislators. A different example is provided by the American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP). During the Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA) debate, the AARP,
who vigorously opposed the amendment, sponsored a poll that showed public support for
a balanced budget to be soft. 1 he poll, which contradicted several other private polls and
polls by respected institutions like Gallup and the Roper Center, indicated that support for
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the amendment, parlieularly among senior eiti.ens, was eontingent upon sustained levels
of entitlement spending. In this instance, pollsters produced evidence to bolster their
client's position in a policy debate. The completed poll was then used by the AARP to
persuade several wavering Democratic Senators to oppose the amendment. According to
John Rother, the head of governmental relations for the AARP, the poll - and the possible
electoral consequences it presaged - contributed to their decision to vote against the
IiI)A.« The AARP's innovative use of a poll as an offensive weapon revives old
questions about the place of public opinion in policy making and raises new ones about
the validity of agenda-driven issue polls. Despite advances in methodology and
technology, polls remain an inexact measure of public sentiment. Their accuracy can be
further compromised by slanted questions that produce faulty data. A poll produced to
support an agenda should be viewed with skepticism. But polls, with their patina of
scientific credibility, arc often assigned value they do not deserve, fhe AARP's poll, for
instance, was touted as an accurate rendering of public opinion even though its results
were disputed by other polls conducted by the (Jallup organization.''
Edcctcd officials are by far the largest consumers of polls and with the high level
of consumption comes a greater susceptibility to flawed advice. During the 104th
Congress, leaders in both parties regularly used polls to plot strategy. In some cases,
polls produced a vivid snapshot of the public mood; a useful glimpse of the public's
reaction to a new idea such as eliminating federal mandates. In other cases, however,
polls served to thwart the prospects of negotiation and bolstered the recalcitrant positions
taken by both sides, fhe tense budget battle between the Clinton Administration and the
I louse Republicans in 1995 is a fine illustration of the hazards presented by poll-driven
advice. In this instance, polls may have served to prolong a government shutdown, fhe
House Republican leadership was given poll data by their own party pollsters that showed
the public supported their principled stand against the President. Conversely, the
President's pollsters supplied him with numbers that unequivocally backed his position."
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Both polls presented a sanitized version of publ.c opinion skewed to reflect a particular
vewpomt. Using polls in this fashion endangers political compromise. It instills a
malign form of righteousness in dehate as each side claims to be speaking for the public.
To this point, the discussion has focused almost exclusively on actions pertaining
to the House, bu, in order for the Contract to complete its transformation into new public
policies it needed to pass the Senate and be signed into law by President Clinton.
Gingrich's bouyant confidence aside, he and his lieutenants realized that passage of the
entire Contract was a long shot. Nevertheless, as the Contract moved swiftly through the
House the Republican leadership became more optimistic for its chances in the Senate.
The Senate, however, was reluctant to rubber stamp the House agenda and, as Table 3.2
shows, only passed two Contract related bills with minor amendments. The remainder
were either defeated outright or were changed substantially. Even though the Senate was
controlled by Republicans, the priorities outlined in Contract were not universally
embraced by their membership. Senate Republicans had, in fact, unveiled their own
seven plank platform in September that stood apart from the Contract with America. The
Senate plan, entitled “Seven More in '94,” included a pledge on health care reform and
did not mention unfunded mandates, a line-item veto, term limits, a capital gains tax cut,
or an overhaul in product liability law.« The fact that the Senate was unwilling to
meekly accept a junior role regarding the Contract is unsurprising given its unique
political and institutional characteristics.
From a political perspective, Senate Republicans are considered less ideological
than their counterparts in the Flouse. ACU ratings (a measure of conservatism based on
selected roll call votes) show that Senate Republicans draw a lower overall score than
House Republicans.^^ This was especially true in the 104th Congress. In addition,
moderate figures such as Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-OR), James Jeffords (R-VT), and John
Chaffee (R-RI) held positions of influence within the Senate. Aside from their party
affiliation, these senators had little in common with firebrands in the House and staked
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out positions that pu, them in direct conflict with House Republicans. Senator Hatfield,
for example, cast the deciding vote against the Balanced Budget Amendment and was
P ed m the House for his opposition. Even Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, whose
pedigree as a conservative is impeccable, was taken aback by the revolutionary fewor and
irreverent behavior seen in the House. Dole was perhaps influenced by his own ambition.
Dole, as the prohibitive favorite for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination, faced a
dilemma. He could ill afford to alienate party stalwarts by actively obstructing the House
agenda. Yet, he could not appear to the public as Gingrich's handmaiden, lest he isolate
independent and moderate voters.
The contrasting political atmosphere provides one explanation for the Senate's
lack of enthusiasm for the Contract, hut institutional factors also played a role. The
Senate's cool reception to some Contract items is an affirmation of the chamber's design.
The Senate was intended, according to notes taken during the Constitutional Convention
and the Federalist Papers, to serve as a check against the volatile House. James
Madison, writing under the psuedonym Publius, outlined the purpose of the Senate in
Federalist 62 stating “the necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of
all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions
and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious revolutions.’””
Madison s words could be interpreted as an uncanny forecast of the 104th Congress.
Thus, the Senate s decision to slow the legislative pace appears to be a natural reaction to
the House's hyperactive 100 days.
The Senate s predilection for reflection and methodogical action is indulged by
Senators electoral circumstances. Unlike House members who must stand for reelection
every two years, Senators serve six year terms. The longer term and staggered elections
protect them from the more pernicious effects of the permanent campaign. I am not
suggesting that Senators do not take electoral consequences into account when making
policy decisions. I am, however, suggesting that the Senate is more shock resistant to
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short term nucuations in public opinion and, thus, less likely to be concerned with issue
polls and less vulnerable to pressure applied by mass media advertising. In this
institutional environment, the public relations strateg.es developed by consultants are apt
to be less effective.
Conclusion
Using pollsters and political consultants as a means of promoting or denigrating
policies represents an evolutionary change in the way political actors communicate with
the general public. Stumping for a particular piece of legislation is not a new
phenomenon. Our history is replete with examples of presidents and, to a lesser extent,
legislators campaigning for programs between elections. However, the use of
professional campaign operatives who utilize social science and mass marketing
techniques is qualitatively different from earlier instances public outreach.
It IS tempting to draw normative conclusions about this turn of events. For some
observers, the permanent campaign and the presence of political consultants at the heart
of policy debates is a perversion of political discourse. Policy filtered through
consultants seems cynical and somehow phony. Other critics delve deeper than political
aesthetics. Journalists and public interest advocates, for example, are dismayed by the
enormous sums being funneled through political consultants to devise issue advocacy
campaigns and produce polls. They contend that it is another symptom of a diseased
process poisoned by money. Well-heeled interests employing consultants drown out the
voices of average citizens and the exorbitant fees political consultants charge virtually
precludes their use by groups without vast financial resources."** Although political
consultants do not possess a knowledge monopoly, as medical doctors and attorneys do,
their specialized expertise puts them in a similar category. Just as the average citizen is
incapable of performing surgery, he also cannot conduct a poll or organize a direct-mail
campaign.
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Poh„cal scholars have also offered criticism of the coosult.ng industry's new
focus. Academies such as Kathleen Hall Jamieson and James Thurber
.uest.on whether
consultants vtolate the principles of democratic accountability by providing strategic
advtce to elected officials, wh.le simultaneously selling their serv.ces to pr.vate
.nterests.
It ts not dtfficult to imagine a scenario in which the consultant doctors advice to political
clients in order to appease private sector clients. These are all valid concerns and
important criticisms.
In terms of the effect on political rhetoric, consultants are often accused of
channeling debate to the lowest common denominator - emotion. The Contract presents
several examples where the policy became obscured by emotionally charged symbolism.
Through the artful work of political consultants, tort reform became a crusade to save
Little League and federal block grants were transformed into a nefarious plot to take hot
lunches away from poor kids. These are visceral, powerful images that can often stir the
most apathetic citizen into action. But is the political process enhanced by this sort of
electronic demogoguery? On the one hand, efforts to engage the public in the debate
could be seen as an enhanced form of pluralism. On the other hand, the reduction of
complex issues to bold, overwrought metaphors is an affront to honest politieal discourse.
I would, however, caution against a broad indictment of the consulting profession
for several reasons. First, it may be unfair to single out political consultants for criticism
as unelected and unaccountable figures in the policy process without mentioning similar
activity by other Washington insiders. The interplay between consultants and the
Republican leadership is not a frivolous matter, but they were just one of several groups
who aided the Republicans. Lobbyists, for example, enjoyed a more substantial role
shaping legislation than political consultants, who were primarily used to develop
message strategies and cultivate public support. During the first 100 days. Republican
Conference Chairman John Boehner hosted weekly meetings with representatives from
the Chamber of Commerce, NFIB, and the Christian Coalition to discuss legislative
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priorities and, in some isolated cases, invited the groups to submit drafts of their own
bills. In subsequent interviews Boehner unabashedly defended the close relationship
some lobbyists had with Republican lawmakers claiming, “the lobbyists share common
principles about what the appropriate role of the federal government is.“« As the first
session wore on there were numerous examples of lobbyists coordinating vote counting
operations, putting together talking points for members, and conducting briefings for
aides. All of this activity occurred despite legal restrictions and regulations governing
contact between legislators and lobbyists. Activists from conservative think tanks were
also involved In the legislative process. Organizations like the Heritage Foundation and
the Competitive Enterprise Institute hosted orientation seminars for new members and
even loaned policy experts to congressional offices for special projects.™ Bringing to
light the actions of lobbyists and think tank activists does not absolve consultants or
justify their involvement in the legislative process, but it provides a context to evaluate
their role.
Some of the criticism leveled at political consultants undoubtedly stems from
their reputation as mercenaries. Concerns that they may be misleading their political
clients for private gain are rooted in the image of the political consultant as a an amoral,
gun-for-hire. But the fact is most of the consultants, with Dick Morris being the major
exception, worked for clients whose political ideology matched their own. Frank Luntz,
Bill Mclnturff, and Linda DiVall worked for Republicans because they are Republicans
and support the party's mission. As for the use of direct-mail, media advertising, and
polling to influence legislation, critics are on firmer ground. The Contract presents
several disturbing examples where these methods were misused. The fraudulent and
deceptive direct-mail campaign sponsored by the Competitive Long Distance Coalition
and the push poll conducted on behalf of the AARP are egregious examples of misuse.
Even honest direct-mail contact and issue polling raise questions about the legitimacy of
constituent pressure. However, some of the opprobrium is overdrawn. Criticizing
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political consultants for using campaign tactics is little like blaming the army for warfare
Consultants run campaigns, not public educat.on seminars. They are not hired to perform
a public service.
In 1980 the political journalist cum presidential advisor Sidney Blumenthal wrote,
“the campaign method of governing implies a vision of the voters as passive yet
moveable; supportive of bold action, yet possessing shallow allegiances; willing to
endorse new possibilities, yet afflicted with a short attention span.’- ,n many respects
the Contract with America is an affirmation of Sidney Blumenthal's description of the
permanent campaign as well as a testament to the media-oriented, image laden politics
practiced by modem politicians. The metamorphosis of campaign specialists into
strategic policy advisors speaks to the value assigned to public opinion and public
perception by our elected officials. In this environment, elections no longer provide
mandates for governing. In fact, the election is simply one battle in an endless war of
attrition fought over public sentiment.” It is inevitable that politicians with an eye to
minute fluctuations of public opinion would seek the advice and services of the people
best equipped to manage their public image. In an age where policy debates are largely
fought at the grassroots level and over the airwaves, political consultants are a valuable
and I would suspect enduring addition to the legislative process.
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Table 1; The Contract with America
Bill Title Bill
Description
Number
Congressional
Accountability Act
HR 1
Ends exemptions that Congress granted itself from
1 1 laws governing safety and other work place
issues.
Line-Item Veto Act/BBA HR 2
HJResl
Crams the president the authority to veto portions
of appropriations bills or cancel targeted tax
breaks; a constitutional amendment requiring a
balanced federal budget
Taking Back Our Streets
A^t
HR 3
Increases state grants for prison construction;
requires restitution to victims; gives communities
flexibility to use federal anti-crime funds..
Personal Responsibility
Act
HR 4
Converts welfare programs into block grants to
states; ends automatic eligibility for welfare
payments; caps welfare spending and imposes a
time limit on welfare recipients
Unfunded Mandate Reform
Act
HR 5
Eliminates imposition of federal regulations
without compensation to the states for
enforcement.
American Dream
Restoration Act
HR 6
A i^uu per child tax credit; ease the marriage
penalty for filers ofjoint tax returns; cuts capital
gains taxes; and expand IRA savings plans.
National Security
Restoration Act
HR 7
Prohibits the use of US troops in UN missions
under foreign command; prohibits cuts in defense
to finance social programs; provides funding for a
missle defense system.
Senior Citizens Equity Act HR 8
Repeals the 1993 increase in Social Security
benefits subject to income tax; permits benficiaries
to earn up to $30,000 without losing benefits
Job Creation and Wage
Enhancement Act
HR 9
Reduces federal paperwork; requires federal
agencies to reimburse businesses for reduction in
property value due to regulations; and increases
first year tax deductions for small businesses
Common Sense Legal
Reform Act
HR 10
Establishes national product liability law limits on
punitive damages; introduces “loser pays” rule to
certain federal cases; and protects companies
against lawsuits by investors.
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1
Contract Item
Congressional
Accountability Act
House Action
Passed January 5, 1995
Senate Action
Passed January 1 1,
1995
Enacted
Yes
i^ine-item Veto/BBA BBA passed January
26, 1995
Line Item Veto passed
February 6, 1995
BBA defeated March 2
1995
Line item Veto passed
March 23, 1995
Partial
1 aKing Back the
Streets Act
Passed bebruary 7-14
1995
No action taken in 1995 No
Personal
Responsibility Act
Passed March 24, 1995 Passed Senate in
amended fashion
Partial
Unfunded Mandate
Reform Act
Passed February 1,
1995
Passed Senate January
27, 1995
Yes
American Dream
Restoration Act
National Security
Restoration Act
Passed April 4-7, 1995 Passed Senate in
amended fashion
Partial
rassea rebruary 16,
1995
No action taken in the
Senate
No
Senior Citizens
Equity Act
No action taken in the
Senate
Partial
Job Creation and
IVage Enhancement
Act
Passed February 22-24,
1995
Passed Senate in
amended fashion
Partial
Common Sense
Legal Reform Act
Passed March 7- 1 0,
1995
Passed Senate in
amended fashion
No
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CHAPTER IV
medicare
Introduction
The Contract with America offers an interesting glimpse of the legislative process.
Ltkc most real world examples, the events of the 104th Congress broaden some of the
colorless descriptions found in textbooks and reveal a dynamic, often unpredictable
system enriched by personality and charged with ideology. The Contract also illustrates
lawmakers’ powerful fascination with public opinion. The legislative process, when
viewed through the lens provided by the Contract, shows legislators determ.nation to
harness the power of public opinion and use it as a weapon to bludgeon their adveraries.
The Founders were wary of the power of public opinion and their apprehension
about the “tyranny of the majority” led them to create a system to check the momentary
impulses of the general public. Since the 1 700s. public opinion has undergone a radical
metamorphosis. Where it used to be ephemeral and slightly mysterious, soeial seience
has quantified it and made it seem concrete. Scientific polling has given public opinion
the substance it lacked during Madison's day. This in turn has altered the link between
the legislature and public opinion. The ability to “see” public opinion has inspired
politicians to manipulate it.'
Legislators and other political actors expend vast amounts of money, time and
effort m order to secure and sustain public support for their agendas. This behavior has
had a profound effect on the legislative process. By courting public sentiment
aggressively, politicians have unwittingly blurred the line distinguishing governing from
campaigning until a division is no longer recognizable. In the 1990s it has become
exceedingly rare for a major legislative initiative not to be accompanied by an expertly
designed and professionally administered public relations campaign. The conflation of
campaigning and governing presents obvious opportunities for political consultants who
possess indispensable campaign experience and technical expertise. Their expanded role
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.s C,early evident ,n the Contract with America. However, desp.te incontroverttble
evdence of post-electoral consulting, it is impossible to speculate on the impact that
pol.t,eal consultants may have on policy making without putting the actions described in
chapter three ,nto a broader context. In short, without an historical account of the
legislative process absent the presence of political consultants, any conclusions drawn
from the Contract could be fundamentally Hawed. The passage of Medicare in 1 965 is an
appropriate baseline with which to assess later examples of consultant activity. In 1965
professional political consultants were a rarity and were confined to campaign work
Before proceeding with a discussion of Medicare, a fuller definition and
description of the permanent campaign must be provided.^ I, is the phenomenon that
distinguishes the Contract with America and the Clinton health care reform from
Medicare and it under girds the analysis of post-electoral consulting. The permanent
campaign - the idea that a boundary between campaigning and governing existed that
eroded during the 1980s - has been examined at length by several political scientists and
journalists. For some political practitioners, a separation between governing and
campaigning is an academic conceit, a contrivance that does not exist in reality.’ In a
democracy, electoral consequences are invariably part of the decision-makers' calculus.’
The permanent campaign theory does not imply that an impermeable barrier has always
divided campaigning and governing, but that modern behavior is so different in degree
from the past that it has become different in kind.’ The hallmarks of the permanent
campaign - campaign specialists masquerading as policy advisors, multi million dollar
advertising schemes, and ceaseless polling - are not analogous to earlier examples of
public outreach.
In 1 965 the political consultant, at least as we know him today, did not exist. It
would be several years before Joe Napolitan, David Garth and a number of other
consultants would form the American Association of Political Consultants and thus
signify the birth of a profession. The absence of political consultants from the Medicare
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te differentiates tt from the Contract with America and the Clinton health care
reform. In the latter two cases, the legislative strategies exhibit tell-tale signs of
consultant inlluence. Although President Lyndon Johnson cultivated public support and
entreated citizens to contact their representatives and senators on behalf of Medicare he
did so without the extravagant public relations spectacle that followed President Clinton's
health care reform. The cornerstone of the White House approach was a high level
behind-the-scenes effort to influence legislators such as House Ways and Means
Chairman Wilbur Mills and Senate Finance Chairman Russell Long. Interest groups,
with the notable exception of the American Medical Association, also eschewed
grassroots efforts and largely confined their activities within the corridors of power.
The Legislative History of Medicare
Medicare's enactment in 1965 was the culmination of a legislative battle that
spanned nearly three decades. It pitted New Deal liberals, attempting to fulfill plans
outlined by the original authors of the Social Security Act, against a phalanx of
conservative politicians and interest groups led by the American Medical Association
(AMA). For anyone interested in exploring the legislative process through the case study
method. Medicare presents a well-defined example. Through its many preludes and false
starts. Medicare featured all the elements scholars traditionally associate with the
legislative process: ideological conflicts between conservatives and liberals; institutional
clashes between the President and Congress; and the manifest manuervings of interest
groups. It also underscored the unbounded personal autonomy enjoyed by House
committee chairmen before the legislative reforms of the 1970s.
The idea of government sponsored health insurance germinated during the New
Deal. Several members of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s brain trust encouraged him
to include health care as part of his sweeping Social Security program, but Roosevelt
demurred. A cursory survey of the political landscape led Roosevelt to conclude that
incorporating health care could jeopardize his entire proposal. Physicians and insurance
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companies had repeatedly vowed to fight any legislation that instituted exeessive
governmental control over the health care industry. The AMA. the lead.ng prolessional
assoc,ation representing American doctors, was on record expressmg adamant
dtsapproval of government health care. As early as 1920 the AMA released a statement
declartng the.r “opposition to the institution of any plan embodying the system of
compulsoo, contributory insurance...provided, controlled, or regulated by any state or
federal government.- The group equated government health care with government
.nterference and claimed any federal attempt to manage health care would lead down a
slippery slope to socialism. In congressional hearings and in paid advertisements
spokesmen for the AMA presented a dark view of the future in which patient services
were rationed by the government and citizens could no longer choose their own doctors.’
The fear of heavy-handed government control in the form of “socialized medicine” was
articulated in the 1940s and became the cornerstone of the AMA's argument against
Medicare.
Alarmist prognostications notwithstanding, throughout the 1940s and 1950s the
AMA had little cause for concern. Despite the fact that Democrats controlled both
chambers of Congress and the White House continuously from 1939 to 1946, they did
not, according to Ted Mannor, enjoy a “programmatic majority” for government-
sponsored health care. The House and Senate were dominated by a conservative coalition
made up of Republicans and Southern Democrats who opposed activist government
intervention and the expansion of social programs.’ The coalition was sympathetic to the
AMA's position and used their influence to stymie health care legislation in committees.
The strength of the conservative coalition was evident in 1948 when President Harry
Truman made national health insurance a domestic priority for his administration.
Truman campaigned hard for the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, a bill intended to provide
universal health insurance, but he was unable to sway conservative lawmakers. His
attempt to marshal public support for the proposal also met with defeat at the hands of a
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massive public relations campaign sponsored by the AMA. In a move iha, eerily
presages
.be 1 leal.l, Insurers Assoeia.ion of Ameriea (1 IIAA) eampa.gn agan.s, ,be
Clmton health eare plan, the AMA hired Wh,taker and Baxter, the prest.g.ous polt.ieal
consulting firm from Cal.fornia, to develop a national ad campaign demonixing Truntan's
proposal. Using a clever mix of newspaper advertising and ghost written editorials
Whitaker and Baxter's S2 million ad campaign succeeded in portraying the Trumanplan
as socialized medicine After the -ut mitn, u iad blitz began public support for health care reform
plummeted.
Ouring the Eisenhower years national health insurance remained off the public
agenda. Iwery year, liberal members of Congress would introduce legislation that would
subsequently disappear in committee. After a series of fruitless congressional sessions,
experts working at HEW and the Social Security Administration, in conjunction with
their congressional allies, changed tactics. They recognized earlier examples of health
legislation were too ambitious and attracted opposition from a variety of perspectives.
The core group of universal health care opponents believed that compulsory, government-
sponsored health insurance violated American principles of independence and self-
reliance. These members were philosophically opposed to statist welfare programs in all
forms. They did not, however, represent an absolute majority. Their position was
strengthened by an alliance of convenience with other lawmakers who were more
concerned about the enormous financial burden the federal government would incur in an
attempt to insure every American citizen. They were unwilling to commit the
government to a program of this magnitude. In order to dellcct criticism and
simultaneously shrink the scope of the plan. Medicare supporters decided to limit the
proposal to the elderly.'" There were strong moral and economic arguments to expand the
Social Security system to include health care for the aged. Many older Americans were
retired and could no longer afford private insurance. Even though they tended to suffer
from worse health, an overwhelming number did not have means to protect themselves.
14
1
ed,carc advoca.es believed ,ha, ,he governmen, had a moral imperative ,o help Us older
cu,ze„s. in,erven.,on was defended on economic grounds as well, s.nce a governmen.
plan covering
.he elderly would help lower premiums for other age brackets." By 1957
supporters in Congress and in HEW created the leg.slative template for Medicare.
As the 1 950s drew to a close, health care once again emerged as a viable national
issue. John F. Kennedy, on advice from his pollster Lou Harris, incorporated health care
into his presidential campaign. In the Senate, Kennedy had introduced a version of the
House bill and announced that enactment of Medicare was one of his chief legislative
goals if he were elected president. Although the Republican candidate Richard Nixon
was reticent to discuss health care, Kennedy succeeded in reviving public interest in
health care reform.
The Kennedy administration began with great promise and vision, but he was
saddled with a number of debilitating handicaps that ultimately precluded serious
consideration of Medicare. First, he possessed a weak electoral mandate. His victory
over Richard Nixon was the narrowest margin since 1 880 and thus he could not claim his
election was an unqualified public endorsement of his agenda." Second, he faced
formidable conservative opposition in Congress. Southern Democrats were particularly
wary of a northern, urban Democrat like Kennedy. Aside from these immutable factors,
Kennedy made the situation more complicated by unveiling a long list of priorities. I lis
domesttc agenda was cluttered with major pieces of legislation including a complete
overhaul of the tax code, a massive increase in federal aid for education, and an ambitious
space exploration program. These issues depleted his limited political capital and forced
Kennedy to pare back his efforts on behalf of Medicare. He could ill afford to squander
his influence with Congress and perhaps incur the enmity of men like Wilbur Mills by
badgering him to report a Medicare bill.'^
Without Mills’s cooperation, Kennedy, under the counsel of Wilbur Cohen and his
domestic policy advisors, decided to bypass the House and work through the Senate.
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Ailhough ,he Constitution stipulates all tax hills ntust onginate in the Mouse, Detnocfats
and hhcral Republicans side-stepped this provision hy attaching Medicare as an
amendment to a welfare hill that had already passed the I louse. The atncndtnent passed
and Kennedy aehieved a major hut fleeting victory.^
eonlercttcc connnittee
ohsttnatc Mouse eonferees refused to discuss Medicare and the htll died conference.
It may he reasonably asserted that the ealalyst for Medieare's passage was the
l%4 election. Without the 1964 election, which brought an it, flux of liberal
congressmen to add to Lyndon ,lohnson's popular mandate. Medicare would have likely
remained an idealistic but unreachable goal. The addition of 37 new, tno,stly liberal
Democratic congressmen swelled the Mou.se Demoeratie majority to 295 men,hers. In the
Senate, Democrats increased their total to 68. ISut the raw numbers are not as signifleant
as the ideological outlook of the 89th Congress." The new members were able to
surmount the obstructionist tactics practiced by the conservative coalitiot, that had
thwarted social legislation in the two previous Congresses. President
.lohnson, whose
unprecedented margin of victory over Sen. Barry Goldwatcr was interpreted as an
endorsement of his ambitious agenda, matched the activist fervor on Capitol Mill.
According to .lohnson biographer Doris Kearns Goodwin the 1964 election presented a
rare opportunity and “produced a blend of interests, needs, convictions, and alliances
powerlul enough to go beyond the normal pattern of slow incrcntenlal change,”"'
In the I louse of Representatives, the liberal cohort had an inmicdiatc impact on
the institutional structure, hirst, they forced the Mouse to adopt new rules restricting the
power of the Rules Committee. Under the direction of conservative Democrat I loward
Smith, the Rules Commtttee had bottled up a number of progressive bills by refusing to
report a rule lor floor consideration. The new rules permitted the chairmen of legislative
committees, if recognized by the Speaker, to call up bills that had languished in the Rules
Commtitcc for over 21 days. Second, the addition of new members on committees
altered the balance ol power between conservative and liberal forces. On the Ways and
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eans Comm.ttee, for example. Democrats increased the.r number by 2, creat.ng a , 7 to
8 rat.0 wtth l.beral supporters outnumbering conservatives 14 to 1 1. For the first time a
“programmatic majority” for Med,care extsted in the House of Representatives.
President Johnson's determination to pass Medicare provoked a combative
response from the AMA. Throughout the Kennedy administration, the AMA had lobbied
legislators and conducted sporad.c advertising eampa.gns highl.ghting the deficiencies of
Medtcare. In 1965, the AMA raised its level of operations and unveiled a $1 million
lobbying campaign that included TV, radio, and newspaper ads. The AMA campaign
was unprecedented in terms of cost. According to Congressional Quarterly in 1965,
“there have been only two occasions when lobbying spending by any organization for any
full year reached or exceeded $900,000.’"’ The AMA surpassed that mark in three
months. Yet, the AMA's massive public relations campaign should be interpreted as an
act of desperation rather than par, of a formidable long-range strategy. The campaign
was largely unnoticed by lawmakers, and the public seemed unaffected by revived cries
of socialism. By 1965, the hysteria that could be generated by any mention of socialism
(a euphemism for communism) had abated. The AMA was hampered by another crucial
weakness. Despite the vast sum spent in 1965, the campaign had a primitive design.
Modem public relations campaigns, like the one developed for the Contract with
America, use poll data and demographic information to target specific audiences where
the ads will have the greatest impact. The AMA spent millions of dollars, but the
outreach was haphazard and lacked focus.
Although President Johnson was the most visible force behind Medicare,
Representative Wilbur Mills may have played a more pivotal role. His decision to
support Medicare after opposing it for nearly a decade was considered by many
participants as the “missing link” needed for passage.'^ Mills's change of heart is a fine
example of political pragmatism. He recognized his autonomy as Ways and Means
Chairman was threatened by the liberal make-up of the 89th Congress and he was not
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wlhng
.o sacrifice his reputation by fighting a futile battle against Medicare. H.s chotce
was nrade easier by the fobnson adntinistrations wi.bngness to offer a nta|or concession
M.lls had expressed reservations toward earlier versions of Medicare concerning the
financng scheme and was especially critical of sublimating Medicare into the Social
Security trust fund. The Johnson administration bill kept Medicare financing separate
from Social Security.
Once Mills decided to support Medicare, he exerted tremendous infiuence over
the substance of the bill. fact, it is accurate to say that he is responsible for the existing
scope of Medicare. Aside from the administrations bill, there were two other bills
purporting to be superior versions of Medicare. The Republicans introduced an
alternative with a broader range of benefits that was financed through general revenue
taxes instead of a payroli deduction. A third plan, endorsed by the AMA, was even more
generous calling for an expansion of the Kerr-Milis Act which permitted the federal and
state governments to purchase health insurance on behalfof impoverished elderly. The
AMA's plan, however, was voluntary.” The AMA's abrupt reversal of their opposition to
government-sponsored health care was a cynical exercise in political symbolism. They
believed that they could embarrass the administration by supporting a bill with more
generous benefits. The ploy, however, turned out to be an enormous tactical blunder.
Instead of engaging in a time-consuming battle over various proposals. Mills decided to
combine elements of all three plans into a new bill. His brilliant legislative maneuver
expanded coverage and simultaneously preempted the opponents' arguments. The Mills
version easily passed the House by a 3 1 3 to 1 1 5 roll call vote.
Medicare had even less trouble in the Senate. The Senate had already
demonstrated its receptiveness to Medicare, passing previous incarnations of the bill
twice only to have them falter in conference committee with the House. There were,
however, some delicate moments. The Senate Finance Committee, the committee with
jurisdiction over Medicare, was led by the mercurial senator from Louisiana. Russell
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Long. Senator Long was not opposed to Medicare in principle, but he was unwilling to
let ,t pass through his committee without leaving his mark. Driven by what critics said
was overweening pride and personal ambition, Long began tinkering with the Mills
version. Supporters were concerned that Long’s efforts to improve the bill would
dtsmantle it and result in a lengthy conferenee committee.” Personal entreaties to
Senator Long by President Johnson along with the cooperation of several Democratic
committee members succeeded in keeping the Senate-sponsored changes minimal. On 9
July 1965, Medicare passed the Senate by a vote of 68 to 21?'
On 30 July 1965, barely seven months after Medicare had been introduced in
Congress, President Johnson signed it into law. But the actions of the 89th Congress
should be viewed as part of a larger 30 year struggle to put together a viable piece of
legislation. Fittingly and symbolically, President Johnson conducted a signing ceremony
m Independence Missouri, Harry Truman's home town, as homage to the former
President. It was an historic and bittersweet moment that reminded all the witnesses how
long they had been fighting for it and how many failures they had endured.
Why Did It Pass? Explanations for Medicare
The chronology of the Medicare debate is a reflection of a complex legislative
system buffeted by many external and internal forces. The historical account highlights
several important incidents such as: Wilbur Mills reversal on Medicare, the election of
Lyndon Johnson, the change in the ideological makeup of the Congress, and the
diminished influence of reactionary interest groups. All contributed to Medicare's
enactment. But discussing Medicare without the language of political science makes it
seem as if Medicare were a serendipitous event, worse still it makes the legislative
process seem incoherent and inexplicable. Description alone does not explain why it took
thirty years for the program to became a reality or why in 1965 passage was virtually
assured.
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Pohcy making is an activity that involves a myriad of choices for legislators and
pres,dents. For political scientists, discovering and analyzing the motives beh.nd the
chotces is an unending quest. A great deal of thought and research has been conducted in
an effort to distill the factors that comprise the decision making calculus. It is a trying
endeavor that usually involves assumptions about human behavior and often forces
scholars to flatten the legislative process so that it can fit into a research design. The very
nature of the division and separation of variables is a contrivance that distinguishes
academic study from political reality. Congressmen, for instance, often scoff at the
notion that their decisions are the product of applied arithmetic.^ The analytical
challenge ,s summarized by Roger Davidson and Waiter Oleszek who state, “to unravel
the chain of causality involved in congressional decision making would require a
comprehensive model embracing demographic, sociological, psychological, and political
motivations. Simplified models, without a doubt, pinpoint important components of
legislative decisions. As with all complex human behavior, however, such decisions
elude wholly satisfactory description.”^’ Congressional votes taken on a single issue
should be examined, interpreted and labeled with caution. Nevertheless, a number of
excellent works provide insight into the motives behind major policy proposals. With
regards to Medicare, it appears constituency, presidential pressure, and ideology all
played a significant part in its passage.
One of the more intriguing aspects of Medicare is the long string of failures and
false starts that preceded its passage in 1965. The significance of these failures has been
duly noted in several historic accounts of Medicare, but each work is colored by
optimism inspired by the Great Society and seems to treat Medicare as an inevitable
outgrowth ofNew Deal policies. John Kingdon offers a sophisticated and satisfying
explanation for Medicare's emergence as a national priority. Kingdon posits major policy
initiatives as the result of three streams — problem recognition, policy solutions, and
politics - converging to open a narrow window of legislative opportunity. The streams,
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accord.„g ,0 Kingdon, “are largely
.ndependem of one another, and each develops
accordtng to tts own dynamics and rules. But at some critical junctures the three streams
are jotned. and the policy changes grow out of that coupltng of problems, policy
proposals, and polities.’- Medicare fits well into his conceptual framework By the
. 960s, a growing number of academtes and poltcy experts in government had concluded
that the lack of affordable health care for the elderly was an urgent problem. The overall
number of senior citizens was increasing and they were living longer, but without the
benefit of health insurance. Knowledgeable observers feared their numbers would
eventually overwhelm the private health care system unless the government intervened.
By the time Lyndon Johnson was inaugurated in 1965 a policy solution had taken shape,
molded and revised by years of discussion on Capitol Hill and within the health care
bureaucracy. The final piece of the puzzle was the landslide election in 1964. It created a
friendly environment for Medicare and enabled partisans to push the measure through
Congress. Kingdoms argument is implicit in James Sundquist's description of Medicare
politics;
The final measure was the product of 15 years of refinement and
liberalization since the first Federal Security Agency, and 8 years of
continuous public debate since Aime Forand presented his original
proposal. Many of the changes were made to meet Republican objectives
and embodied ideas that the Republicans could claim as their own.^^
Kmgdon's work suggests that Medicare was the culmination of unique events.
For years, health policy experts knew that there was a problem; and they and their allies
m Congress spent considerable time attempting to construct a legislative response. The
decision in the late 1950s to limit coverage to the elderly, in order to avoid the trouble
that plagued the Truman bill, was a crucial step toward enactment. But until the 1 964
election, which returned an activist president to the White House along with a cadre of
liberal representatives. Medicare remained an unlikely possibility. The window of
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opponunuy d,d not stay open for long. The 1966 mid-term elections were a disaster for
Democrats as they lost 47 seats tn the House, far more than the 37 they gained in i 964
Gtven the eireumstanees. it appears doubtful that Johnson could have shepherded
Medtcare through the 90th Congress. Civ.l unrest at home and the tragedy unfolding in
Vietnam ate away at Johnson's prestige and public support. As health policy scholar
Lawrence Brown notes, “Medicare was an incidental consequence of political
convergences and coalitions so rare that they dominate US politics for perhaps ten years
in a century.
Congressional scholars Richard Fenno and David Mayhew present compelling
arguments why it proved so difficult to pass Medicare prior to the 89th Congress. For
both authors constituency is the locus of their analysis of congressional behavior. Their
work argues that legislators' desire to be reelected and to serve the constituency that put
them in office is the driving force behind many policy decisions. In Home Sfyle, Fenno
develops a complex description of constituency that goes far beyond the geographic
representation. Fenno maintains there are four concentric circles of constituency with
varying degrees of influence over a legislator’s behavior. Aside from the geographic
constituency, which is made up of all the citizens residing in the prescribed district or
state, a legislator pays special attention to the needs of his reelection constituency, his
primary constituency, and his personal constituency. The reelection constituency are
people that the legislator expects will support him, such as party stalwarts and long time
supporters. The primary constituency are those especially active in the primary
campaign. The personal constituency is comprised of intimate associates that the
legislator may seek out for advice.” Fenno's contribution puts the early success of the
AMA into clearer perspective. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the AMA's
extraordinary influence over the process eclipsed its relatively small membership. The
organization was able to achieve this in part because so many of its members were trusted
friends of congressmen or were community leaders in their own right. They constituted a
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specialized constituency whose opinion, parttcularly in med.cal matters, was taken
seriously by members of Congress.
David Mayhew bolsters Fenno's analysis in his sem.nal work. Congress; ,ke
Electoral Connection. Mayhew posits that reelection is the primary goal of all
legislators, whom he characterizes as “single-minded seekers of reelection.” This
eonsuming ambition has predictable effects on public policy. According to this logic
broad policy proposals that provide diffuse benefits to the disorganized are marginal.zed
m favor of particularized programs that can translate into electoral support.
“Congress,”
Mayhew claims, “will favor the passage of transfer programs when they are championed
by powerful interest groups against unorganized opposition [but] will be reluctant to
legislate new programs benefiting the unorganized over the opposition of the
organized.”^' This analysis accounts for the tepid response Medicare received in
Congress prior to 1964. Doctors loud protestations against Medicare were not matched
by any coherent public outcry in support of the program. The AMA's voice reverberated
through Congress because the public remained silent.
The frameworks created by Fenno and Mayhew are strongest when explaining
why Medicare failed to pass Congress, but their rationale falters slightly when examining
the events of 1965. Explaining why narrow interests triumph over diffuse ones is
relatively easy. So is explaining efforts to obtain benefits or prevent costs for attentive
constituencies. In The Logic ofCongressional Action, R. Douglas Arnold amplifies
Fenno and Mayhew’ s explanations by offering a more advanced theory of the electoral
concerns that motivate legislators. Mayhew and Fenno limit their analysis to active
participants in politics and give short shrift to the mass of indifferent voters. Arnold, on
the other hand, imbues this bloc of voters with a great deal of power. He claims that
inattentive publics can affect legislators' decisions because “latent or unfocused opinions
can be quickly transformed into very real opinions with enormous political
repercussions.”^^ Capable legislators endeavor to anticipate public response to bills and
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rarely confuse unformed public opinion with no op.nion a. all. The landsl.de elec,ion of
1964 was taken as a strong indication of the pubhc's position regarding Medicare.
Johnson had made it his number one legislative priority so his election could be
rnterpreted as an endorsement of his social policies. Although the pubhc was not
clamoring for Medicare, Johnson’s crushing victory induced some otherwise skept.cal
legislators to support the president's agenda.
Congress, of course, does not consider issues in a political vacuum.
Congressional decision making cannot be readily uncoupled from the larger
constitutional framework and as Louis Fisher notes, “to study one branch of government
in isolation from the others is an exercise in make-believe. Veo- few operations of
Congress and the presidency are genuinely independent or autonomous.”” The
president's shadow looms over the entire process and his position, particularly on major
policy initiatives, and is often the impetus for congressional action. It is true that
Congress functions independently of the executive branch, but it is impossible to imagine
a legislative proposal on the order of Medicare emerging from Congress without forceful,
committed leadership from the president.
Lyndon Johnson's decision to make Medicare his primary domestic priority was
erucial to congressional action. As every grade school civics text makes clear, it is
beyond the president's power to order Congress to take action. Yet, the president is
obviously more than just an interested bystander watching the legislative process from
afar. His agenda, even in times of divided government, focuses congressional attention
and provides the context for future debate. During the post war era when presidential
power was seen to have grown with respect to Congress, it became popular to speak of
presidential dominance.” The aphorism “the president proposes and the Congress
disposes” was commonly used to describe the relationship between the legislative and
executive branches. This is a distortion of the true relationship, as Congress is quite
capable of pursing its own public policy course.
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Paul Light, who portrays the president
accurate description. According to Light, the
as a legislative facilitator, offers a more
president's most important skill is his
“ability ,0 link abstract public support to specific legislative nreasures’- and highlight
important issues for the Congress. Johnson's indefatigable enthusiasm for Medicare and
his relentless pursuit of its passage kept congressional attention centered on the issue
Johnson's muscular lobbying was intended, in part, to keep Congress from becom.ng
distracted. His experience in the Senate taught him a valuable lesson about the tendency
for legislation to drift aimlessly unless a powerful force guided its path. President
Johnson explained his philosophy in his autobiography, stating that “there is only one
way for a President to deal with Congress and that is continuously, incessantly, and
without interruption.”^^
not
Johnson’s vigorous effort, however, would have been for naught if he had
possessed a vast reservoir of political capital. The president’s real power - the power to
persuade according to Richard Neustadt - is predicated on his prestige and public
popularity.^^ His prestige is the standing he has with other important political figures.
Johnson, as a former Senate Majority Leader, was intimate with many power brokers on
Capitol Hill. His personal rapport with committee chairmen and the elected leadership of
the House and Senate was vital to his standing in Congress. Although many stories about
Lyndon Johnson are apocryphal, there is little doubt that he was a man who was
consumed by politics and thoroughly enjoyed the rough and tumble nature of law
making. Historians and biographers have produced a veritable hagiography depicting
Johnson’s highly personal style of politics. The other half of the president’s power, from
Neustadt s perspective, emanates from his public popularity. At the outset of the 89th
Congress, President Johnson enjoyed tremendous public support. His public approval
rating remained over 60 percent until the summer of 1966. Thus, in 1965 President
Johnson, drawing upon a deep well of public support and his own prodigious political
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sk.ll, was a formidable force in .he legislative process, and given the circumstances, it
seems unl.kely that Congress would blatantly disregard his wishes concern.ng Medicare.
Johnson cannot take sole credit for his impressive string of legislative
accomphshments. The 1964 elections radically altered the ideological make up of
Congress. The conservative coalition was weakened by the influx of new urban and
suburban Northeastern Democrats. In both the House and the Senate, conservative forces
the number of legtslative victories decrease by 60% during the 89th Congress.’* In
committee and on the House and Senate floor, the tacit alliance that had blocked
progressive legislation during the early 1960s fell apart in the face an overwhelming
liberal majority. The new members had an activist bent and did not need prompting from
the White House to support a progressive measure like Medicare. According to a study
of presidential success conducted by Joseph Cooper and Gary Bombardier, “Johnson
could win victories denied to Kennedy because he was drawing on a larger population of
fellow partisans, a population in which the northern Democrats alone could come very
close to furnishing all the votes needed for a majority.’* In the 89th Congress,
progressive measures like Medicare enjoyed a programmatic majority for the first time
since the New Deal.
At the outset of this section, I stated that no single perspective offered a
completely satisfactory explanation for the events which culminated in Medicare. This is
a facile, bordering on axiomatic, conjecture. Of course no single theory could account for
the passage of a complex and ambitious policy like Medicare. But the strength or utility
of a theory is not predicated on its ability to clarify everything. Moreover, if competing
explanations for public policy were invalidated by one all-encompassing theory, studying
politics would be a pointless exercise since every vantage point would yield the same
view. Reality may not be as precise or formulaic as theories portend it to be, but the
application of rigorous political science theory demystifies the legislative process and
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enables observers lo eonrprehend rhe underlying factors that propel legislation through
Congress.
IMferent Circumstances: The I hree
We return to the main focus of the study, political consulting. Medicare presents
an tntcresting case study of the legislative process before the advent of post-electoral
eonsulting, but it begs the question: how are the events surrounding the Medicare debate
distinct from later examples involving pohtieal consultants? I propose that there are three
s.gnirteant differences distinguishing Medicare from the Contraet with America and the
Clinton health care reform related to political eonsulting. hirst, in the thirty years that
separate the Great Society from the Clinton administration, the political landscape
underwent a great transformation, particularly in the held of communications.
Technological advances, such as satellite communications and cable television, and the
emergence of mass media forced politicians to adapt to a faster paced, more lluid political
environment. C-SPAN and 24 hour news channels have made the legislative process
more transparent to the public eye and subsequently given politicians a greater
apprectation for the importance of perception. The dawn of mass media politics has real
consequences for how politicians behave and interact with each other. Contemporary
presidents, for example, are disposed to “go public" rather than negotiate with public
leaders behind the scenes. Legislators, for their part, seem just as intent on “making
news” as they are on making laws," This evolutionary change in the way politicians
engage in policy debates and communicate with the general public has created a demand
for the services of political consultants. Consultants, whose experience in the heated,
rhetorically charged atmosphere of campaigns, are ideally suited to provide policy advice
to politicians in this context.
Second and related to the first, the venue where policy battles are fought has been
expanded to Include the virtual world of television and, more recently, cyberspace. In
1965 the combatants faced each other within the exclusive confines of Washington D.C.
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agamst Medicare. The AMA's expensive but primitive political marketing effort was not
successful and was barely noticed by legislators. Contrast this with the sophisticated
adverttsmg effort coordinated by the Heath Insurers Association of America (HIAA) to
defeat the Clinton health care reform. Contemporary political actors have accepted the
proposttion. rightly or wrongly, that policy battles are won and lost around the “kitchen
table.” This is not to suggest public relations overshadows committee work and tnter-
governmental negotiations, but that grassroots activity by interest groups and government
officials is a crucial part of an overall legislative strategy.- The similarity between
grassroots activity and electoral campaigning is not superficial, creating yet another
opportunity for political consultants to involve themselves in the policy process.
Finally, m a basic sense what public opinion means to law making today is
markedly different to what it meant during the Medicare debate. It would foolish, as well
as incorrect, to claim that public opinion regarding Medicare was not important to
Lyndon Johnson and his allies on Capitol Hill, but the historical record reveals policy
makers were not obsessed with the public mood. Some political figures, such as Wilbur
Mills, were disdainful of public opinion, and others, such as Wilbur Cohen, were wary of
its role in shaping the legislation. Johnson, for his part, understood that his opportunity to
pass Medicare was predicated on the public's approval of his ambitious domestic agenda,
but he did remarkably little to cultivate public support once the election was over.
Instead, he preferred to concentrate on personal contact with Members of Congress.
Compare this with the fiirtive, incessant polling that followed the Contract and the
Clinton health care reform effort. In both cases, policy makers felt compelled to harness
public opinion as a way of projecting an advantage. Their preoccupation with public
sentiment created an insatiable appetite for polls. The elevated status of public opinion
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motivated politicians to employ political consultants,
and manipulate it.
who are best equipped to interpret
A host of scholars have addressed the changes wrought by the advancement of
communications technology and the development of the mass media on American
politics. I do not wish to do them a disservice by engaging in a slapdash, pasteurized
summary of their work, so I will endeavor to keep my remarks focused on how the
changes relate to the advent of post-electoral consulting. Essentially, politicians who
chose to use the mass media, particularly television, to garner support for their policies
routinely rely upon the figures that have the most experience manipulating the medium,
political consultants. Moreover, the modem politicians nearly pathological fascination
with public opinion leads them to employ pollsters as full time policy soothsayers. The
decision to use political consultants is directly related to the challenges posed by
communicating in a technically sophisticated mediated polity. Simply put, political
consultants preeminence is an affiimation of the contemporary political condition where
selling a policy is just as crucial as developing it.
Lawmaking is much more transparent today than it was in the 1960s. During the
Medicare debate politicians were shielded, to a degree, from scrutiny by the insularity of
congressional politics. Affairs were not kept secret, print journalists and lobbyists paid
keen attention, but the absence of television allowed legislators to conduct their business
m relative anonymity. Now C-SPAN presents gavel-to-gavel coverage of the House and
Senate while other cable networks maintain a permanent presence on the Hill, ready to
report a story at a moment's notice. Today's legislators live in what Paul Light refers to
as an environment of surveillance.”^^ The increased attention and visibility has altered
how legislators act, particularly with regard to high profile issues.
As the mass media grew in stature, congressional scholars advanced a typology
that divided legislators into two, rough categories. Members of the first group - the
workhorses — were typically described as diligent, behind-the-scenes figures that
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shunned the glaring media spotlight. These members
who generally supported the hierarchical
were usually old guard politicians
arrangement and worked within the system to
earn respec. and power. The other group - the “showhorses’’ - exploited „edia attention
and sought it out with a variety of symbolic and
publicity. These members tended to be
controversial actions designed to gain
younger and were less likely to accept the
instrtutional confines established by more senior members. The difference between the
two is more than stylistic or aesthetic and involves a conception of productive behavior
that is fundamentally different. The new generation of media conscious legislators are
willing to use mass media techniques to advance their policy goals. They prefer taking to
the airwaves to solicit public support instead of toiling in the shadows to build a policy
coalition.'''^
The crude dichotomy is simplistic and does not render a complete picture of
congressional behavior, but it does serve as a departure point for a debate about how
legislators make laws. In the case of Medicare, workhorse type legislators dominated the
process. Chairman Mills and his colleagues on the Ways and Means committee were
content to operate without provoking a maelstrom of media attention. Mills felt his
primary obligation was to craft a viable bill that a majority of Democrats could support
on the House floor. He was indifferent to public perception. His low regard for public
opinion is exemplified by his decision not to hold public hearings on Medicare. In order
to expedite the bill. Mills with the support of the Democrats on the Ways and Means
Committee went straight to closed, executive session.'*’ This is in sharp contrast to the
spectacle that followed the latter two case studies. During the Contract with America,
legislators m both parties held “theme team” meetings, often with affiliated political
consultants, to develop daily messages tied to committee action. Legislators would then
take to the House floor or use committee time to promote the message. The strategy is
rooted in the understanding that hard work within the institutional setting can be for
naught if the corresponding public perception is negative. Public relations is not a
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substitute for committee work, but the resources devoted to “spin contror indicate a
commttment to capture the terms of debate in addition to innuence the actual content of a
bill.
The workhorse legislator is not extinct tn the 1990s. In fact, there are many
members who enjoy long, successful careers in Congress far away from the limelight
Yet. even the most ret.cent, self-effac.ng member would acknowledge that media scrutiny
has ratsed the profile and influence of self-promoting political entrepreneurs. Consider
the dtfferent political world's inhabited by Wilbur Mills and Dan Rostenkowski.
Rostenkowski, a protege of Mills, was very comfortable in the cloistered world of
lobbyists and committee mark ups. He was awkward in front of the camera and openly
expressed derision for “blow dried politicians” who cultivated the media. In a recent
Rostenkowski biography, Richard Cohen remarked that he was an old-style politician
trapped in a media-oriented political world.« Unfortunately for Rostenkowski, he. unlike
Mills, could not afford to ignore the media or treat members who took cues from the
media with indifference. By the time Rostenkowski became chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, the ability of committee chairman to control its members had
declined sharply. His impotence is demonstrated by his inability to fend off pressure
generated by outside public relations campaigns. When it became clear that some Ways
and Means Democrats were fearful of supporting the Clinton administrations bill due to
bad publicity, Rostenkowski negotiated with the HIAA to have their attack ads taken off
the atr in return for some concessions in the bill. It is difficult to imagine Wilbur Mills
succumbing to this type of pressure. In fact, the AMA's expensive public campaign to
defeat Medicare went virtually unnoticed by Mills. Mills casual disregard for public
relations and Rostenkowski's explicit acknowledgment of it, illustrates the influence
marketing and advertising have over the legislative process.
From the politician s perspective there is a dark side to the omnipresence of the
media. Since the early 1970s, elected officials, liberals as well as conservatives, have
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crmczed the media for wha, they perce.ve as undue, del.bera.e eynicism.
,t is now
commonplace ,o hear politicians lament about sn.de comments, puerile coverage, and
oumght distortions tha, pervade the mainstream media. Their concern, while
undoubtedly self-serving, has been echoed by scholars and knowledgeable observers of
media behavior. According to media critics like James Fallows and Mark Rozell,
empirical evidence supports the assertion that media coverage of Congress and the
President has grown increasingly negative over the past 30 years. Indeed, James Fallows
cla.ms that today’s journalists are inculcated with a condescending cynicism toward
politicians. He states, “reporters don’t explicitly argue or analyze what they dislike in a
political program but instead sound sneering and supercilious about the whole idea of
politics.’’” This persistent media bias has led some contemporary politicians to use
consultants to manage their dealings with the press. During the first 100 days of the
1 04th Congress, the House Republicans used several consulting firms to peddle stories
that put the Republican accomplishments in a positive light. Republicans claimed they
had to resort to paid media and direct mail to penetrate the national media."
The dawn of mass media politics has had pronounced consequences for the
presidency as well. Over the past forty years, it has become an accepted practice for the
president to use the “electronic bully pulpit” to champion a new policy. Despite evidence
of this phenomenon dating back to the 1930s, it is generally associated with the 1980s
and 1990s. Samuel Kemell states, “the concept and legitimizing precedents of going
public may have been established during FDR's time, but the emergence of presidents’
who routinely do so to promote their policies in Washington awaited the development of
modem systems of transportation and mass communication.”^^ The strategy was
perfected under Ronald Reagan who effectively used television to exhort the public to
support his economic plan during his first term. Bill Clinton is a president in Reagan's
mold, comfortable in front of a camera and willing to use the media to leverage Congress.
Throughout the health care debate. President Clinton used televised appeals, photo
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opponunmes, and staged med.a events - all coordinated with the help of consultants from
the DNC as well as those attached to the White House - to highlight the importance of
health care reform. The philosophy was summed up by President Clinton's spokesman
Mike MeCurry, “campaigns are about framing a choice for the American people...when
you are responsible for governing you have to use the same tools of public persuasion to
advance the program, to build public support for the direction you are attempting to
lead.’- McCurry's explanation highlights the irony of contemporary politics in which the
president must pander to the general public in order to “lead” it. Clinton's campaign-
style issue management stands in shatp relief against the actions of Lyndon Johnson who
preferred a more personal strategy. Johnson's publie pronouncements for Medicare were
unambiguous, but they were isolated and not the centerpiece of his legislative strategy.
Instead, he worked quietly with congressional leaders and other interested parties to build
a stable coalition in support of Medicare.
After President Clinton introduced his health care plan, Bill Gradison, a former
Republican Congressman and the President of the HIAA, told reporters that the lobbying
battle on Capitol Hill would be intense, but that the war would be won or lost around
America's kitchen tables.'*' Gradison's comments encapsulate the difference in interest
group strategy from the 1960s to the 1990s. In the 1960s, lobbyists would roam the halls
of Congress and meet with legislators and buttonhole them to make their arguments. In
the 1990s, lobbyists are still fixtures on Capitol Hill, but their activities have been
supplemented by grassroots pressure applied by average citizens. These grassroots
efforts are often conducted and developed by political consultants and enhance the insider
position by demonstrating public support for the issue. Some observers claim that during
the health care debate nearly $50 million was spent on grassroots activity.'** An equally
impressive sum was spent by interest groups in connection with the Contract with
America. In both cases, the bulk of the money was filtered through political consultants
who created the advertisements and conducted the direct mail outreach. Although it is
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d.fficul, ,0 speculate about the tmpact that these contrived grassroots campaigns have on
legtslattve decision mak.ng, consultants believe that they have changed the face of
lobby.„g.» Grassroots lobbying was a novelty ,n the 1960s because the capab.lity to
contact millions of citizens did not exist. Groups with large, geographically dispersed
memberships had difficulty generating enough constituent pressure to justify expensive
grassroots efforts. Grassroots lobbying was so unreliable that Wilbur Cohen dissuaded
the AFL-CIO from using it on behalf of Medicare. He believed it was clumsy and a
waste of labor s limited resources.
According to health policy analyst Lawrence Jacobs, “When the Medicare
program was debated in 1964 under President Lyndon Johnson, 78 percent of Americans
said that they trusted the federal government to do what is right; in 1994, when President
Clinton was promoting his reform plan, only 22 percent expressed this level of trust.”"
Given this level of public skepticism, the President can hardly be blamed for resorting to
an epic public relations campaign. What is significant about the difference, however, is
not the radical drop in public faith in government; it is the idea that the government must
constantly solicit public support. Politicians are loathe to admit they pander to public
opinion, but their behavior suggests they are in its thrall. The proof is in their statements
in which they cite poll results as a justification for a policy and in their actions, which
respond to fluctuations in public opinion. Of course there are individuals who have made
a career by ignoring majority opinion, but they are considered mavericks whose fame is
derived in large part because they are isolated voices.
During the Clinton health care reform and the Contract with America, pollsters
occupied prominent positions as strategic advisors. Stan Greenberg, President Clinton's
lead pollster in 1993 and 1994, played a crucial role in developing the marketing strategy
behind the Clinton plan. He edited the president's speeches and suggested various ways
to pitch the plan to the public. After the Republicans took control of Congress in 1995,
Frank Luntz used his poll data to help the Republican majority implement the Contract.
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He and fellow GOP pollsters Bill Mclnturff and I inda HiVniiuuiu a L DiVall were instrumental in
craf„„g the vocabulary used by many Republican legislators to describe the party’s goals
Both case studies provide ample instances in which focus groups and poll data were an
tntegral part of the legislative strategy. There is nothing comparable regarding Medicare
The Johnson administration did employ pollsters, but they were not the masters of voter
knowledge that they are today. Johnson's own appreciation for the power of public
opinion was largely unformed and intuitive.” As for Congress, there is no ev.dence that
any key member consulted a pollster in connection with Medicare. Mills had l.ttle use
for a pollster and the members who did quote poll numbers invariably cited neutral
polling organizations like Gallup or Roper.”
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CHAPTER V
THE CLINTON HEALTH CARE REFORM EFFORT
Introduction
The passage of Medicare in 1965 did not resolve the nation's medical access
problems. The calculated political dec.sion to hmit Medicare coverage to seniors blunted
opposition to the program, but it also ensured that future policy makers would likely
revisit the issue. Ironically, the success and popularity of the program served to highlight
systemic inadequacies in the American health care system. In the decades since the Great
Society, health care costs outpaced economic growth to a significant degree, and the
number of uninsured Americans continued to multiply. Although public interest in health
care issues waxed and waned during the 1 970s and 1 980s, health policy experts raised
fears among some lawmakers by arguing that the nation was headed for a crisis that could
only be avoided through government intervention.' Health experts concern, though not
their recommendations, was shared by American business leaders who witnessed a
growing share of pre-tax corporate profits eaten away by health care costs for employees.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, health policy experts representing a wide spectrum of
interests ranging from free market proponents like Stanford University's Alain Enthoven
to statist reformers like Senator Ted Kennedy began sketching the outlines of various
health care reform plans.' Despite ideological differences, knowledgeable observers from
the left and the right agreed that the enormous contingent of uninsured Americans (close
to 32 million by 1991) posed a threat to American economic stability. Elite attention
coincided with renewed public concern over access to affordable health insurance.
The issue gained broader notice from national politicians during a 1991 special
election to fill a vacant Pennsylvania senate seat. In that race, the Democratic candidate,
Bryn Mawr College President Harris Wofford, trailed the Republican, former Bush
Administration Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, by a significant margin. It appeared
that Wofford's defeat was a foregone conclusion until his campaign seized upon health
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defining issue. Wofford successfully capitalized on public apprehension over
health insurance and medical costs and quickly erased Thornburgh's lead in the polls.
The message he reiterated in his speeches and pubitc appearances focused on his desire to
reform the system and guarantee coverage for all Americans. His political consultants
powerful advertisement that featured Wofford's signature statement, "if criminals have a
right to a lawyer, then I think average Americans have a right to a doctor." According to
many political strategists. Thornburgh's inability or unwillingness to articulate a
Republican response to health care was a crucial factor in his defeat.
In the 1992 presidential campaign, several of the Democratic contenders including
Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey, Paul Tsongas, and the eventual nominee. Arkansas
Governor Bill Clinton, took a lesson from Wofford and made health care reform a core
issue in their campaigns. During the general election, Clinton highlighted his call for
health care reform as a way to distinguish himself from the other two candidates, Ross
Perot and incumbent President George Bush. Although he never released a detailed plan
and only provided vague information to the press, his political pedigree as a centrist
Democrat and his belief in market-based reform won praise among elite pundits and the
votmg populace as well.’ Clinton's conviction that the American health care system was
m desperate need of reform carried through the election; and shortly after he was
inaugurated, he announced the formation of a task force headed by his wife and Rhode
Island business consultant, Ira Magaziner. President Clinton's intended goal was to pass
his health care bill by the end of summer 1993.
President Clinton's determination to enact health care reform early in his first term
hearkens back to Lyndon Johnson's promise to make Medicare his number one domestic
priority. Unfortunately for President Clinton, the similarity ends there. President
Clinton s experience is fundamentally different from Johnson's both in terms of process
and outcome. Scores of scholars and journalists have autopsied the Clinton health care
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reform and their combined efforts have • i ^ron produced a mynad ol retrospective explanations
for .ts fatlure. Some observers claim that Clinton misinterpreted his electron, which he
won wrth a plurality of votes, as a mandate for a wholesale restructuring of the Amencan
health care system.' This is a favorite of conservative commentators who assert that
Clinton's hubris led him to overestimate his public support and grossly underestimate
pubitc antipathy toward government intervention.' Their characterization is simplistic
but there is no doubt that public desire for an improved health care system was matched
by apprehension over a new, massive government plan. Other observers, citing an
institutional reason, point to the political dynamics on Capitol Hill. The Clinton health
care reform, they argue, was the victim of the rise of entrepreneurial politics and the
corresponding decline in party loyalty that appeared in Congress during the 1970s.
Democratic party leaders, hampered by the emergence of candidate-centered politics, had
difficulty sustaining party support for large-scale policy initiatives.' Moreover, many key
legislators were members with long tenures who had cultivated personal relationships
with interest groups, health care advocates and lobbyists. Insurance companies, doctors,
drug manufacturers and hospitals were determined to use their ties with legislators to
advance their singular interests. Beyond the intraparty concerns, the White House had to
worry about a resurgent Republican minority in the House. The new generation of
congressional Republicans, exemplified by their brash defacto leader Newt Gingrich,
was philosophically opposed to plans to reshape health care through government
mterventton and thetr resolve further complicated the prospects of reform. Clinton’s
pohtical foes were further bolstered by a series of scandals that broke during the first year
of his administration.
Rather than engage in an ad museum analysis of the factors that led to the demise
of the Clinton health care reform, I will use the events of 1993-1994 as a lens through
which to examine the connection of professional political consultants to the legislative
process. Consultants were heavily involved with the health care debate on both sides of
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.he issue. Their actions appear to have shaped the course of events and were thought to
have tnnuenced the outcome to a significant degree. Some participants have even blamed
them for the failure of the reform effort Hillarv riintr. r •• y Clinton, for instance, told the New York
Times,Ui she believed the health care debate “was lost on paid media and paid direct
mail.- The First Lady's comment is certainly an exaggeration that ignores crucial
mstitutional and political factors, but her frustrations with the process have merit. As
with the case of the Contract with America, the manifest presence of political consultants
at the core of a policy debate raises some interesting questions. First, does the blending
of campaign tactics, like direct mail and mass media advertising, with governing threaten
the prospects for compromise among elected officials by polarizing the public debate? In
other words, do the pointed rhetoric and public appeals crafted by consultants corrupt the
normal give-and-take of the legislative process. Second, using campaign tactics and tools
to sell public policies to the American public often involves deception and a
misrepresentation of the facts. Alarmist ads, focus groups, and biased polls may not be
suitable means to communicate complex issues to the general public. Finally, consultants
are specially trained political operatives who charge large fees for their services. This
condition has created an organic elite bias among their clientele. During the health care
reform debate, for example, insurance companies, hospitals, and drug manufacturers all
employed political consultants. However, people with a great stake in the outcome,
namely the poor and uninsured, were not able to afford the services of consultants. Are
the disorganized and impoverished threatened by the hegemony political consultants in an
era of mass media politics?
The Legislative History of the Clinton Health Care Reform
In late January 1993, President Clinton announced that he was forming a task
force comprised of health policy experts from business, academia, and government to
study and eventually formulate a health care reform plan. From the outset, political
pundits and media commentators questioned the wisdom of creating an unwieldy ad hoc
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coalmen ,o draft such a major piece of legislation. In terms ofdes.gn and procedure the
.ask force became a magnet for eriticism. A strietly enforced media blackout only
enhanced the sense of frustration among the groups left out of the task force meetings.
Members of Congress, for example, grumbled that they were not regularly appnsed of the
.ask force’s progress and that their input was dtscounted. In add.tion, many civ.l servants
who had spent their entire careers studying, modifying and working within the
government health care system were suddenly swept aside in favor of a cadre of outside
experts. But the greatest outcry came from health eare lobbyists who believed that their
vested economic interests were under siege by Ira Magaziner and his inscrutable task
force. Conservative groups were so furious at being frozen out of the process that they
filed suit in federal court to open the task force proceedings for public comment.'
Magaziner, however, was unperturbed by the negative reaction and defended the task
force charter vigorously. He distrusted the insular Washington policy environment and
believed that true reform could only come from a fresh perspective. According to Haynes
Johnson and David Broder, Magaziner “wanted the specialized expertise, but did not
want special interests to write the policy. Instead he wanted outside experts to challenge
the conventional views of the health care bureaucrats and force them to document their
assumptions.’” The 500-person task force was comprised of health policy experts outside
the Washington community, interest groups who were receptive to government reform
and select government officials. It met continuously from February to May 1993 and,
after an exhaustive period of drafting sessions, produced a thoughtful, comprehensive
document. Unfortunately, it was freighted with business-school jargon and technical
terminology like “consumer purchasing alliances” and “regional health insurance
cooperatives.” The impenetrable vocabulary would have negative consequences later in
the debate when the White House attempted to explain the details of the plan to the
general public.
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Ironically, the firs, major obstacle ,o health care reform was the presidency.
ho study the presidency, like Paul Light, have noted that the President's ability
manage and direct his agenda is constrained by circumstance. Scarcity of time and
unexpected crises interfere with the most rigorous scheduling and often force the
President to scale back his initial plans." Moreover, staff and cabinet officials fight
among themselves for attention from the President. Early in Clinton's firs, term, health
care advocates lost a decisive battle for the primary spot on the President's agenda to
budget deficit hawks. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and Budge, Director Alice
Rivlin argued successfully that i, was more important for the country and for the Clinton
presidency to address the budget deficit before embarking on any large-scale domestic
programs." The delay proved to be extremely costly since it enabled interest groups to
organize grassroots opposition and disseminate a contrary message through direct mail
and mass media advertising. Bill Gradison, president of the Health Insurers' Association
of America (HIAA), explained “we had lots of time to ge, geared up. I, [the delay] gave
us more time to refine our message, raise our money, do internal staffing changes and
have training sessions with members of our association as to what they could do with
their home towns.”" Clinton's inability to use the bully pulpi, to present a cogent vision
of reform early in the debate compromised his natural communications advantage over
his opponents. Even after the formal introduction of the plan in the fall. President Clinton
was forced to attend to a series of foreign policy crises. Events in Somalia and Haiti led
the White House to abandon plans for a presidential health care awareness campaign. To
make matters worse, following the suicide of White House lawyer and Clinton friend
Vince Foster, burgeoning interest in the Whitewater affair drew press coverage away
from health care. Opponents to the Clinton plan filled the communications void plan
quickly and ably.
When President Clinton finally made his trek to Capitol Hill in late September
1 993 to unveil his health care plan to Congress and the American public, its passage was
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already m jeopardy. The massive 1,300 page tome was one of the most amhit.ous
domesttc pohcy proposals ever produced by an American President; and for ,t to b,
realized as law would require solid Democratic support. Yet, despite Democratic
majorities in both chambers, President Clinton did not possess overwhelming support In
fact, by the fall of 1 993 the President had dissipated much
in January. Two events can be singled out
of the goodwill he had enjoyed
reasons for his tepid support among
congressional Democrats. First, Clinton's unwavering commitment to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) put him at odds with a substantial number of
Democrats, particularly laborites who believed that the treaty would lead to depressed
wages and a loss of manufacturing jobs to Mexico. The ugly internecine conflict between
pro-labor and free market Democrats left a lasting bitterness among union supporters.''
Second, the memory of the budget betrayal was still fresh in the minds of many House
Democrats. Earlier that summer, President Clinton had implored House Democrats to
vote for a controversial stimulus package that included a national fuel tax increase. 1, was
a politically dangerous move for many legislators, especially those from swing districts.
When Clinton jettisoned the fuel tax in a secret agreement with midwestem senators, he
infuriated House Democrats and left many of them wondering if they could trust the
President.
Clinton s uncertain relationship with congressional Democrats would have
consequences; but since most of them were ideologically disposed toward some sort of
reform, they were not considered a serious threat to the process. Many White House
aides and political strategists were more concerned with wooing the general public than
with placating irate legislators. Since the general campaign, the President's pollsters had
warned of a bifurcation in popular opinion concerning health care. The assessment was
echoed by non-partisan health opinion analysts including Lawrence Jacobs of Harvard
University who noted “the public is deeply ambivalent about how to change substantially
government's involvement in health care; it supports reform but is uneasy about
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expand,
„g government’s role. This uneasiness is part of Americans' well known fear of
big government and excessive regulation infringing on economic efficiency and
individual freedom.”- In light of the conflicted nature of public opinion, the Clinton
administration faced a daunting task. In order to convince the public to support the plan
they had to assure them that it would not cause a major disruption in their lives, while
simultaneously countering the inflammatory claims of “big government” made by its
opponents. This challenge proved to be too much for the Clinton administration, and
they ultimately lost the message battle. Evidence of their failure can be found in opinion
polls that indicate support for the goals espoused in the President's plan remained
constant throughout the debate, while support for the actual plan plummeted.-
The legislative battle to pass comprehensive health care reform began in the fall
of 1 993 when the text of the president’s plan was sent to Capitol Hill. According to
House rules, the Speaker can refer a bill to multiple committees for concurrent markup.
The procedure was initially designed to curb the power of recalcitrant committee
chairman, but it is also occasionally used to speed up the legislative process. Thus, when
the Clinton bill was delivered to Congress in October Speaker Foley sent it to three
committees: Education and Labor, Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce. The
Education and Labor Committee is a bastion of Great Society liberals and urban
Democrats. Although it had the weakest jurisdictional claim on the bill, it could be
trusted to produce a favorable report. However, most knowledgeable observers expected
the real work would be done by either the Ways and Means Committee or the Energy and
Commerce Committee. Both were led by strong chairman who had decades of
experience in health related issues.” Furthermore, each committee had an indisputable
proprietary interest in health legislation. Yet, in spite of their parliamentary skill and
personal power, neither Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski nor Energy and
Commerce Chairman John Dingell could report a satisfactory bill. Members of both
committees faced intense grassroots pressure stirred up by direct mail and mass media
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advertising. Lobbyists representing small bus,nesses and insurance con,pan,cs were
relentless and made certain that undecided members knew what the potential electoral
consequences would be if they voted for the Clinton plan.
The bill faltered f,rst ,n the Commerce Committee. John Dingell, whose father
had tmrodueed the first universal health care legislation during the Truman
administration, was trapped by two intractable forces on his committee.'* On one side
were liberal members who favored a Canadian-style. s,ngle-payer approach in which the
federal government essentially manages the national health care system. On the other
side were insurgent conservative Democrats led by Representative Jim Cooper. These
members supported a free market solution to health care access. The ideological
divisions on the committee constrained Dingelfs attempts to reach a compromise since
any overture to one faction would cost him votes with the other faction. In June 1994,
after several frustrating weeks of negotiation, Dingell informed Speaker Foley that it
would be impossible to report a bill.
The Ways and Means Committee was not as polarized as the Commerce
Committee, and Clinton administration officials believed Rostenkowski could cobble
together a majority without abandoning the principles behind the legislation.
Unfortunately, Rostenkowski never got an opportunity because he was indicted under
federal corruption charges in late May 1994. Although Rostenkowski remained a
member of the committee. House rules forced him to resign the chairmanship. His
replacement. Representative Sam Gibbons, stubbornly refused to fulfill pledges made by
Rostenkowski to certain members at the behest of constituent interests. Gibbon's fiery
temper and unfamiliarity with the quidpro quo arrangements that had made
Rostenkowski popular among Ways and Means members limited his influence over the
committee. In Rostenkowski ’s absence, the committee was able to report a bill; but
without his leadership the legislation lost focus.
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The b,ll faced considerable difficulty
,n the Senate as well. Part of the probletn
stentnred front institutional characteristics unique to the Senate. The individual
prerogatives afforded to members of the Senate, such as the ftlibuster and the hold can
slow and in some cases halt he legislative process. The Senate's penchant for indulging
.ndtvtdual concerns was evident in the Senate Finance Committee, the committee with
pnmary jurisdiction over health care reform. Finance Committee members, including its
chairman Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. were skeptical of the employer mandates and
weak cost controls lodged within the administration's bill. The concern retlectcd the
oubts of the Senate at large, and in late spring 1994, Moynihan told the White House
that the bill in its current form could not survive on the Senate floor.
The continued string of mishaps and misfortunes on Capitol Hill did not dissuade
the White House from pursuing health care reform. In fact, they stepped up the public
relations campaign.'’ During the summer, the Clinton administration took the advice of
Its political consultants and brought the debate to the general public in the form of a
national bus tour. The caravan (dubbed the “phony express” by Republicans) was
matched by a national ad campaign produced by the Democratic National Committee.”
But the White House underestimated the organizational capabilities and consultant-led
public outreach conducted by their opponents. For months, groups using direct-mail,
television commercials, and phone banks had impressed upon the general public all the
negative things associated with the Clinton plan. They had succeeded in defining the
debate; and by the time the Clinton administration engaged in the bus tour, the
communications war was already lost.^‘ By late summer, public support for the plan was
weakening with a large number expressing outright opposition.
After July, the health care reform effort slouched toward its inevitable conclusion.
House and Senate leaders told the White House that they intended to pull the Clinton bill
from consideration and introduce a scaled back version. In the House, the compromise
bill introduced by Majority Leader Dick Gephardt drew opposition from the left as well
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as the right. Liberal Democrats were unwilling
,o support a bill that lacked universal
coverage while conservative Democrats were d.sillusioned by the leadership's willmgness
to pander to the left. In late August, the Gephardt bill was withdrawn from the floor
without a vote. In the Senate, George Mitchell browbeat, shamed, and pleaded with his
fellow senators to support the measure without success. Mitchell pulled the bill from the
Senate calendar when it became apparent that a viable compromise could not be reached.
On September 26, 1994, a year and four days after President Clinton made his
impassioned speech before Congress, legislative leaders announced to the American
public that health care reform would not be enacted during the 103rd Congress.”
The preceding abridged legislative history of the Clinton health care reform effort
touchs briefly upon the public nature of the fight, particularly the emphasis placed on
grassroots lobbying and mass media advertising. The remainder of the discussion will
focus on the role played by political consultants and the actions they took during the
debate. Health care presents a compelling example of how political consultants and their
campaign oriented techniques have insinuated themselves into the legislative process.
Their work has not gone unnoticed. According to David Broder, the public relations
spectacle that followed health care “resembled in cost and complexity a presidential
campaign without the candidates”” and may be the harbinger of a new way of infiuencing
public policy. Scholars, such as Kathleen Hall Jamieson, marveled at the power political
advertising had over the opinions of political leaders despite a lack of evidence that it
influenced the general public.” Health care reform may have been a legislative failure for
the Clinton administration, but turned out to be a triumph for political consulting.
Campaign Techniques and Policy Makinp
Since the emergence of the mass media-oriented campaign, a great number of
pohtieal observers (including academics, journalists, and citizens advoeates) have raised
eoncerns over the proliferation and content of political advertising (for the purposes of
this discussion, I am speaking of television, radio and print advertising as well as direct
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mail outreach). Media commentators and PonH or.g od government groups such as Common
Cause and Ralph Nader's Pubhc In.eres. Research Group clain, ,ha. nega.ivhy
,s .he
def.n,„g eharac.er.shc ofrhe ^odenr campaign and ,ha. scurrilous ahack ads and
personal nrudshnging are i.s hallmarks. These cri.ies generally blanre consul,an.s for
.he
nse ,n negahve advertising and hold them respons.ble
- although w.thout ntuch entpirical
evdenee - for a corresponding increase in voter cynieism. Political advertising also
draws cmical attention from academics who continue to debate the normative
.mphcations of mass marketing in the political system « These concerns are not confined
to cand,date campaigns as observers who follow advocacy advertising continue to study
the impact of ads on public policy debates.^^
One of the main criticisms of political advertising is that advertisements on
television and in the mail tend to polarize the political debate rather than enlighten
citizens. Critics understand that a political advertisement will have, by definition, more
in common with propaganda than with a public service announcement, but they contend
that the inherent tendency toward boosterism is not an excuse to be deliberately
misleading. Political advertising, like commercial advertising, should be held to some
standard of truthfulness. Concrete evidence of critics concerns appeared several times
during the health care debate. A number of advertisements misled the general public
through a selective appropriation of the facts and, in some rare instances, promoted an
outright distortion of the truth.
The American Council for Health Care Reform, an umbrella conservative
organization, sponsored one of the more egregious examples of inflammatory advertising
In a direct mail campaign targeting elderly Americans, the group alleged that under the
Clinton plan consumers would “face jail time if they bought extra health care.”'' The
claim was based on a provision within the Clinton bill that stated anyone who offered or
promised something of value to influence a “health care official” could be indicted for
bribery. While the alarming prediction made in the ad is a technical possibility, the
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co„suUan.s who envisioned
.he scenario we.e no. conceded wi.h p.esenhn, a iihei,
evenh On the conha,,
.hei. express «oa, was io ,ah ihe
.ecipien.s ahen.ion whh a
s ock.„g example. An ad produced on behalf of .he Seniors Coalition
,s another case in
pent, in the conrnrercia,
.he, assert
.ha. Pres.den. Clinton's plan would ehnnna.e
'
statement sure to ra.se the ire of senior citizens. Again, this claim is lodged
government funded insurance program for the elderly would be eliminated. No.
surprisingly, this deta.1 was left out of the ad. In both instances, consultants identified a
viable demographic - senior citizens - and touched upon their fear of losing health care
as a way to activate resistance to the Clinton plan.
In the push to exaggerate the danger posed by health care reform, some
consultants melded fact with fiction. In a radio spot produced by Americans for Tax
Reform, a conservative grassroots advocacy group, the truth became a casuaity to the
message. The ad depicts a plaintive mother who is seeking help for her sick child. The
woman calls a government bureaucrat for permission to take the child to the hospital but
she is put on hold. An ominous voice over warns that this is what awaits Americans if
the Chnton plan is passed.^' It is a visceral, powerful image but it is completely untrue.
None of the reform bills introduced during the 103'" Congress would have required
citizens to call for government approval before visiting a doctor. Given the level of
demagoguery found in some political ads, it is easy to understand the frustration of health
care advocates. However, some liberal organizations that decried the inflammatory
tactics used during the health care debate learned a valuable lesson from their political
adversaries and, when political fortunes changed in 1994, they used similar ads to attack
the conservative agenda. Consultants on both sides of the political spectrum defend their
actions, at least according to preliminary survey data, and even maintain that they are
performing a needed service.^^
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Perhaps
.he „,„s. visible adverhse.en.s in were
.hose tea.uri,,,
and Lou,se sponsored by
.he Heal.h Insurers' Associal.on of An.erica (IIIAA) The
con,n.erc,als were
.he bra.nchild of Goddard/Claussen, a California-based lirnr
.ha,
spee.ahzes ,n referendunrs and issue-specific ini.ia.ive caurpaigns. The ads. a wc„-
a anced syn.hes.s of denrographic inference and poli.ieal rhe.oric, iarge.ed
.he broad
swa,h o, nnddle-ciass vo.ers wi.h a financial s.ake in .he heal.h care rcfonn. I„
.he ads
Harry and Lou.se, a white, nriddle-aged, obviously middle-class couple, discuss
.he risks
associated with the Clinton nhn o .plan such as rahon.ng, loss of eonsunrer choice and ,ha, grea,
An.er.can bugbear - "big governmen,.” I. was a clever pi.ch .ha. avoided
.he hyperbohc
cla,n,s made by o.her groups and ins.ead focused on dampening public en.husiasm for
reform.
Each Harry and Lou.se ad (.here were several varia.ions drafied
.0 appeal ,0 a
d,fferen, demographic audience) included a .oil-free number
.ha, viewers could call ,0 ge,
more mformal.on or ,0 reg.s.er commenis. According to the HIAA, nearly half a million
people contacted the organization as a result of the ads. Among
.he 500,000, IIIAA
enlisted 45,000 to write letters ,0 legislators, pen editorials for local papers, and make
phone calls ,0 o.her citizens. This dedicated corps of activists broadened
.he limited
reach ofHIAA and pu, pressure on legislators through relentless, repetitive
communtcation. The HIAA, along with other like-minded organizations, was able to
create the impression of a massive groundswell against the Clinton plan. Legislators, for
instance, would return to their districts and be confronted with a well-organized,
articulate group arguing against employer mandates. Meanwhile, legislative staff tallied
hundreds of letters and postcards expressing opposition to elements of the reform
legislation.
Legislators and officials in the White House gave credit to the Harry and Louise
campaign for turning public opinion against health care reform. However, despite the
spate of news reports about the ad campaign, there is conflicting evidence that suggests
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were only aired in Washington D C and New Vr^ v j-^ u.c. York media markets and in districts with
particularly vulnerable congressmen. Nevertheless them • ienn s, he commercials were effective inn uencng political elites who were convinced the ads were responsible for the shift in
public opinion. House Ways and Means Chairnran Dan Rostenhowshi claimed that the
Harry and Lou.se ads were “the Willie Horton of the health care debate - they're
.ncreasing the heat without adding any light.- Rostenkowski's concern over the ads was
so great that he took the unprecedented step of negotiating with the HIAA to have them
taken off the air. The White House was also aggravated and unwittingly aided the ad
campaign by publicly criticizing it. thus raising the ads' profile. The Clinton
administration's communications team paid Goddard/Claussen a backhanded compliment
by commissioning spoof commercials of Harry and Louise starring stage actor Jerry
Stiller. These exaggerated reactions by the White House and congressional Democrats
pervasive and systemic nature of the permanent campaign mentality. The close
attention they paid to a medium-sized insurance lobby ad campaign that only aired in
New York and Washington is indicative of the warped perception many politicians have
of power of political advertising. Kathleen Hall Jamieson explained the reaction thusly,
“those candidates who believe that they were elected because of their consultants not their
convictions are susceptible to ad phobia - an irrational but deeply held fear of the killer
If one accepts the argument made by Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure that
most Americans are inured to political advertising, then the concern over deceptive
tactics employed by political consultants is misplaced.'' Who cares if they tell outright
falsehoods if the people do not bother to listen? Many scholars agree with Patterson and
McClure that political advertising is rarely a decisive factor in a citizen’s decision making
calculus, but they stop short of claiming it has no measurable effect. Rather, the
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consensus a.on, political contntunica.lon scholars Is Iha. adve, Using seen, lo reinforce
pre-ex.s.mg b.ases - Th.s assessment accurately describes the course of events dunng
. e health care debate. Opponents to the Clinton plan saturated the airwaves and ntatl
boxes wtth a message attuned to Americans' nascent d.strust of central.zed. bureaucratic
authority. By the time the White House formulated a response, the plan was already
synonymous wtth “big goventment” and all the negative images that phrase connotes
Indeed. Cl.nton admin.stration officials later admitted they were unprepared for the scale
of the pa,d advertising campaign. In essence, the political consultants played upon an
established, prevailing bias in the American body politic and successfully persuaded
policy makers that the public was opposed to reform.
The negativity and hyperbole found in television ads and direct
seems to have made it more difficult for elected officials and 1
mail appeals
interest groups to negotiate
in good faith. From the outset of the refonn effort, political consultants attached to the
White House were eager to cast a set of villains in the health care debate. They believed
that connecting failures in the system with publicly recognizable groups such as
pharmaceutical manufacturers and HMO’s would strengthen the administration’s case for
legislative action.” The First Lady and members of the task force took the advice
seriously and wove a narrative that laid blame for America's health care woes with a
select group of companies. Throughout her public appearances, for example, Mrs.
Clinton made a point to condemn drug companies for “profiteering” on the backs of the
elderly and infirm. The persistent rhetorical attacks from the White House compelled the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) to respond in kind."
The Clinton administration's aggressive campaign-style tactics hardened the resolve of
the interest groups aligned against the reform plan and erased the possibility of a
negotiated compromise. Spokespeople for various interest groups expressed puzzlement
that the White House would pursue such an aggressive attack when the groups claimed to
support a majority of the President’s goals. Although PhRMA maintained it developed
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ads .0 defend i,s reputadon, several other groups sponsored ads and direc-nra.l
campatgns wuhou. provocation. Conservative activists such as Antencans for Tax
Reform (ATR) and Citizens for a Sound Economv trspr ,y sent out literature and aired
polmcal attack ads before the Clinton plan was introduced to Congress.
The national attention and outcry spawned by political ads like Ha.y and Louise
may have caught some health care experts offguard, but thetr success probably
d,d not surprise the political consultants who created them. The ads and direct mail
salvos were all buttressed by sophisticated polling data and focus group research that
gave consultants a clear picture of the general public's fears and apprehenstons. Harry
and Louise could not have existed without exhaustive survey research. Aside from their
.nvolvement with the ad campaign, pollsters occasionally plotted strategy and helped
shape the rhetoric used by participants. Contemporary critics of American government
often daim political actions are “poll driven” in the sense that politicians measure the
public's temperature before they commit to a course of action. But the truth is more
complicated than these statements would lead us to believe. Instead of using polls to
select their positions, politicians mainly use polls to learn how to sell their ideas. In other
words, “to educate and direct public opinion itself.”- Polls were also used by health care
debate participants to develop strategies. Pollsters in the White House, for instance, used
poll data to convince President Clinton to abandon a value-added-tax as a possible
funding mechanism for the plan.
Technological advances and the infusion of social science has given pollsters
greater confidence in their abilities and, as a result, a more prominent position within the
advisory hierarchy. Successful pollsters exhibit an uncanny blend of speed and precision
as their clients often demand results within a narrow time period. Stan Greenberg,
President Clinton's pollster cum policy advisor, was the first presidential pollster to
engage in interactive “real time” polling by employing a device known as the dial-a-
meter. Using a small group of citizens who were carefully selected for their demographic
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characteristics, Greenberg asked them to watch President ri' t - t > .
.
.
Clinton s health care speech and
to register their reactions with a dial Tt,^thadiai. The aggregate results were then platted on a graph
and enabled Greenberg to discover witVi jt wtth some degree of confidence what words inspired a
postttve response and as well as what words drew a negative reaet.on. The sample was
non-random and unseienttfic, hut it nevertheless provided a useful gimtpse of unfiltered
cttzen reactton. Greenberg’s Republican counterparts used sim.lar means to discern
words and phrases that engendered publ.c doubts. GOP pollsters used focus groups and in
depth interview to glean valuable snapshots of the public mood.
Reporters who covered health care in 1993-1994 routinely critieized leaders for
the artificial, buzz word jargon they used when they discussed legislative options.” It
sounded inauthentic and it seemed, in David Broder's estimation, to be scripted and
spoken without reflection. The reason for the disappointing qual.ty of the rhetoric may
have been polls and focus groups. Many of the words and phrases used in the debate
were specifically selected in response to survey research. As Robin Toner of the iVe.r
York Times pointed out, “[the] politicians used polls to figure out how to talk about the
issue, how to connect with voters anxiety, and how to allay their nightmares.”"'
Politicians telling people what they want to hear is hardly a novel occurrence in American
history. However, the development of tools and a methodology to divine a popular
vocabulary is an evolutionary leap beyond the traditional interchange between politicians
and the general public. Unfortunately, couching proposals in poll-tested phrases deprives
the public of valuable information they can use to evaluate the merits of a public policy.
Politicians who resort to euphemisms, cliches, and metaphors to describe policies are in
essence evading their responsibilities to their constituents. Yet, the real fault - if casting
blame is appropriate - lies with consultants who peddle symbols as a substitute for
information. By mining the public for evocative words, consultants can sheath
unpleasant elements in sugar-coated terminology or conversely they can tar a reasonable
proposition with slurs and innuendo. Evidence suggests that this does have an effect on
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were able to describe their impressions of ipres the plan usmg the same phrases found in
political ads. ^
In tenns of the actual content of the plan, pollsters exerted little influence
However, there are a few notable excepttons. the White House, for example, during
the planning stages of the health plan, Stan Greenberg told the
.ash force leaders that a
payroll tax or anything resembling a tax would compromise the popularity of the reform
goals. H,s adv.ce was instrumental in shap.ng the financing arrangement, a design that
eventually settled on employer mandates rather than a tax increase.^ GOP pollsters also
provided useful strategic information. In early 1994 they quietly urged their clients to
oppose any health bill no matter how benign. They based their advice on poll data that
indicated the Democratic party would benefit in the fall elections if it could point to
legislative achievement in health care. In the aftermath of the reform collapse, several
health policy scholars vented their disgust a. what they perceived to be a cynical, wholly
political spectacle. “Policy makers,” noted Lawrence Jacobs of Harvard University,
“concentrated not on what works best but on what mattered and what would be
acceptable in terms of public preferences and understandings.’" His dismay was echoed
by Dianne Heath of Brown University, who rejected the publie pandering and mass
marketing as a debasement of thoughtful policy making.
As in the case of the Contract with America, interest groups were not above
manipulating poll results to bolster an established position. The National Federation of
Independent Businesses (NFIB), an association representing small businesses, polled its
500,000 members on a weekly basis and transmitted the results to all 535 members of
Congress.^^ The poll questions, however, were not neutral and were intended to provoke
negative assessments of the Clinton plan. NFIB is considered a small to medium-sized
lobbying organization, but its influence transcends its size. Small business owners, to
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so
paraphrase Richard Fenno, are a SDeciali^PH
-end to be communi,y
leaders in their own right T poido+ i •
^
.
ofs™„ businessmen do
at their own peril. Theretoro email khe f re, small business owners' opinion, especially if i, is
coordinated on a national scale, will gain the attention of members of Congress.
1993 19'r
7' direct-mail in
94, the activities of political consultants inspired familiar concerns over elite-bias
and the norm.ative implications of mass media politics.*’ As with the Contract with
America, the groups that most heavily utilized the services of political consultants were
organizations with a substantial financial stake in the outcome. Through the television
.he radio, and the nation's mail boxes, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, doctors and
most importantly insurance companies were able to disseminate their point of view while
groups with smaller budgets, namely consumer advocates and organizations representing
.he poor, were shut out. ,t was, as many health care advocates claimed afterwards, not a
fair fight. According to one estimate, groups opposed to the Clinton health plan outspent
those that favored it by more than a two-to-one margin in political advertising. The
HIAA alone spent nearly $16 million on the Harry and Louise campaign.*-
The FEC does not keep statistics on advocacy advertising. Advocacy advertising
like independent expenditures made by interest groups during the regular election cycle.
'
rs not regulated by the federal government; therefore estimates of the expenditures are
subject to dispute. Nevertheless, several scholars and reputable public interest groups
have compiled data that show that overall advocacy advertising (television and print ads
as well as direct mail outreach) totaled over $250 million. A cursory survey of the
organizations with the heaviest involvement reveals an unsurprising pro-business, anti-
government bias. The HIAA and PhRMA spent nearly $34 million combined, a figure
that dwarfs the combined total of the four largest health care advocate groups. The AFL-
CIO, the Democratic National Committee, the Health Care Reform Project (a consumer
group), and the American Conference of Health Care Workers spent a total of $1 1.3
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million on advertising supporting health care reform The H' ,
,
.
,
.
disparity was most evident
uring the crucial months immediatelv • *1
„ ^
^ following the introduction of the Clinton plan inCongress. From October 1993 to December 1993 the nwr'
. ,
T>NC spent only $ 1 50,000 on print
money through well-known consultants such as Bill MCnturff and Bill Hamilton.
This IS a valid and serious concern, but politicians and scholars should keep in
mind that advertising is jus. one of a myriad of informational outlets accessed by citizensA combination of factors balance out the paid advertising advantage owned by well
funded interest groups. The Clinton administration, for example, benefited from
overwhelmingly positive press coverage after the President, initial presentation before
.he Congress.’" His inability to capitalize on the goodwill had nothing to do with political
consultants or opposition ads. Health care advocates also used free media. The Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation, a philanthropic organization devoted to public health issues,
bought two hours of prime time air from NBC to present a detailed explanation of the
American health care system and what was required to reform it.’' The foundation paid
nearly $2.5 million for the air time and an additional $1 million to advertise the special.
Although the foundation was not a declared supporter of the Clinton plan, representatives
had participated in the health care task force and were on record supporting the goals
outlined in the plan.
The lamentations and self-pitying protestations that emanated from the White
House shortly after Senate Majority Leader Mitchell pulled health care from the Senate
calendar sounded like sour grapes to many of President Clinton's adversaries.
Republicans claimed, with some glee, that the President had made an enormous blunder
by trying to foist a burdensome policy scheme on a skeptical general public. It is true
that over the last several years a large portion of the electorate has come to distrust the
government and m turn has become wary of new policy programs, especially when those
initiatives are complex and the future consequences are unknown.^^ flowever, public
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opposition to the Clinton plan did not, not emerge s,u generis. The latent antipathy needed tobe activated and manipulated. In this sense nrriif i, political consultants were invaluable
contractors for the forces aligned against the White House.
After health care had been removed from the legislative agenda, a reporter asked
rt,ic
.ch„d lh„„ „.j. I,„
Election Men, Goddard claimed, “we dodeed a vprr/ Ac, a g ery dangerous, overwhelming proposal
that obviously most Americans did not support.’- Goddard wen. on to credit the work
done by his firm and fellow consultants in protecting Americans from the Clinton plan
H.S candtd, if self-promoting, remarks raise an interesting question about the place of the
consultant in our political system. In Larry Saba.o's landmark work. The Rise ofPolitical
Consultants, he chastises them for serving as candidate pre-selectors. Although Sabato’s
alarm seems to be out of proportion to the actual problem, there is reason to question the
position of political consultants as unaccountable gatekeepers and interlocutors. The fact
that Ben Goddard believes he did a public service by creating skewed, inflammatoiy
advertising campaign should give scholars pause, particularly when there is survey data
that suggests his opinion is not isolated among his profession. According to a study by
James Thurber of American University, a large number of consultants believe that they
are m a better position to decide policy matters than the average citizen.^'* Their
paternalistic outlook is coupled with an unfortunate disdain for the political system,
giving fuel to accusations that consultants harbor anti-democratic tendencies.
Conclusion
The movement to pass comprehensive health care reform was an important event
in the Clinton presidency and for the Democratic party in general. Its failure
demonstrated a powerful undercurrent of public distrust for large scale, government-
sponsored policy initiatives; and it challenged the Clinton administration’s assumptions
about what the American people want from the federal government. It also brought to the
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surface the deep, pervasive divisions within the r>em„ ,
,
and, conversely, helped
.0 untfy and galvanize the fledgling conservative nrovcnent in Anterican politics
Although would be an exaggeration to clain, that health care begot the Contract w.th
menea, ,t ,s hard to
.magine the triumph of the Republican party without the
Democrats’ d.sastrous pursuit of health care reform. Bu, perhaps its most lasting
s.gn,ficancc ,n American political history will be as the archetypal example of mass
ntedia-oriented, public poi.ey campaignmg. Veteran political reporters David Broder and
Haynes Johnson remarked that the health care debate
“represented the first time pol.t.cal
ngures had brought the entire complement of campaign tools to bear during a policy
battle.’”’ An observation that is confirmed by the enormous sum spent on poli.ieal ads
rect mail, not to mention the incessant polling conducted by the White House,
legislators, and interest groups.
As in the case of the Contract with America, it is tempting to draw conclusions
concerning the ubiquitous presence of high-priced political consultants and their
campaign-oriented tactics. Hillary Clinton condemned the negative ads and
misrepresentations spread in direct mail for “poisoning the debate.’’ In a fit of pique, she
placed blame for the defeat of the legislation squarely on the shoulders of interest groups
and political consultants (it seems ironic that an administration known for calculating
political angles would criticize opponents for adopting the same strategy). HIAA
President Bill Gradison, conversely, was effusive in his praise for the work done by
political consultants on behalf of groups opposed to the plan. He claims, for example,
that Harry and Louise were instrumental in turning public opinion against the statist
approach favored by the Clinton administration. Both comments imbue political
consultants with great power and influence over the legislative process, but it is
impossible to validate either statement. As Theda Skcopol argues impressively in her
book, Boomerang, the reform effort was hampered early on by a myriad of factors
unrelated to public relations. Institutional tension between the White House and
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Congress, coupled with jurisdictional disputes within Cn ^ ,
,
.
ongress, delayed consideration ofthe legislation. The sixteen-month sojourn throueh Cng Congress opened dozens of
opportunities to block the legislation.
It . an overstatement to claim political consultants are somehow culpable for the
debate by serving private interests and publ.c officials simultaneously. There is no
evidence that Bii, Mclnturff, Mandy Grunwald, or Bill Hamilton misled or mfiuenced
.heir public sector clients at the behest of private interests. This is not to suggest that
political consultants are excused from all responsibility for the ugly tenor of the health
care debate. The public arguments that followed health care legislation were fraught with
emotional rhetoric, market-tested symbolism, and demagoguery. The critical, bu, highly
dubious, claims made by the contrived couple. Hairy and Louise, about the Clinton plan
represent just one example among dozens where the facts were obscured by clever
advertising. At least the creators of Harry and Louise stuck to a defensible version of the
facts, the same could not be said for some other attack ads. The consultants who worked
on behalf of the Clinton plan were no better as they eagerly identified groups that could
fill the role of villain for public relations purposes. Aside from the heated and
occasionally misleading rhetoric, consultants are also accountable for inflating the
influence disparity between well-heeled interest groups and iesser-endowed counterparts.
Political consultants are expensive, and the advice they provide costs money. Supporters
of the Clinton plan claimed afterwards that the positive message was drowned out in the
wash of paid media. Preliminary data suggests that they may be right. Consumer
organizations and service sector unions - two groups claiming to represent the uninsured
and the under insured - were outspent by a 4 to I margin by insurance companies and
drug manufacturers opposed to the reform plan.
The nature of modern American politics virtually assures the continued presence
of political consultants in policy debates. In the era of the permanent campaign,
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grassroots stimulation, public onininnPUDUC p o polling, and political advertising are an
indispensable addition to the legislative process. Political consultants, by virtue of their
raining and expertise, are the obvious choice to lead the campaigns. What this means for
e American political system will addressed in greater depth in the next chapter.
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Table 3: Health Care Initiative Chronology
1
Date
-“T
—
Significance
1
January 25, 1993
_
First Lady and Ira MrazinTl!!.!™ appoints the
Feb - May, 1993
_
drafting sessions to design a vLl! pi!!!"* ^ of seminars and
September 5, 1993
September 22, 1 993
October 27, 1993
^ommmee, and the Education and Labor Committee In the Senate fheFinance Committee asserts iurisdiction
November, 1993
opponents to the ^„„ion pian, such as NFIB, HIAA, and the ChHiftii^
.0 defers; ^ -'a--- campaign
Nov - Dec, 1993
me House and Senate close the 1st Session of the 103rd ^ressaftgtaking some preliminary action concerning health care
^
1
Feb - May, 1994 Prridl'n7s“nl^til'^d
""" to craft a bill that fulfills the
'
esi ent s intentions and can muster a majority on the ftoor
May 31,1 994 U™*'
Ways and Means Chairman Rostenkowski is indicted and resigns the
'
_^.rmanship. Gibbons takes over and fails to holH .
May - July, 1994
puDiic support tor the Clinton plan is slipping. Direct-mail and
media advertising have successfully portrayed the plan as a risky “biggovernment venture. ^ ^
I June 9, 1 994
senator Moynihan advises the White House that a health plan with emplover
_5andates would have difficulty passing the Senate Finance Committee
1
June 28, 1994 tr. ^
commerce Chairman John Dingell admits defeat and fails
to report a health care bill from his committee
June 30, 1994 i!m
Committee reports a modified version of the Clinton
bi 1 to the House. It lacks a guarantee of universal coverage and possesses adiluted employer mandate.
July 15, 1994
H pun icveais 00 /o ot those polled disapprove” of the Clinton plan,
his IS a sharp contrast to a similar poll conducted in September 1993 in
which 59% of the respondents supported the plan
July 21, 1994
House and Senate leaders remove the Clinton plan from floor consideration
and pledge to introduce a new bill that is “less bureaucratic and provides for a
longer phase in period.”
July - Aug, 1994
1 he White House organizes a last ditch public campaign for health reform. A
national bus tour sparks controversy and fails to ignite public support
1
August 3, 1994
House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt and Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell introduce their new health care bill.
August 25, 1994
1 he House Democratic leadership decides not to risk a humiliating defeat and
pulls the Gephardt bill from the floor.
1
September 26, 1 994
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell takes health care off the Senate
calendar and states Congress will not pass a bill this year
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chapter VI
EXPERT ASSESSMENT OF POST-ELECTORAL CONSULTING
Over the past three decades, political consulting has undergone an evolutionary
transformation. In the 1960s. ,t was a small cottage tndustry dominated by a select group
of general practitioners who considered themselves campaign junkies. By 2000, i, has
become a multi-billion dollar profession that boasts experts in a wide range of subf.elds.
The industry’s maturity is exemplified by a robust profess.onal association (The
American Political Science Association) with nearly 1,000 members and the existence of
a glossy trade magazine {Campdgm & EkcHom) devoted to advancing the image of
political consulting. Further evidence of the enhanced stature of the industry ,s readily
found in our mainstream culture where pollsters are well-known television pundits and
political strategists earn six figure fees to advise Fortune 500 companies.
As the industry matured and flourished, consultants penetrated all levels of
political activity including governing. The Contract with America and the Clinton health
care reform effort illustrate clearly that political consulting is no longer relegated to the
fairly limited confines of candidate-centered campaigns. In contemporary politics, media
specialists, pollsters, and campaign strategists are routinely called upon to bring their
expertise to bear in the governing realm. Events in the 106"’ Congress (1999-2000)
illustrate the new dynamics. Throughout the winter and spring of 2000, interest groups
and political parties waged expensive, frenzied issue campaigns over two high profile
pieces of legislation
- permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China and
prescription drug benefits. In both cases, consultants were intimately involved in the
strategic development and tactical implementation of massive campaigns to capture
public support.' Post-electoral work has become so lucrative, and the demand for it is so
widespread, that some political consultants are leaving electoral politics altogether to
concentrate on issue advocacy.
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At the outset of the study I nositerty. three questions raised by the emergence or
post eiectora, consulting, hirst, by pursuing overt, campa.gn-ortented public strategiesdo elected orfic.als and
.merest groups mahe it more dirticult to negotiate and seeh
'
compromise on policy matters behind closed doors. Political consultants did no. create
natural partisan and institutional tensions, but their innuence can exacerbate an already
tenuous situation. Second, does the presence of unelee.ed, for-profit political operatives
at the center of policy debates violate the principles of democratic accountability There
.s reason to speculate that political consultants
- as for-h.re political advisors with
multiple public and private sector clients - have become ,efaco lobbyists. Consultants
however, are not subject to the rules and laws that regulate contact between lobbyists and
elected officials. Third, despite their technical proficiency and undeniable utility during a
campaign, are the many specialized skills that consultants offer overestimated and ill
suited for governing. Diree. mail appeals and television advertising use crass, emotion-
laden rhetoric to inflame passions rather than inform citizens. Polls are an integral par. of
campaigns, but their inherent uneertainty coupled with normative concerns about the
proper role of public opinion in a liberal democracy leave some critics wondering if they
are an appropriate tool for making public policy. In addition to these questions, the
chapter will explore other matters such as the extent to which consultants have moved
beyond electoral polities and why have they done so, whether they are a permanent
additton to the legislative process, and whether their methods actually work in a
governing context?
The data presented in this chapter come from two sources. Primary material was
obtained through m-depth interviews with a group of political consultants, lobbyists, and
key congressional staff members (a complete list of the interviewees along with
biographical information is found in the Appendix). All of those interviewed are relevant
political actors with experience in legislative politics and are familiar with the events
described in the Contract with America and health care reform case studies. The
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_s based on a series of open-ended
.uesdons predicted on .he n.ain concerns
se, forth ,n this study. The printary materia, is supplenten.ed with background
.nfomtatton gathered front news reports, scholarly articles, and books. The interview
sample ts no. large enough or diverse enough for a stat.stica, analysis. But as explained
tn Chapter
..the focus of this study is on qualitative tssues that are no. easily reducible
for stattstteal analysis. I. is does no. purport to present an empirically derived “theory” of
post-electoral consulting. Nevertheless, the tnsight offered by the interview subjects is
contpelling evidence of the changes wrought on the leg.slat.ve process by the advent of
post-electoral consulting.
Political Consultants and Issue-Based rantpatn..
Ir. the early ,990s. Matt Reese, one of the pioneers in professional political
consulting, declared that he had foresworn consulting on behalfofcandida.es and that he
was concentrating on advising non-political private sector clients exclusively. It was, he
clatmed, easier to do and the pay was much better.^ Reese’s decision to move beyond the
candidate base is not uncommon and is in fact indicative of an industry-wide shift away
from trad.ttonal campaign work. According to a recent study conducted by James
Thurber of American University, over 78 percent of the 200 consultants he surveyed
stated that they engaged in non-candidate related political consulting and a significant
number claimed that private sector work was the central focus of their firm.' The reasons
they offered were manifold, ranging from better pay and greater job stability to a greater
sense of personal accomplishment. Republican pollster Bill Mclnturff is typical of the
new generation of political consultants who eschew political races for the opportunities
presented by non-candidate consulting. Mclnturff asserts that:
As recently as the 1990/1992 election cycles approximately 80 percent of
our work was candidate work. In 1998 that number dropped to 48 percent
and in 2000 it has decreased to 40 percent. The Harry and Louise
commercials were a watershed in the sense that it crystallized the
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transformation of lobbying from far^ r.. fo
constant campaign style you see today,'
“ “
In little over eight years Mclnturffs firm has em i,= . vaS cut Its candidate work in half and replaced itW..H consulting on hehalf of private sector groups. Meln.urff and other memhers of his
CO ort are undoubtedly innovators, but they are also opportunists who have taken
advan.ge of changes in the polifiea, environment. Post-electoral, issue-based consulting
work has nourtshed because of a confluence of factors. Two important reasons often
cted by academ.cs and other experts are the weak controls on spending for issue
advocacy as well as the modern politician's faith in the power of polls and advertising.
Each trend will be discussed at greater length later in the chapter.
Those interviewed are unperturbed by the de-emphasis of candidate consulting
seeming to see it as an inevitable outgrowth of our political culture. Ben Goddard,
principal partner with the consulting firm Goddard/Claussen, views the elevation of
public policy issues over candidates as a natural realignment brought on by changes in
American politics as well as by the lure of financial reward. Goddard explains that:
In the nineties, consultants have become much more interested in publicpohey. Some of the interest is purely financial, but some of il is the resultthings that are outside our control such as independent voters and weak
?98rl^thre'd f,r“'n
0” a^»didate campaign since
work’ fn ,b I . r
™ of candidatek In the last five years we've begun to compete with candidate
consultants who are moving into advocacy work.^
Goddard's comments underscore a commonly held assumption that political
consultants gained their newfound notoriety at the expense of political parties. The
theory of party decline has suffused political science so thoroughly that in some circles it
IS axiomatic to consider parties anemic, hollow and increasingly irrelevant institutions.'’
In spite of a vigorous counter argument, the perception of the party as an ineffectual
remnant of an earlier era persists. Among the scholars that study political consultants,
party decline, and the consultants’ role in advancing it, is a recurring theme.'^ However,
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the consultants I interviewed downolaveH
...
,
.
^ ^ adversarial relationship with
political parties. Instead, thev viewer!
of ,he- r n . .r t ir skill at energizine citizen*! nr>t og g mze s, not as an assault on traditional party activities
.nterest groups have been t,utch to realize the post-eleetoral potential of political
consulttng and they have over the past decade created a vast ntarket for consultant
servtees. There are a nunther of reasons why interest groups hire polit.ca, consultants,
ome organizations seek out well-known consultants because they regard consultants as
an access potnt to pohtica, decision-ntakers. Frank Luntz, for example, in the aftertnath
Contract with America used his connections with the House Republican leadership
.0 expand hts private sector cl.ent base.* Some of Luntz’s contemporaries sneered at his
brazen and occasionally clumsy efforts a, self-promotion, but name-dropping is an
accepted practice within the industry as way of attracting new clients. For most interest
groups, however, a consultant is not a totem or a conduit. Indeed, he is a valuable, cost
effect,ve source of political intelligence and strategy. Political communications scholars
Darrell West and Burdet, Loomis insist that special interests have an overwhelming need
.0 control the terms of debate and therefore are willing to spend enormous sums of money
.0 develop narratives that resonate with opinion leaders, policy makers, and the general
public (e.g. Harry and Louise).^
Democratic pollster Geoff Garin encourages groups with substantial financial
resources to invest in a poll before mounting a full-scale lobbying effort.
ur firm does work for a variety of organizations that sponsor polling that
IS exclusively on policy matters designed to inform their own legislative
campaigns or try to affect the way legislators think about the issues...On
major policy matters it makes sense to use polls and mass media
campaigns. To give it the old college try so to speak.
Gann s description of polling as a commonsense, affordable investment is accurate."
Over the past decade the number of competent private pollsters coupled with advances in
technology have depressed the cost of conducting a scientific poll. Thus, reliable polling
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is now widely available to non-nroflt • •P ““fgan.zations and smaller interest groupsHowever Garin. M.tHe endorsement of p„st-electoral eonsultlng falls to ta.e Into
account the prohibitive eost of the other components of a puhitc relations campaign
n»re y medta buys, d.rect mail and advertising. What good is sound information, ifyoua e unable to eap.talize on ,t. The concern over el.te bias animates West and l.oomis Inbooh TheW the authors argue
.hat moneyed intere^^^
construct stories more clearly and effectively than poorer organizations.-
The shift toward private sector political advising is important because it signifies
a systemtc change ,n the way interest groups seek to influence poltcy. Traditional
lobbytng techniques such as face-to-face encounters are still applicable, bu, they are
supplemented with regularity by mass med.a advertising and grassroots pressure Chip
Kahn, prestdent of the Health Insurers’ Association of America (HIAA), argues that
.merest groups that work on high-profile, controversial issues tgnore public rela.tons at
their own peril.
IwTlW petLVaf ifh •heV4 eriod all healt issues tend to be front page news and thisrffects your lobbying method. If someone wants to get a payment fix in
I f U
protection or prescription drug issues become larger than
the health care area those front page issues affect your strategy as lo how
cypres!”’ ^ome kind of full
Health care is an area that lends itself to emotional advertising appeals, sentimental public
overtures, and demagogic mass mailings. All are areas of strength for political
consultants. Thus, it is no surprise that, in the aftermath of the Clinton debacle, many
major health care proposals including Medicare reform, prescription drug benefits and
cancer research have been followed by a professionally-administered public relations
campaign complete with polls, focus groups, direct mail, and television commercials.
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I hus, special interests’ innovative use of campaign techniques to supplement
.radttional lobbying has created a tremendous demand for the specialized skills political
consultants possess. More importantly, it appears that the use of consultants is no.
hmited to big-budget, High-pronie issues. Small to medium size organizations are also
employing consultants to coordinate public relations campaigns to capture public
attention. The continued growth of the trend alarms some observers that view it as
another manifestation of elite bias in our political system.
Knowledgeable observers and practitioners generally cite two reasons for the
recent explosion in post-electoral consulting. First, loopholes in campaign Hnance laws
encourage groups to spend unlimited amounts of money on issue advocacy without
regulation and, until very recently, without disclosure.'^ Second, there is a perception
among elite decision makers, cultivated by political consultants, that public relations is an
indispensable part of modern day lobbying. Politicians, inculcated with what Kathleen
Hall Jamieson describes as an enduring fear of “the killer ad,” have brought their
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sensitivity to the publie poliey realm Tnt^ *
,H„
“‘I are acutely awarethat appearance and perception are valuable cunencv in A
cases, artince can tru.p sober analysis.
"
-Pin. 'c,islation des,„ed to regulate
:7
" ^"
7 - -b„c calls to Clean up the systetn anttdst
requtrentems wtthstood court challenges. The lawntakers who dratted the 1970s
legtslatton deserve credit for being pioneers; but as crities and present day refornters
pent out. the original laws and subsequent addendum are not comprehensive.
One of the omissions, augmented by the legal interpretations of the Supreme
Court, enables interest groups and PACs to spend an unlimited amount of money
advocattng for a specific piece of legislation or public policy agenda. They are free to do
so, provtded that they do not promote a particular candidate exclusively and explicitly.
Prior to 2000, ad hoc single-issue coalitions did not have to register with the FEC or
disclose a list of contributors and expenditures. '» The loophole has led to a mushrooming
of small, fluid organizations with benign names like Citizens for Better Medicare,
Citizens for State Power and Clean Water for Our Future. These groups function as
intermediaries for established interest groups to influence public opinion and shape the
terms of the political debate.
The emergence of issue advocacy has been a financial windfall for political
consultants who manage virtually every aspect of the issue-based campaign. In Bill
Mclnturff s estimation, the enormous amount of money spent on issue advocacy reflects
decades of poor thinking with respect to campaign finance reform. Reformers, working
to impose cost controls on inputs (donations and contributions) but ignoring outputs (the
costs associated with running a campaign), have done nothing to diminish the demand for
political money. “The push for campaign finance reform,” he states, “will mean that you
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will see more and more advocacy
advertisinc Th
.Ha. area is essen.ially unregula.e, I.
'
y t d
,, seems like a logical place.’"’ The 1 06'" To.took limhcd action, but i, remains to be seen if ,he d' ,
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interest group enthusiasm for issue advocacy.”
'
Irregularities in campaign finance law explain the
to appear b,„ >h
opportunity for issue advocacyr, ut the reason why it has flourished is due to a beliefamong the political elitebased on anecdotal evidence, that it works. Elected offlcials at a,, levels of gover^^^^^^
are sensitive to shifts m public opinion; yc legislators, in pan.cular House members
owtng to their short election cycle, possess an amplified acuity to fluctuations. Ted VanDer Meid, a chief aide to House Speaker Dennis Hastert notes, "Members pay a lot of
attention to their mail and their phone calls and any member wodh his sal. will try to flnd
out Where his constituents are on an issue. The public rare, becomes engaged in an issue
so when they do, members take notice.’"' Successful issue advocacy work creates the
.nrpression
.ha, the public has strong views by showering legislators with feedback The
tmpressive power of issue advocacy was aptly demonstrated during the health care reform
debate when several Ways and Means committee members expressed reservations about
supporting the Clinton plan after experiencing a wave of grassroots pressure instigated by
tnteres. groups.” [,he ads] almost destroyed the process,’’ claims former Ways and
Means Chairman Dan Ros.enkowski,
“Membership just became so conscious of those
things that it looked as though we weren’t going ,o have the possibility of having a bill.’’”
There is some debate whether the use of consultants to stimulate a negative public
outcry can alter the trajectory of legislation on a consistent basis. However, it is an
established fact that a vigorous public reaction will gain legislators’ attention. The
dynamic, states Dan Meyer, chief of staff to former Speaker Newt Gingrich, is easy to
understand.
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The reason ,t works is simple,” they argue,
“const.tuents have a high degree of
ctedihility that no Washington lohhy.st can match. They are not hired guns, they have
not sold thetr soul for a spee.al interest, and they reflect concerns of ordinary citi^ens.'-
Barry Jackson, former communications director for the House Repubhcan
Conference, believes that members can distingu.sh contrived and genu.ne public pressure.
grocery store, take their kids to McDonalds, and g^aTh'tol ITcct
fsTei; ITuaJltremtels"^
Jackson did not, however, dismiss the power of interest group sponsored activism
“Contrived grassroots can be effective. I mean if the NRA can get people to send out
thousands of postcards, the member is still going to pay attention. He knows it was
prompted, but that doesn’t mean the public won’t remember come election day.”“
Political scientists have spent considerable energy analyzing the connection
between public opinion and legislative behavior as well as arguing over the proper role
public opinion should play in a liberal democracy.^’ The comments offered by Meyer and
Jackson are consistent with the macro theory presented by R. Douglas Arnold in The
Logic ofCongressional Action. Arnold suggests that “legislators choose among many
policy proposals by estimating the likelihood that citizens might incorporate these policy
preferences into their choices among candidates in subsequent elections.”^ Within Ihe
framework presented by Arnold, issue advocacy can serve as a cue for legislators.
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Angie Garcia, a former Democratic
recalled several instances when interest
able to manipulate the agenda.
counsel to the House Banking Committee,
groups using grassroots and mass media were
he was sensitive toL00^ 0^
Democrats and if some leeil,
insurance companies small busT
he could to help. So ’l guess in tta lim'it' 7 do what
moved the agenda.-
Implicit in Garcia’s description of post-electoral consulting
,s its reliance on
legtslators’ reflexive response to public pressure. What consultants know and many
pohttcans fail to realize is that the outcty created by a direct mailing or a TV commercial
ts an exaggeration of actual public sentiment. The Many and Louise commerctals. for
example, elicited a reaction from legislators that was not commensurate with the scope of
.he ad campatgn. When Rostenkowski lamented that the advertising
“almost destroyed
the process” he is giving too much credit to commercials that only appeared in select
markets. An exasperated Stan Greenberg recalls “doing focus groups on Harry and
Louise and people just hadn’t seen it. Even in the markets where they were targeting
members, people claimed they never saw it.”» Indeed, subsequent analysis conducted by
Kathleen Hall Jamieson argued that the widespread influence of Harry and Louise was an
elaborate hoax “as it evoked little short term recall among viewers.”"
Post-electoral consulting at the legislative level did not emerge in a vacuum. Bill
Mclnturff believes that the cun-ent fascination with issue advocacy in Congress is a result
of the president’s power to control the policy agenda through the mass media.
I think the proliferation of PR campaigns on major public policy issues is
partly in response to the executive control of the bully pulpit. The
president’s natural advantage in communications has forced groups that
disagree with his policies to spend money on professionals. Interest
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groups, for example, that are wnrL-ir,r>
consultants to counteract the inherein pf'd'*'
“ Proposal need
House." advantage owned by the White
The president’s overwheinring nredia presence and his inherent abtlity to capture pubhe
attentton ,s a source of frustration for congressional leaders, part.eularly in titnes of
.vtded government. However, Melnturffs assertion that clever public relat.ons can
cquahze the advantage owned by the pres.dent does not resonate with some
game. G.ngrich tried and for a short wh.le he succeeded, but it was Heeting. Looh what
happened to him in the end. He couldn’t control his members, and he was nearly
toppled.
Mclnturff may have gotten carried away. Congress, for a host of reasons, will
never challenge the executive branch for mass media supremacy. However, he is correct
to suggest that Congress has taken lessons from the executive branch. Two recent
presidents, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, elevated the practice ofcampaign style
leadership to new heights. Reagan was a master at diffusing public opposition through
symbolic gestures. However, the interview subjects claim that Clinton has outdone
Reagan and credit him with intensifying the governing-as-campaigning method. Chip
Khan asserts, “the Clinton administration has set the campaign style approach to
government at a new high. He may be aping Reagan in terms of posturing, but he went
way beyond anything that Reagan did.’’" Dan Meyer came to the same conclusion.
Clinton s ability,” he maintains, “combined with the campaign aspect of his
administration has absolutely led Republicans to increase their communications efforts.
It IS still much more difficult for a legislature to compete with a president, but by using
pros we can mitigate his natural advantage to some degree.
Haphazard regulation of issue advocacy coupled with a virtually unassailable faith
in the power of advertising among political elites has created a vast market for post-
electoral consulting. The desire among some members of Congress to use political
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.he
nature of modern political discourse and
.he entrenchment of mass media politics it is
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.0 assume that experts in political communication such as consultants will
rematn
.nfluent.al figures. The contemporary political era,
.0 paraphrase Steven Medv.c,
rel.es heav.ly on speed and technology with respect
.0 communication. 1
. also places
heavy emphasis on the symbolic that, while present in earlier eras, has no. been as
pervasive as it is in the television age. Both characteristics shift the balance in favor of
professional political consultants who are used .0 the fast pace of a campaign and are
masters of symbolism and evocative imagery.^*
It is pointless to belabor the extent .0 which technological advances in
commun.ca.ions and the proliferation of the mass media have altered the behavior of
elected officials. Suffice to say politicians at virtually every level have gained an
appreciation for the value of public appearance and perception. In Congress, leadership
strategy has changed as a result of a preoccupation with public relations and the mass
media. I. is, for instance, unlikeiy that the leadership wiii prod the members to support a
high profile piece of legislation without proffering a comprehensive sales strategy. Barry
Jackson acknowledges the importance of developing a coherent message:
On lesser issues guys know where they are going to vote. On bigger
issues they may still know where the are going to vote but those issues
tend to become campaign fodder and they usually need thematic cover to
some extent in order to articulate a reason for their constituents. The
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IS very important to the rank and file.”
specific, unified message
Todd Funk, legislative director for Congresswoman Nancy
to a certain degree:
Johnson, agrees with Jackson
limes th reaSSt ^
would use our own pollstem ^0? r
tailored to the district tnh,'^ ‘“P “ specificallya t. So in that respect it is not different.^^
Cultivating a reliable message is a high priority for congressional leaders of both parties
but how elosely do consultants work with congressional leadership offices ,0 craft the
message? During the Contract with America, some journalists attributed its success ,0
.he political consultants who helped develop the marketing strategy, even though the
Ideas espoused in the Contract were based on long-standing conservative principles.
»
The undue credit paid to political consultants was a source of controversy. Dan Meyer
bristled when asked about the media's characterization of the consultants’ relationship
with the Contract:
There is one consultant in particular [Frank Luntz] who has marketed hisinvolvement in the Contract as if he were the sole author and the rest of us
were just waiting around for him to give us our cue and I think that is
outrageous. You have to remember that the conservatives on the Hill
determined the substance of the Contract long ago. What Luntz was used
tor was determining the language with which to sell the ideas.^”
Perhaps owing to the negative attention consultants drew during the 104 "’ Congress, the
House leadership in the lOb'" Congress tried to downplay the presence of consultants.
Ted Van Der Meid claims that the Speaker's office does not use the services of political
consultants.
We don t use them per se. The NRCC hires pollsters and media people to
consult with our offices, but the Speaker never employs outside political
operatives to test issues or what have you. The leadership has a press
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office that takes a lone ranpp nnri q oi ^
people who stage photo ops and wrhrspeecteT'rr®'''
coordinated under the direct.on of the House Republics
Van Der Meid s insistence that consultants are involved only through surrogate
agents such as the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) or the
Repubhcan National Committee (RNC) does not alter the fact that the advice they
provide shapes the way legislators behave. In the 106- Congress, during the contentious
debate over prescription drug coverage for senior citizens, Repubhcan pollster Glen
Bolger contracted with the RNC to evaluate the issue. ,n a memo to House Republicans
Bolger outhned the legislative strategy that they should follow. His memo included
strategic advice, such as gathering support from conservative Democrats so that the plan
would appear to be bi-part.sa„, and tactical advice like the language that Republicans
should use when describing the plan. Bolger’s memo prompted swift action from House
Republicans. In staged media events and press conferences. Speaker Hasten and
Majority Leader Armey used the phrases and descriptions touted by Bolger almost word
for word, causing some reporters and House Democrats to suggest that the Republicans
were following a “poll-tested script.”''^
One of the reasons legislators employ political consultants is to bypass or
penetrate the mainstream mass media. As Timothy Cook explains in Making Lau>s and
Making News, the way the press frames the issue is as important as whether or not it is
covered at all. If the press characterizes a policy option one way early on in the decision-
making process, it is often very difficult for officials to turn that image around to their
preferred perspective.'' Moreover, the way the press covers public policy issues is
similar to the way they cover candidate campaigns. Congressional scholar Thomas Mann
suggests that “reporters now increasingly cover policy battles in Congress and the White
House as campaigns, with the focus on who is winning and losing and on the motives and
machinations of the players, not on the stakes or the choices.”" Media influence on
public policy is so pronounced that some critics have taken to describing it as the fourth
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branch of government. The monolithic presence of tl..
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“®°"'’«^“'”mercial media is a source of
rus ra ton and resentment for some legislators. The House Republicans during the 104'"
Te°dTarZr
^'te^attves to the traditional med.a outlets through outside consultants.
n er e, the method, “what we try to do is bypass the Washington
e .te medta and reach out to the public. We use talk radio and other outlets to work
around trad.t.onal med.a. Consultants are a fixture in this process.- Pohtical
consultants enable politicians,
.n a l.mited fashion, to control the timing and content of
their message.
Republican legislators justify the use of paid media because of their enduring
SUSP,con of a hberal bias in the mainstream media. However, Democrats on the Hill also
employ professional media strategists to promote their polices. The goal, explauted Ben
Goddard, ts universal and non-partisan; you want to create an echo chamber where you
have pa,d media establishing the message and earned media (news repofis, pundits, etc.)
repeat,ng until it becomes a mantra. In this respect, the two major parties have proven
less capable than interest groups. The Harry and Louise campaign is a textbook example
The ads were shown only in a limited market, but they generated such controversy that
media reports began citing the ads, thus amplifying their visibility. The charges made by
the fictitious couple and repeated in the press angered White House officials and
provoked a stern response from the President. President Clinton’s retort inadvertently
gave the ads and the negative message greater notoriety. By the end of the health care
debate, the ads had taken on a near mythic status. A similar ripple took place during the
tort reform debate in the 104'" Congress. Some of the ads sponsored by business groups
became fodder for Sunday morning political talk shows. According to Ben Goddard,
synergy is considered crucial to the overall success of the public relations campaign on
htgh profile issues. Tom Edwards with the eponymous Washington, D.C. media firm
Edwards & Associates concurs, “what you are doing here is sending your message to
those who can retail it to others. This is a wholesale market. The audience you can reach
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- trade associations, news ntedia, international press organ.ations
- can get your
message to the public and the world.
The partisan efforts of poli.iea, consultants in recent Congresses run counter to thejreenary stereotype pronroted in early acadenrie treat,nents of political consulting Dan
Ntnrnro, David Rosenhlootn, and Carry Sahato all deserlHed consultants as urdependent
contractors who thnved due to a eonlluenee of weak political parties and independent
cand,daces. They were aloof to party polities and. although ideology played a role in
chent selection, ntany renra.ned skeptical of party practices and avoided forntal links to
y aders. Recent work by 1 emple University political scientist Robin Kolodny
challenges these assunrptions and establishes strong ties between consultants and political
parties within government.
te?LTf«eir^^^ '»p tnem tocus their message and issue stands with the hope of shorinr^up their strength at election time...Party leaders clearly indicated that {hetraditional feedback loop in the political party was no longer sufficient tomeet their needs. Specialized pollsters and strategists are hired by theparty in government directly to deal with their collective needs "
The party connection described by Kolodny is an important aspect of post-electoral
consulting because it signifies a reliance on outside strategists trusted by party leaders to
supplement the work done by congressional staff. It also indicates a heretofore ignored
degree of party loyalty on the part of political consultants.
In short, it appears post-electoral consulting affects the legislative process in a
variety of ways. Party leaders in Congress employ consultants to articulate poll-tested
phraseology and to develop “thematic cover” for rank-and-file members. Consultants are
also used to develop media strategy on controversial issues or to bypass traditional media
outlets. In addition, as the earlier section discussed, post-electoral consulting offers
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another avenue for interest groups to influence the legislation through direct ntail and
television advertising.
Envirnnn,.„.
The co^nrents ntade by the tnterview subjects coupled with events described in
-he case stud.es is strong evidence that post-electoral consulting
.s not a fleeting or
random phenonrenon.
,f this is true, then the question becon.es what is its effect on the
pchhca, systen.7 Consultants and lobbyists, while eager to recount the.r success stories
a.e re uctant to assess their itnpact on a larger scale. Although they admit their actions
prospects for compromise, no one interviewed was willing to entertain the
poss.b.hty that post-electoral consulting is a threat to the
.ntegrity of the legislative
process. Moreover, the consultants suggested that the academics that have cast
aspersions on their work are either misgu.ded, naive or motivated by a hostile bias against
political practitioners.
In Gomg Public, one of Samuel KemelPs central concerns with the president’s
predilection to use the bully pulpit was its impact on political bargaining. Kernell states,
“to the extent that it [going public] fixes the president’s bargaining position, posturing
makes subsequent compromise with other practitioners more difficult. Because
negotiators must be prepared to yield some of their client’s preferences to make a deal,
bargaining proceeds best behind closed doors.”** Post-electoral consulting raises a
similar concern for legislators. When the interview subjects were asked if they thought
the incorporation of campaign techniques into governing made it harder to achieve
compromise, the response was affirmative. Dan Meyer’s comments are typical:
es It makes it harder. I mean sometimes the public is served by bringing
issues out of the backrooms, but one of the downsides of that is if you take
your case to the public there you have people who have invested in a
particular solution and it makes compromise much more difficult. Public
strategies also benefit junior members and it empowers them, making
compromise with them even more tenuous.'*^
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Stan Greenberg. President Clinton’s fornter pollster concurs
Definitely, going public makes it harHpr i •
compromise. Look at the recent cns^ r
'
™«antngful
have these hyperbolic ad campaigns pL”for
Medicare, but really it is just a shell forle
^
adamantly opposed to anything resemblina nr
® ^re
scare old people and just plain^create mom^'l^nhy^J™'"
Meyer and Greenberg agree, but for different reasons. Meyer claims that the tnclination
o use publtc relattons hinders party leadershtp control over the agenda tn Congress by
creattng “med.a” personalities. Ironically. Meyer’s fornter boss. Newt Gingrich was
constdered by many observers to be a legislator tn that mold. Greenberg focuses his
cnttctsm on the tnflammatory, often mislead.ng, ads designed by consultants. He
belteves that the public debate is sullied by fear mongering tactics.
Bill Mclnturff does not dispute the notion that post-electoral consulting has made
Closed door negotiations more tenuous. However, he views the change as a blessing
rather than a curse.
thine Tt" 1”"' i' « "01 always a badg. ake the catastrophic tnsurance debacle in 1 989. In that instanceCongress passed a bad bill from behind closed doors and when the pubhcound out what tt did they went crazy. It could be argued that all the
rouble would have been avoided if the bill were accompanied by a public
relations campatgm The Harry & Louise case is another good exampleWe had a generic, bland couple sitting there at their kitchL table
discussing the had elements of the Clinton plan. When people took notice
asked their legislators to answer questions, they didn't offer much
response and the public soured on the plan.^'
Mclnturffs self-congratulatory assessment, however, fails to consider the normative
implications of using visceral, emotion-laden rhetoric to trigger latent fears among the
general public. There is a genuine difference between informing people and scaring
them. Moreover, Mclnturff s focus on Harry and Louise conveniently ignores some of
the other less savory ads that ran during the health care debate. Ads that claimed, for
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example, that senior citizens could be iailed fn,- uJ li foi purchasing
“extra” health care or thatpeople would be forced to request nerrmc • f
I,
.
,
^
^ bureaucrat before
changing doctors were outright fabrications.
an exception among the consultants interviewed. Public
re attons he nta.nta.ns, is a symptom of a much larger problem in governance. The root
cause of legislative gridloeh is not advertising or polling, but the mereased level of
parttsanshtp that emerged in the 1980s and 1 990s. Harsh, ideological battles between
conservattve Republicans and Democrats created an atmosphere of mistrust and
an.mos.ty that is wholly unrelated to worh done by political consultants.^ Barry dachson
ongressman John Boehner's chief of staff, shares some of Garin’s doubts.
It [issue campaigning] can have an effect because behind rirr ^
negotiations are only successful based on thr. i ,
Both parties know and accept that there will beIL° kind
spin used on the outside. But when trust is broken then th t!,
"
Strategy can further alienate the negotiators.”
' ^ Pu ic
In response to the same question Ben Goddard offers an expanded interpretation
of post-electoral consulting’s impact:
here are times when it does make compromise more difficult' particularlvwhen pol.cy makers get backed into a public position that tends to limitthetr negot.at.ng room. But by and large, I think that the legislativeprocess hasn t changed that much. It’s still a process of negotiation and
accommodation. What really has changed is that an outside force isavtng a greater impact on legislative decisions. The policy campaign weun with grassroots, earned media, and paid media have changed the^ynamic. There is a whole other leverage point to move Congress. I think
what Harry and Louise have proved is that the most influential lobbyistsdon t live m Washington, D.C., they live out here where the people are.”
One of the common criticisms leveled at political consultants by both academics
and politicians is that post-electoral consulting activity further exacerbates voter cynicism
and saps public faith in our political institutions. Public opinion scholars suggest that
Americans possess a latent distrust of central authority and arc naturally skeptical of
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grand schemes ,o solve complex problems ” During the health care debate, consultantsworhmg agatnst the Clinton plan tapped Into this senttment h. coniurtng up negative
ges an ustng alarmtst narrattves. The result was a debilitating drain of popular
support for the Clinton plan. The conQuita + ’
.
<^’sgusted some public officials
.ncludtng Senator day Rockefeller who railed against negattve issue advocacy
Rockefeller clatmed. “I think that the advertising is probably the most destructtve effort
at can remember tn 30 years political life, at trying to undermine public policy that
.hts country desperately and definitely wants Even consultants who promote new
pohetes cultrvate cynictsm. Communtcattons scholar W. Lance Bennett suggests that
pohttctans- dependence on pohtical consultants feed publtc cynictsm by encouraging the
spread of symbolic politics. Symbolic politics, in Bennen's estimation, fosters cynictsm
because tt masks dtfficult public policy choices with pleasant soundtng, but ultimately
Illusory, soluttons. In other words, modem politics is awash in lofty rhetoric and
engaging tmagery. but short on concrete action.” Rockefeller and Bennett seem to
suggest that consultants are an attenuating force in American politics because they tend to
pander in the lowest common human factor - emotion. The general publtc is not served
by boiling down complicated issues into easy to grasp metaphors and symbols.
Pohtical consultants, not surprisingly, disagree with Senator Rockefeller and W.
Lance Bennett. The consensus among the interview sample is that issue campaigning has
a muffled, imprecise effect on voter attitudes and that, in cases when it does bear fruit, the
consequences are positive. Dan Meyer believes that the American public is served by the
growth and proliferation of issue campaigning.
“I think it’s good for the process,” he
further adds, “I think bringing these decisions out from behind closed doors is good for
democracy. The move to employ grassroots to shape public opinion has helped draw
people into politics.”” Geoff Garin is also quick to defend issue advocacy and post-
electoral consulting. Garin argues, “the truth is that the public is so disengaged from the
policy process that any action that brings knowledge to them is good. Anything that
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penetrates the public consciousness is beneficial ”« r • a >o t . Gann and Meyer promote thepolarizing effects of issue advocacy as a Hp™
ocratic good
- getting more people involvedand aware of the issues. However thev arp • a rc
different to motivate a citizen with a
actionwithfearorange';:
3 j
*at the negativity will linger
leave the citizens with a diminished faith in their elected representatives
^
AS poiitical consultants strengthened their ties with successful clients in office and
n inue to ranch out into lucrative issue advocacy work, critics began to suggest that
the enhanced status of uneleeted political mercenaries posed a threat to democratic
accountability. Charles Lewis, director of the Center for Public Integrity, a non-profit
watchdog group, claimed that political consultants who serve elected officials and private
sector clients simultaneously present a serious conflict of interest.* Lewis’s concern is
echoed by some political scientists who see an inherent elite bias in post-eiectoral
consulting.- The actions of a select number of high profile political consultants such as
Frank Luntz and Dick Morris lend credibility to the afore mentioned criticisms
However, the appearance of impropriety is not proof of corruption. There is no evidence
that consultants en masse have used their influence with political clients to advance the
goals of other private sector groups surreptitiously.
Stan Greenberg was often criticized by Republicans for his overt role in White
House affairs while representing a number of private clients, but he claims his actions
were no different or less ethical than those of ad hoe counselors from an earlier era.“
There is no question that political consultants are playing a role in the
policy process whether they work for interest groups developing ads
1 When 1 worked atthe DNC I advised both the president and Hill Democrats because they
ot trusted me. Now, I am obviously involved in the process and I am
certainly an unelected figure. But there are a lot of unelected figures
including congressional staff, lobbyists, and civil servants that have more
influence than I did. What makes us so different from them?^^
193
or
Greenberg’s comments are self-servinp and i ^
Hi ff ,
® the most important
erence between consultants and other une.ected figures, namely the presence of
uTiTo y.sts for tnstance, do not have to register with the FEC. disclose client lists
submtt to periodic reviews. Nevertheless, Greenberg, basic po.nt ts valtd. There are’
mnumerable unelected figures that contribute to the policy mak.ng process. Furthermore,
obbytng regulations have not altered the publ.c perception of ethical impropriety
wtth regard to elected officials.
,n fact, it has been suggested that the proliferation of
laws governtng contact between lobby.sts and government offictals has created an
^pnmaface evidence of illegal activity. Thus, there is no reason to believe that
tmpostng similar controls on consultants, as James Thurber and Datrell West argue,
would have the desired effect.
The question of elite bias is harder to refute, especially in light of the expenses
tnvolved in conducting a full-scale public relations campaign. PhARMA's S65 mill,on
tnvestment, for example, in a national advertising and educational campaign on a single
tssue is a sobering figure. Chip Kahn, however, believes the concern about elite bias is
mtsplaced. In fact, Kahn submits that the effective use ofcampaign techniques can level
the playing field between two mismatched foes.
ake us for example. The insurance industry is not a minor industry butwe don t have anywhere near the resources of the drug industry. On’the
tssue of senior s drug coverage, the drug industry has staked out a firm
positton because they are very concerned about price controls. But we
ave also gotten a lot of attention on this issue because we have created a
smart, strategically sound public relations campaign. The 900 pound
gorilla IS not always successful in getting attention in a campaign.^’
Tom McCrocklin shares Kahn’s view
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Kahn, MeCrocklin and Me,nturff speak from experience, but their comments focus on the
relattve difference between large and medium size lobbies and fat, to address the
underlying dilemma. Electronic advocacy and issue campaigning is a capita, intensive
process that is not available to a„ political actors. Small groups and disorganized
tnterests have traditionally lost policy battles to larger, better organized adversaries
Critics fear, however, that the ascendance of post-electoral consulting will make the
natural advantage owned by moneyed interests more pronounced since they will be able
to disseminate their message to a larger audience. Groups working against the Clinton
health care plan, for example, outspent their opposition by a 4 to I margin.'" “It’s a
variation of the .same old story,” claims Angie Garcia, “groups with the cash come in and
try to cajole, plead, or bully members. But now it’s much worse because they can use
their money to move public opinion or create false impressions of popular support.”'’
Consultants answer their academic critics with equal parts indignation and
condescension. According to Bill Meinturff, political scientists will never embrace
consultants because consulting work does not fit into academic paradigms.
Political scientists are sensitive to our effect on their work. They operate
with this elaborate fiction of the political process and consultants tend to
screw up their contrived models of legislative behavior. I also think that
they view our work as a corruption of the established theory of interest
group pluralism - that is groups competing with each other to influence
policy m a system of checks and balances. What we do somehow
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personally think it upsets them to see their
Geoff Garin echoes Meinturff s disdain for political science
we do. We don’tyntmi™nto*TpoM misconstrue what
truth is a lot of what we do 0^0?^^! ? 'he
bring it to bear on the policy making preess ’’ThereT'""’"’ r
'
populist about what we do and I Hn ti • i ^
^o^^iething very
populist outlook.”
' have a very
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Consultants, as a group, exhib.t a great deal of self-assurance. Accord,ng toJames Thurber’s study of the profession, over half of the consultants he surveyed
belteved that they had a significant to fair amount of influence on the public policy
agenda tn the United States.’^ Legislators and interest groups also have a high degree of
confidence ,n the powers of political consultants and some of the praise is justified.
just the past few years, consultants have left their mark on a range of policy issues
.ncluding Medicare reform, trade with China, and electric utility deregulation. However
as Paul Herrnson points out. practitioners and clients tend to exaggerate the value of
professtonal consulting.
“Consultants have a built in incentive to inflate their role After
all. many consultants spend nearly as much time marketing their services as they do
working on political campaigns."” Meanwhile, their clients put an inordinate amount of
faith in a strategy that is difficult to evaluate (how do they know that a Senator changed
h,s position because of a television commercial or a direct mailing?)
Once health care refom, was officially removed from the congressional agenda in
1994. an embittered Hillary Clinton in an interview with the Ne. York Times shared her
conviction that health care was defeated by a coordinated assault of paid media and direct
mail. She was utterly convinced that television commercials like Harry and Louise had
turned the tide against health reform. However, in her book-length post-mortem of the
Clinton plan, Theda Sckopol cautioned against placing blame (or credit depending on
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u
^’‘Pl^'tulions that point to advcrtisimt
r,ues, are ,lih and u„sat.sf,in, because they dintinish tnsti.uuonal factors and oiher'
-enstonsofthepuhltcdehateover
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PC . tea consultants were influential figures during the health care debate, but even slnte
consultants believe their actions have been tahen out of content.
.^Harry and houise
states Geoff Gann, “has taken on conrpletel, ntythical power. 1 think the intpact is
’
ove^tated. The failure of health care refomt - if you listed the reasons for failure - Harry
and Louise would be far down the list
Hillary Clinton’s condemnation of political consultants is an understandable if
dtsproporttonate, reaction. Whether Harry and Lou.se defeated health care reform l.ke
nafional level, poht.cal eonsuitants have become indispensable advisors to decis.on
makers on major poliey matters. Furihermore, public relations, advertising, direct mail
and polhng are w.dely accepted methods used by interests groups to effect public policy.
In short, the focus on Harry and Louise is trivial h.r r,ui IS trivial by comparison to the change in interest
group and legislative behavior.
A similar evaluation can be made with respect to the Contract with America.
Consultant involvement with the Contract from its genesis as a campaign document to its
metamorphosis into legislation was manifest. It would be a gross exaggeration to credit
political consultants with the successes won by the House Republicans. Yet, GOP
consultants were instrumental m crafting the language used to sell Republican policies,
and their Democratic counterparts were equally valuable in the pitched battle to stall the
agenda. Consultants on both sides of the political
.spectrum helped the leadership of both
parties in Congress develop strategy and provided crucial political intelligence. In spite
of their undeniable presence, I believe that academic critics who single out consultants for
approbation are selectively interpreting the historical record. Political consultants should
not be elevated over unelected actors in the political drama. Conservative think tanks
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owever, given the testimony ofin erview subjects and the burgeoning source of seconda^ material, it seems that
post-electoral consulting is not a curiosity or a faddish response to political fashion. Post-
e ectora, consulting is a relatively new phenomenon as demonstrated by comparing the
edicare case study with case studies taken from the 1 990s. Publie relations and opinion
polling were present during the fight to pass Medicare, but the actions described in the
Clinton health care reform and Contract with America case studies are so different in
degree as to be different in kind. In both instances, the crucial difference was the
presence of professional political consultants and the incorporation of campaign-style
tactics into public policy making. I, would be specious to suggest that slick packaging
and poll-tested vocabulary supercede traditional, recognizable features of the legislative
process such as committee work, face-to-face lobbying, and interaction between the
executive and legislative branches, but it would not be an exaggeration to claim that
political leaders are just as concerned with selling a policy as they are with developing it.
The final chapter will cover some of the normative implications concerning the
ascendance of the permanent campaign and the position political consultants now occupy
in the legislative process. In addition, it will offer speculation on the future of post-
electoral consulting in such areas as initiatives and referendum and in new
communications mediums such as the Internet.
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Consultants are the shamans in the nolitiral t u u
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Nicholas Lemann
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
During one of the tnterviews for this project, I was pressed repeatedly by a
pohbcal consultant for assurance that his comments would not appear, as he put it in
some hatchet job magazine expose. His concern, he said, was based on a prior
experience where comments he had made in confidence to a researcher later surfaced ,n
an unflattering article. He further stated Uor nn that he was reluctant to do interviews because
“we [pohtical consultants, always get bad press.- It is iromc that these self-proclaimed
pubhc relations experts should suffer from such a poor public image. Consultants claim
that their unsavory reputation is due. in pan, to sensational press repons that alternately
ponray them as dirty tricksters or immoral manipulators. Two prime examples come to
mind immediately. Ed Rollins and Dick Morris. Rollins was excoriated by reporters for
hts underhanded attempt to suppress the black vote in a New Jersey campaign and Morris
was lampooned for his infamous telephone conversation with President Clinton while in
bed with a prostttute. The negative image is reinforced by Hollywood as the movie
industry faithfully casts consultants as cynical, soulless villains in political films.' The
academic literature on political consulting, unlike the popular press, offers a well-
rounded portrait of the profession, with more detail than the caricature drawn by the mass
media and the entertainment industry. However, scholars share some of the popular
disdain for political consultants. Indeed, some authors blame them for the proliferation
of a host of ills in the democratic process such as the cost of conducting a campaign and
the vicious tenor of political advertising.^
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,s because few people have stud.ed the subject. Although a few scholars
r .e pohtica. sole ce
of pontlca, eon,sultn,.By latter part of.he l.SOs and ear, H,90s, poh.ical consulting had established t.self
:
^7 - --- --S.S began to pay closer at.en.ton tonsul ants nte.hods and the.r i„nuence over candidates.^ Now, scholars are reeti,i„g
.He earIter oversight and are addressing pertinent questions such as what is the tnrpac. ofpo . teal consultants on congressional canrpaigns, what is their relationship with the
poHtica, parties, and what is their role ,n the growing trend of direct denrocracy (, e
referendunrs and tnt.ia.ive canrpaigns).’ Increased acadenric curios., about political
consulting has produced a robust body of literature in a relative, short time
Nevertheless, one notable blindspo. has persisted. The vast nrajori, of books and
arttcles analyzing political consulting, whether impressionistic or empirical, remain
focused on the consultants’ natural milieu - campaigns. Over the pas. decade political
consultants transcended the artificial boundary of candidate campaigns and have begun to
explore opportunities in issue advocacy work; essentially managing a campaign around
an Idea instead of a candidate. In addition to the new ventures, a significant number of
consultants have reinvented themselves as policy advisors and continue to counsel their
pohttcal clients once in office, providing tactical advice and plotting strategy. The
purpose of this study has been to cast some light on the expanded role political
consultants play in the policy making process after the election.
The penetration of political consulting into the policy making process is more
than a curiosity or a passing political fad. Post-electoral consulting represents a
fundamental change in how legislators and interest groups attempt to move a policy
agenda and engage the general public. As the campaign methods and taelics introduced
by consultants gain favor with relevant political actors, lawmaking begins to take on the
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argue, further t,p the balance in favor of privileged interests by using their
communication expertise and mastery over political svmhni ' fo y bolism to manipulate public
policy debates.^
From an historical standpoint, stumping for a new policy or an important piece of
legtslatton ts a commonplace occurrence in American politics. During the 20"' century,
presidents used the bully pulpit to stir up public opinion with regularity. In 1919 for
example. President Woodrow Wilson exhausted himself until he suffered a stroke while
conducting a whistle-stop campaign for public support of the League of Nations.
Advances in communications technology, most notably the invention of television,
enabled future presidents to “campaign” without leaving the confines of the White
House. Members of Congress, while not as ambitious as the president, have also toured
locales and appeared on TV in an effort to create a groundswell behind a new idea.
During the 1980s, former New Hampshire Senator Warren Rudman traveled the country
trying to galvanize the public around the issue of deficit reduction. Yet, the current
situation is distinguished from past examples of public outreach by the presence of
professional campaign operatives and pollsters. In the modern era, television
commercials, direct mail appeals and other forms of political advertising coordinated by
political consultants are used to exhort the public to support or oppose policy proposals.
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.n.rodueea us .o “Flo”, a sp.y eUerly laay who was adan.an.iy opposedbig govemmenl” inlerference in heallh care.’
The aifferenee Helween
.He pas. and
.He presen. is Hes. underslood Hy comparing
lawmaking prior lo Ihe advenl of Ihe nerman^„,tn p enl campaign and ihe involvemenl of
political consullanls
.0 con.emporary examples. Ail
.Hree case s.udies exHihi. fea.ures
typically associaled wi.h lawmaking
-fevered lobbying by interest group, tedious
committee work, back channel negotiations between
.he president and members of
Congress, and horse trading among legislators. Ye., in .he two modem examples the
Contract with America and the Clinton health care reform effort, there was a great
emphasis on marketing and selling the policies. The elevated status of political
marketing (hence the need for political consultants) can be attributed
.0 two basic
changes in American politics. First, the ascendance of television and the corresponding
explosion in mass media outlets has altered the way politicians engage in policy debates
and communicate with the general public. Spreading information through television
often necessitates the use of experts that are familiar in the subtleties and quirks of the
medium. Second, and related to the first, today there Is a more concerted effort on the
part of policy makers and interest groups to draw the public into the policy battle.
Interest groups and politicians spend a significant amount of time and money in an
attempt to mobilize public opinion. Consultants, by virtue of their campaign pedigree,
have the requisite experience and background to serve as interlocutors of policy
messages. Thus, the triumph of mass media politics coupled with a desire on the part of
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two later examples. In 1 964pnncpa, actors respons.ble for Medicare were indifferent to public relations
'
egottanons and legislative haggling were concentrated among a select group of
awmakers and the president. Neither the pres.dent nor congressional leaders expressed
an
.nterest tn soliciting public support through public relahons. Meanwhile, interest
g
jps focused thetr energ.es on tradt.ional
“inside” lobbying. Political advert.sing, what
-ntle there was, had no discernible impact on the outcome. Contras, the Med.care
expenenee with the Chnton health care reform effort, where legislators and White House
offictals seemed preoccupied with public perception and distracted by political ads
Interest groups, complemented their usual lobbying approach with an expensive
outstde” strategy, channeling millions of dollars through high-priced political
consultants in the hopes of influencing the debate.
Wha.Hasl,w.„.,„u.n
Political consultants did not create the conditions that have made them valuable
assets tn policy debates.
,t would be more accurate to describe them as beneficiaries of a
new trend ,n politics. However, the fact that they are not responsible for how post-
electoral consulting came to pass, does not mean that they are absolved from the
consequences their actions have on the legislative process. In chapter 1 , 1 suggested that
the use of political consultants in an advisory capacity could adversely impact the
chances for legislative compromise. The partisan attacks, the inflammatory advertising,
and the public grandstanding urged on by political consultants can compromise
bargaining opportunities. The events chronicled in the Contract with America and the
Clinton health care reform case studies, supplemented with commentary from interview
subjects, support this line of reasoning. President Clinton and the First Lady committed
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nal leaders in both parties to bolster their message strategy and theme
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.es.ed phrases and eampaign-s.yle bromides. There were moments during the
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Congress when it seemed that staying on message and attacking the opposition took
precedence over the substantive details of governing.’
“The real problem.” claims Batry
Jackson, “is that the people in the committee rooms, working out the details oflegislative
compromtse do not trust one another. And part of the mistrust stems from the overt
pohncal, public gamesmanship that you see on television.” Jackson further states that
“political consultants have helped elected officials feel more comfortable with attack.ng
the opposition through the press and through paid media.”'"
It should come as no surprise that political consultants first instinct when
confronted with an adversary is to attack. Political consultants’ perception of politics is
shaped by competitive elections and their responses are honed under the duress of a
campaign. A campaign is a high stakes conflict in which there are clear winners and
clear losers; it is not an intellectual exercise, like lawmaking, where the outcome is
shaped by collaboration as well as combat. According to Thomas Mann, “campaigning
and campaigners use the language of war - opponents are enemies to be vanquished.
Policy makers use the language of negotiation - today’s adversaries may be tomorrow’s
allies. Thus, a consultant s initial inclination is to simplify the policy making process
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Chnton sugges.ed with respec.
.0 heal.h care, hu.
.hey have succeeded in making a
tenuous si.ua.ion more difficul. hy champion.ng
.he w.nner-.ake-ali campa.gn e.h.e.
Ano.her serious concern raised by .he in.roduc.ion of consul.an.s
.0 .he
policymaking process s.ems from
.he sui.abili.y of .heir me.hods in a governing con.ex..
Is
.. proper .0 s.imula.e
.he general public wi.h inflamma.oo' ads and direc. mail appeals?
It .s ques.ionable whe.her
.he public discourse is enhanced or whe.her people are made
more aware of policies, as some consul.an.s claim, by boiling complex social problems
down .0 a 30 second commercial or a .wo-pagc color mailing. As for opinion polls and
focus groups, .he pseudo-scien.ifie au.hori.y ves.ed in polls.ers by o.her polifical ac.ors is
an exaggeraiion of .heir abili.ies. Given the obvious
.echnical lirniiations of polls and in
particular focus groups, there is good reason to fear their use in making policy.
When seholars criticize political advertising, and by proxy political consultants,
the linkage they often seek to establish is between public cynicism and advertising. ''
Since the 1950s, political scientists have watched public confidence in government
plummet along with levels of public participation. Voting in national elections has
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dropped from 61
.6 percent of the elieihlp iP 1952 to 49 percent in 1996
‘'^Ina d..,o„ a„„., Oa,.p
..e.
.ow
.Ha. paHHc
..as. .a .He ,ove™,.e„.. a.H.,
.0scve „a..oaa, p.oH,ea.s Has
.ecHaea s.ea.,
.He pas. 3S ,ea.s,.‘ Wa.al ^
nowIedgeaMe oHse.e.s, adven.sing,
.„ pan.ula.
..ega.ive ads, feed puHHe cy,.,cis,„ Hyemphasizing public doubts and creatine an atm u r
^
g a.mosphere of dis.rus.. The Harry and Louise
co™n,erc.a,s, for e.a.p,e, drove Ho.e.Hen.essa.eof.He„n.as.^
cunrHerson.e, invasive en.i.y
.Ha. was Hound
.„ screw up An.erican Heai.H care. Even
.f’
.s crmcsm
.s jus.,f.ed,
.he blanke. condemna.ion of governmen. I.ngers and fos.ers a
wellofpermanen.dis.rus.inallgovernmen.ac.ions
a a-^ ernmen. aeons. According
.0 Tom McCrocklin a
o y.s. for .He insurance indus.iy, is fair .0 say
.Ha. mos. of .he advocacy advenising
OU.
. ere
.s designed ,0 pu. .he fear of God in .he average ci.izen. ,fyou made
.hem [.he
cnizens, mad or scared,
.hen youTe halfway home .0 crea.ing a grassrools movemen. -
t should He noled
.ha. poli.ica, consuUan.s are no, w.llfully
.ryi„g rum our puHhc fai.h
m our pohlica, ins.i.u.ions.
,n fa«,
, sunuise ,ha. mos. consuhan.s would be appalled a.
such a sugges,.on.'» None.heless, one of .he long-range consequences of mass media and
direc, mail assaul.s on policy proposals may be ,0 accelera.e
.he erosion of public
confidence in the democratic process.
People who cling ,0 .he ideal of sober-minded, articula.e and ra.ional public
deba.es will always view poli.ical consuhan.s wilh a jaundiced eye. Yel, poli.ical
consullanls will be .he firs, ,0 admi, ,ha, ihey are no, responsible for civic educalion.
They are hired experts who are expected to present their clients’ positions in as strong
and persuasive a manner as possible. If this means leaving out some pertinent facts or
slanting the nama.ive ,0 favor
.he client, so be i,. According James Thurber’s survey of
political consultants, an overwhelming number (97.5%) indicated that it was clearly
unethical to make statements in political advertisements that were factually untrue. The
sample was less decisive about other tactics, such as taking facts out of context (25.5%
thought it was unethical) and using ads to frighten voters (14% thought it was unethical
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and 36.5% thought it was acceptable Th„rk.
are important and telling I„some cases, using facts out context nr
^
t o fabncattng public alarm with scare tactics can bejust as corrosive to the Dublin i
^
Informing the elderly, for
example, that they could be nut in im'i r u
health care under President
Clinton s plan does not enhance the public debate.
politicians’ unshakeable addiction to polling has been
sected, analyzed, and critiqued a,„,useu„ by scholars. A substant.a, body of worh
explores the issue from a philosophical vantage point and addresses broad socio-political
questions about the role of public opinion in a representative democracy.® I would
prefer to avoid recapping the ratified theoret.cal debate and instead concentrate on more
pedestnan, but equally relevant, concerns. ,n particular, the utility of using polls to plot
policy strategy. Relying too much on polls gives rise to a strain of political myopia
where everything is viewed through a short-term lens. Large-scale problems with vast
implications for future generations begin to be defined by the immediacy of public
reaction. Reforming massive public benefit programs such as Social Security or
Medicare, for example, will require long-range strategies. In fact, it is possible that
protecting the continued viability of redistributive programs like Social Security will
depend on unpopular short-tenn sacrifices. Using polls to chart a public policy course
could prematurely limit options. As for focus groups, the potential danger is greater.
Ever since famed sociologist Robert Merton introduced focus groups to American
politics m the 1950s, they have been misused and inappropriately eited on a consistent
basis. Supporters fancy them as an effective way to solicit in depth responses from “real
people.” Conventional wisdom has it that they are a good way for a politician to flavor
his message with vocabulary that appeals to average citizens. It is, however, impossible
to generalize the results of focus groups to the at-large populace.^' Politicians who claim
to have discovered the voxpopuli through focus groups are deceiving themselves.
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EE S htT' When•E. cha„schn,eden wno.e T,eWW.,„
.enp/e, his inenchan. cnii.ne of
A™e„eans,,ep,.a..s.po,hies,hec,a™ed.ha.o„eor.hee„«
PC ...es .as ,ha.
.n.nes, ,onp achvh, was do.inaied h. eiiies. As he pn. i. eoio.n,,
c e The has.s Pen SehaiischneideEs cHiicisn. has no. ehanged oven
.he yeans
ac
, e use of fon-pnof„ campaign pnofessionals on behalf of panochial in.enes.s bols.ens
H.S conlenuon of eh.e bias. Hining a ba..e.y of poli.ica, consuhanis
.0 eoond.na.e a pubhc
re a .ons campaign
.s a cap,.al-m.ensive pnocess. Undenfunded in.enes, gnoups, which
me u e almost all gnoups with the exception of big business and labon, ane nanely able to
a ond consultants. It is a variation of the pnoblem with candidate campaigns whene he
resenves (t.e. the dnug industny on the AFL-CIO) ane able to dnown out othen voices by
pound,ng out a message thnough paid media.“ Aside from amplifying the message
political consultants advise thein clients on how to frame thein angumen. so .hat it appeals
.0 the genenal public. The ability of moneyed intenests
.0 tell a compelling stony and
spnead it anound to as many people who ane willing to listen does not ensune that they will
win the angument. ,f money always detenmined the outcome of a policy debate, as Bill
Meintunff cogently pointed out, then big tobacco would have nothing to fean from poonly
funded anti-smoking enusadens. Yet, the imbalance that Schattschneiden identified forty
yeans ago between nich and poon intenests nemains a valid criticism.^'' Given the events
described in the case studies and the comments made by the interview subjects, it is
reasonable to suggest that political consultants widen the disparity by putting their talents
to work for wealthy groups.
The marriage of interest groups and political consultants appears to have the
hallmarks of a lasting partnership based on mutual need and benefit. Interest groups,
generally speaking, have a narrow focus and a strong desire to see their issue(s)
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addressed favorably by the government r
backroom deal' . • "'-''ghmg an mside lobbying, but increasingly organized interests are turning
— campaigns and public relations to pressure legislators. Wdmg to intere
.cup scholar Ken Kollman, there are two bas.e reasons for the addition of an outside
smategy
..outside lobbying accomplished two tasks simultaneously, hirst, at the elite
old' rb7"‘“"
”
~ OP
ying
- publicizing issue positions, mobilizing constituents to contact
ongress. protesting or demonstrating
- have the common purpose of trying to show
PC icy makers that people really do care about some relevant policy issue.
.The second
role for outside lobbying is to influence public opinion by changing how selected
constituents consider and respond to policy issues.’- Some groups can sponsor
grassroots by relying on large, diffuse membership. But for groups with small of
ineffectual numbers, political consultants play a decisive role in crafting an effective
outside strategy. Political consultants can create the impression that there is an
overwhelming public sentiment supporting their client’s position.
The Future of Post-Electoral Consultinp
In a relatively short time, political consultants have successfully migrated from
candidate-centered campaigns to issue advocacy work and policy advising. In doing so
.hey have established a solid beachhead within the legislative process. But wha, does the
future hold for post-electoral consulting? Several of the consultants interviewed for this
project were intrigued by the possibilities offered by the Internet. Ben Goddard was
particularly enthusiastic about connecting television and print ads to an interactive
website where visitors could find out more information about an issue and dash off an
email to their congressman.^’ Indeed, the latest ad campaign sponsored by Citizens for a
Better Medicare touts its web address as a place where seniors can get the ’‘facts” about
prescription drugs and learn how to get involved.’* Several political consultants also
mentioned statewide initiatives and referendum campaigns as an area with tremendous
to
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growth potential. In the early 1930s in Califnm-
Baxter solH,h- •
"
consultants Whitaker*
.etr servtces to groups with hallot interests.^^ The inherttors of the Whitaker
axter trad.t.on have tunred hallot drives tnto a lucrative trade. his latest hook
dtscusstng the proliferation of lawmaking via pleb.scite, Dav.d Broder writes
cam^aTgTelsLtaitl^^^^^^^^ '‘“'^crs and
their services to affluent interest
piayers sell
private policy and political aBentETTl”'^
millionaire do-gooders with
.he state whose lawTi ‘rconStls th'ev
” f™'"
that the initiative is a far more effret'
^ are rewriting - have learned
the cumbersome process of sunnnrt' j
achieving their ends than
then lobbying toZ or slnTe P““>c office and
Broder’s disdain for political consultants and his alarm over their unfettered
expansion, is based in his belief that the integrity of representative democracy is under
stege by political professionals. Broder certainly overstates the ease, but his suspicions
of the permanent campaign are not unfounded. Broder’s concerns about false populism
and manufactured public sentiment are not new. In fact, they are as old as the Republic.
In the Federalist Papers, James Madison devotes a substantial portion of his writing
wrestling with the dilemma of public opinion and the role that the public should play in
governing. Madison was clearly concerned about the ascendancy of passion over reason
and m his defense of the republican concept he expressed ambivalence for popular
control public policy. He was truly committed to the democratic process and believed
in connecting the decisions of elected officials to the people through regularly scheduled
elections. Yet, his trust in public wisdom was far from complete. In his writings he
cautions his fellow citizens not to trade one form of bad government (constitutional
monarchy) for another (despotism masquerading as plebiscite). He believed, with good
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reason, that linking elected officials too closely to fickIP h- c
Madtson’s concerns arc just as relevant today, perhaps even more so consideringnrodem pohtieians. access to political consultants and pollsters. Mad,son. admoniti;
a13
“"'
" consulting isman, cstaUon of two core premises. First, that public perception is more important than
n proceed. Post-electoral consulting champions the introduction ofcampaign log,c andS rategy ,nto the governing process. Earlier in the study,
,t was stated that polittcal
prac.,t,oncrs v,ew acadcnic efforts to distinguish campaign activity form governurg as a
contnvance that docs not ex,st ,n the real world. To a limited degree they are correct.
ected officals rarely make important decisions without calculating the impact in the
next elecon. However, it ,s folly ,o suggest that differences between campatgning and
Soveming are the product of scholarly imagination or that campaigning and governing
are fu„g,ble terms without meaningful distinction. As the Contract with America and the
Chnton health reform illustrated, the wholesale tmportation of campaign strategy and
campatgn experts has relevant consequences for lawmaking. To claim otherw,se is to
Ignore the facts. Using political consultants to plot strategy, to craft the vocabulary and
,be the pohey, and to engage ,n pa,d media warfare over the support of the
American public is a new way to inftuence legislation.
The real danger presented by the transformation of pollsters and consultants to
policy advisors is that the other politieal aetors - namely interest groups and elected
officals
-will absorb the campaign ethic that motivates consultants and begin viewing
the legislative process as a grand game to be won or lost. Campaigns are often about
appearance and showmanship, policymaking should not be. The public does not benefit
from empty sloganeering and focus group-tested messages. Americans do not gain a
valuable perspective when complex policy problems such as health care or tort reform are
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reduced ,o folksy
„a.a.ives or enro.iona, nretaphors. For Feuer or worse, poHUca,
consul.ants are already established
•kingmakers” in .he elec.ora, process. A, .bough they
may never occupy a s.m.lar station in the policy reaim, the experience of the 1990s
suggests that they will be a lasting addition to the legislative process.
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APPENDIX: THE INTERVIEW SUBJECTS
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